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ABSTRACT 
 
For the 2009 elections, Indonesia implemented a gender quota provision that 
required political parties to have one woman for every three candidates on party 
lists. The quota was designed for a semi-open list electoral system where elected 
candidates are determined by their rank of order on party lists. However, just 
months before the 2009 elections, the Constitutional Court overturned the 
formula for electoral victory, transforming Indonesia’s electoral system from using 
semi-open party lists to (fully) open party lists.  
 
This study investigates how the gender quota was implemented and how the 
Constitutional Court’s decision impacted on women’s representation in the Bantul 
and Yogyakarta City district parliaments. It asks what is the role of the women’s 
movement in promoting gender quotas, as well as in the investigating the 
socioeconomic and cultural factors that influenced the success and failure of 
women candidates in the two selected districts.  
 
Data collection for this research was done through one-on-one interviews and 
focus group discussions with women candidates and a series of interviews with 
Electoral Commission members, political party leaders, women’s organisations 
and a judge of the Constitutional Court in Jakarta. Secondary data was collected 
from the Electoral Commission, online literature and from other organisations.  
 
This study found that while the Indonesian women’s movement worked effectively 
with Government agencies and women politicians to legislate the gender quota, 
they were unable to persuade the Constitutional Court of the importance of the 
 vi 
semi-open list system for increasing women’s representation. The research also 
found that political parties that act as gatekeepers for the recruitment, selection 
and placement of candidates on party lists, and as such, play a pivotal role in the 
successful implementation of the gender quota, treated the gender quota as a 
tick-a-box exercise. Additionally, a lack of meaningful sanctions meant that 
parties, primarily large and established parties more likely to achieve the electoral 
quotient and have candidates elected, were able to campaign in the elections 
even though they had not met the quota. This study found that Constitutional 
Court’s decision itself did not significantly decrease the proportion of women in 
parliament, but it did make the campaign very costly and difficult for women, 
particularly those with domestic responsibilities and limited financial resources.   
 
This research concludes that the Constitutional Court’s decision to change the 
formula for electoral victory combined with the lack of meaningful sanctions 
resulted in the gender quota losing its effectiveness. In order for Indonesia to 
meet its international obligations to advance women’s political rights, Indonesia’s 
gender quota needs to be modified to suit the new open list system. This needs 
to be combined with an increased commitment from political parties to gender 
equality, increased resources and support for women candidates and voter 
education. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Gender quotas to increase women's political representation have been endorsed 
by a number of international organisations and agreements as important 
measures to remove discrimination against women in political life and to promote 
gender equality more broadly. For example, the United Nations through the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), an international treaty adopted in 1979, commits signatories to ‘take 
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
political and public life of the country’ (Part II Article 7). In its 1997 General 
Recommendation concerning Article 7 the CEDAW Committee made it clear that 
‘appropriate measures’ included the use of quotas (Schopp-Schilling 2004). 
Meanwhile, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) adopted at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995, calls for Governments to:  
 
Commit themselves to establishing the goal of gender balance in 
governmental bodies and committees, as well as in public 
administrative entities, and in the judiciary, including, inter alia, 
setting specific targets and implementing measures to 
subsequently increase the number of women with a view to 
achieving equal representation of women and men, if necessary 
through positive action, in all governmental and public 
administration positions (190a).  
 
 2 
These international agreements have provided a basis for international 
organisations such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA) and numerous non-government organisations 
(NGOs) to lobby and promote gender quotas to governments and political parties.  
 
As a result of this support and associated campaigns, there is now a global 
movement to introduce quota systems to improve women's political 
representation. Over 100 countries now have some form of quotas, a more than 
fourfold increase since 1980 (Krook 2009). This increase in quota implementation 
is accompanied by an increase in women's political representation as shown by 
Table 1. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), as at October 2014, 
women made up an average of 21.8 percent of both upper and lower houses 
combined across the world. This is almost double compared to January 1997 of 
11.7 percent. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of women in parliament in selected countries before and after 
the implementation of gender quotas 
 
Country 
Year Percentage of 
Women’s 
Representation 
Before the Quota 
Percentage of 
Women’s 
Representation After 
the Quota 
Argentina 1991 6 34 
Belgium 1994 12 35 
Germany 1996 18 33 
Rwanda 2003 18 49 
South Africa 2006 4 25 
Sweden 1972 14 45 
 
 
 
 
In 2003, after several years of advocacy by the Indonesian women's movement, 
the Indonesian Government legislated gender quotas. Initially however, this 
legislation only meant that political parties could voluntarily implement a quota of 
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at least 30 percent of women on party lists. In 2008, the women's movement 
succeeded in expanding the gender quota provision to become a requirement for 
political parties both for party lists and party leadership, and a consideration for 
membership selection of the Electoral Commission (KPU). 
 
Following the legislation of gender quotas in 2008, a proposal was put forward by 
several legislative candidates to the Indonesian Constitutional Court to review the 
formula for electoral victory. Whereas in previous elections, electoral victory in 
the multi-member electorates was based on rank order on party lists 1  the 
proposal requested that the Court consider suara terbanyak (largest number of 
votes) as an alternative formula for determining electoral victory. Under this 
electoral formula, the candidate that receives the most votes (regardless of his or 
her rank order on the party list) is elected. With submission of this proposal just 
months after the new gender quota legislation and only months before the 2009 
district elections, the women's movement was caught off-guard. The movement 
was busy undertaking voter education and believed that the proposal would not 
pass. They were wrong, with the Court deciding to implement suara terbanyak 
for the 2009 elections. The Court's decision changed the “rules of the game”, thus 
requiring new campaign strategies from candidates and their parties. The Court's 
decision also impacted on the effectiveness of the newly legislated gender quotas 
(Sherlock 2009).  
 
This research examines how the implementation of the gender quota and 
Indonesian electoral laws, especially the 2008 Constitutional Court’s decision on 
                                                 
1 This means if a candidate was placed in the top position of the party list and the party received 
enough votes to meet the electoral quotient, the top ranked person won a parliamentary seat. If 
the party received two times more votes than the electoral quotient, then the top two candidates 
on the party list were elected, and so on. See Chapter Two for further information.   
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formula for electoral victory, impacted on women's representation in two district 
parliaments in the 2009 elections. This research will also uncover what other 
factors influenced the success and failure of women candidates to win seats in 
district parliament.  
 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
Supporters of gender quotas argue that women, who constitute over half of the 
population, need to be equally represented in parliament in order for it to have 
democratic legitimacy (Dahlerup 2007). This argument is based on the premise 
that women bring different perspectives and experiences to parliament, tend to 
voice women's interests and advocate for gender responsive policies. Wahida 
Siregar's (2007) research on women in Indonesia's national and sub-national 
parliaments found that women Members of Parliament (MPs) regularly advocated 
for issues relevant to women. For example, women MPs in the East Java 
Provincial Parliament succeeded in advocating for a local regulation on the 
protection of women and children victims of violence. Initially the bill was rejected 
by most of the men MPs, but then women MPs worked together to lobby and 
convince their male counterparts.  
 
In recognition of the importance of increasing women's political representation, 
there is a growing number of studies on the use of gender quotas and women's 
representation in Indonesian parliaments. To date however, most of this research 
is either conducted at the national level, or if undertaken at local levels, focuses 
only on a limited number of variables influencing women's representation. Four 
examples include:  
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 Davies’ (2005) chronicle of women and politics in Indonesia post BPFA 
found that inspite of the Indonesian Government’s commitment to 
implement BPFA, the proportion of women in the national parliament in the 
2004 elections did not increase despite it being the first time a gender 
quota was implemented. Davies’ (2005) study did not discuss the role of 
the electoral system as an influential factor in increasing women’s 
representation in parliament.  
 Sharon Bessell's 2010 study on gender quotas in Indonesia focused on 
women's representation in the national parliament between 2003 and 
2008. As a desk review, Bessell's (2010) study did not examine women 
candidate's experiences of campaigning under the new quota legislation 
implemented in the 2009 elections.  
 Usu (2010) compared the implementation of gender quotas on campaign 
lists in the national parliament in the 2004 and 2009 elections. Usu's 
(2010) research did not include how the judicial review of the 2008 
Elections Law (Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, dan Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah, Law No 10/2008) influenced the implementation and 
effectiveness of gender quotas in the 2009 election from the perspective 
of women candidates and political parties.  
 Hana Satriyo's (2010) study on local executive elections focused on how 
women candidates dealt with barriers to running for office at the sub-
national level. Given that gender quotas are not used in executive 
elections, Satriyo's (2010) study did not assess how the combination of 
the gender quota with the electoral system impacted on women's 
experiences of running for government.  
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While the Davies, Bessell, Usu and Satriyo studies make important contributions 
to the literature, these studies did not examine in any great detail how the 
electoral legislation, in particular the Constitutional Court's decision to implement 
suara terbanyak as the formula for electoral victory, impacted on women's 
campaigns and chances of success. This thesis intends to address that 
knowledge gap.  
 
In addition to contributing to the literature, it is expected that the results of this 
research will provide a platform for women candidates, political parties and 
women's NGOs to review and adjust their strategies in electoral campaigns with 
the ultimate goal of increasing women's representation in Indonesian 
parliaments.  
 
1.3 INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite democracy prevailing in most countries around the world, women's 
representation in all forms and at all levels of government remains low. As noted 
earlier, IPU data from October 2014 reveals that women's representation in 
parliaments around the world is an average of 21.8 percent. Countries such as 
Rwanda and Sweden have some of the highest percentages of women's 
representation in parliament at 63.8 percent and 43.6 percent respectively. 
However, one fifth of the 188 countries for which the IPU has data have less than 
10 per cent of women among their parliamentarians, with Micronesia, Palau, 
Qatar and Vanuatu having no women in parliament (IPU 2014).  
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Norris and Inglehart (2001) explain that there are structural, cultural and political 
factors that cause this underrepresentation. To mitigate these factors, feminists 
have proposed several strategies such as the reform of electoral systems and 
parliamentary institutions; creating women-friendly cultures; introducing quotas 
for women; providing training for women candidates; and financial aid. 
Implementing electoral quotas is highly controversial, but it has shown to be 
effective at increasing women's representation in a number of countries, including 
among others, Argentina and Costa Rica (Bauer 2008; Dahlerup 2003; Goetz 
2002; Hinojosa 2008; Peschard 2002; Powley 2005; Schmidt 2003). As will be 
discussed later, without gender quotas, equal representation would be difficult to 
achieve and would take substantially longer.  
 
The following literature review will describe how gender quotas have been 
implemented in various countries around the world as a means to increase 
women's political representation. The first part will focus on quotas, including the 
rationale for quotas and the different types of quotas. The second part will outline 
the different electoral systems and how these systems influence women's political 
representation. This literature review will be followed by a focused discussion on 
the Indonesian context.  
 
1.3.1 RATIONALE FOR GENDER QUOTAS 
History has shown that women as citizens have often been excluded from the 
male-dominated world of politics. Scholars have provided arguments for the 
importance of political representation, including Marian Sawer (2010), an 
Australian political scientist who has argued that women's representation in 
parliament is a fundamental democratic principle and a proxy for equal 
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opportunity and equal citizenship. Lovenduski (2005, pp 22-24), one of the first 
feminist scholars to tackle the issue of how to feminise institutions outlines three 
arguments to support women's representation: pragmatic, justice and difference 
arguments. The pragmatic argument claims that women are likely to vote for 
parties that put forward women candidates because they have certain 
experiences and interests that can only be understood by women. The justice 
argument claims that men monopolise representation, which is unjust for 
women who have equal citizenship. The difference argument is based on the 
theory that women will bring different styles and approaches to politics, which 
inturn, leads to change and benefits all.  
 
Dahlerup (2006, p19), a leading scholar on gender quotas, defines quotas as 
‘setting up a percentage or number for the representation of a specific group’. 
Similarly, Lovenduski (2005) describes quotas as regulations that promote a 
certain number or proportion in forums or institutions to be comprised of women. 
In the case of gender quotas, the most often applied minimum percentages are 
20, 30 or 40 percent.  
 
Women's inequality in education, the economy, society and culture contribute to 
the underrepresentation of women in parliament (Norris & Inglehart 2001). 
Additionally, those women who enter politics face many cultural and social 
barriers (Siregar 2007; McAllister & Studlar 1991). For example, women are 
stereotyped as being unable to become leaders; are less accepted in politics; 
lack access to higher education and resources; and generally have the burden of 
their private life roles (as wives, mothers, and daughters). Transforming culture 
to support gender equality is a long process; therefore structural measures are 
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needed to increase women's representation in parliament. Quotas are used as a 
structural measure to increase the representation of historically excluded or 
underrepresented groups, including women (Dahlerup 2006).  
 
Dahlerup (2006) contrasts incremental approaches with what she terms "fast 
track" approaches to achieving a gender balance in politics. Supporters of the 
incremental track argue that a gender balance will be achieved if women have 
the same political resources as men. They believe in gradual changes such as 
capacity building for women and hold parties responsible for recruiting more 
women. Meanwhile, supporters of the fast track approach believe that an 
increase in resources will not automatically increase women's representation, 
hence affirmative action is a necessary solution. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) 
compared Scandinavian countries that used the incremental approach to Costa 
Rica, which implemented the fast track approach. Since the implementation of 
legal quotas in Costa Rica, women's representation in parliament jumped from 
19 percent to 35.1 percent in one election. Meanwhile using the incremental 
approach, it took Denmark 70 years to achieve women's representation of 38 
percent in 2001.  
 
There are several arguments supporting the use of gender quotas to achieve 
equal representation in politics. Some refer to quotas as a form of compensation 
for the long history of discrimination against women, some view quotas as the 
only way of achieving a gender balance in politics, while others support quotas to 
improve political accountability (Goetz 2008). On the other hand, quotas are 
described by critics as bypassing a competitive process where the best person 
should be selected for the job, regardless of sex (Bacchi 2006). Lovenduski 
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(2005) also raises the issue that gender quotas provide privileges to women 
whilst marginalising other minorities.  
 
Despite the contested discourse around gender quotas, the United Nations' 
Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 was a milestone for 
addressing the underrepresentation of women in decision-making. In accordance 
with the BPFA endorsed by 189 countries, governments must take measures that 
encourage political parties to include women in elected and non-elected public 
positions in the same proportion and at the same level as men (BPFA Article 
190b; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Sawer et al. 2010). The BFPA has become a 
global platform used by the women's movement worldwide to advocate for gender 
quotas as a means to increase women's representation in parliaments.  
 
The use of quota systems to achieve equal representation has increased over 
the past 70 years. In her book, Krook (2009) highlights the growing number of 
countries applying quota provisions. According to Krook (2009), only 10 countries 
applied quota provisions from 1930 to 1980. Between 1980 and 2000, this grew 
to 40 countries and it is now over 100 countries. This demonstrates the emerging 
demands and global awareness of the importance of equal representation as well 
as the effectiveness of international declarations such as the BPFA.  
 
1.3.2 QUOTA TYPES AND APPLICATION 
There are several types of gender quotas described in the literature and 
implemented around the world (for different descriptions, see Ballington & 
Matland 2004; Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2005; Krook 2009). These quotas can be 
broadly categorised into three types depending on at what stage in the electoral 
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process they are applied: the recruitment stage; party list stage; and elected 
stage (Matland 2006). Quotas applied at the recruitment stage are called aspirant 
quotas. These types of quotas are designed to influence a party's internal process 
of choosing candidates and guarantees that women are considered when parties 
select their nominees. These types of quotas are usually voluntary. Party quotas 
are designed to influence political parties to have a certain proportion of women 
on their party lists. Party quotas can be incorporated in the rules of political parties 
(such as the Australian Labor Party) or enforced by law (such as in Timor Leste). 
Quotas at the elected stage of the process are called reserved seat quotas which 
guarantee that a certain number of seats in parliament will be held by women. 
These types of quotas have to be legislated in a country's electoral law or 
constitution.   
 
According to Dahlerup and Freidenvaal (2013) quotas can be categorised into 
two forms: legislated or party quotas. Legislated quotas are implemented through 
electoral laws or the constitution and require political parties to nominate a certain 
proportion of women on their list/s. Meanwhile party quotas are commitments 
made by parties to put a certain number of women on their list/s.  
 
The implementation of quota systems has been broadly successful in improving 
women's representation in many countries. For example, candidate quotas have 
increased women's representation in Sweden, South Africa, Spain, Australia and 
Peru. Since the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa implemented a 
quota for its candidate list in 1994 as a result of a campaign by the ANC Women’s 
League, women’s representation in parliament reached 25 percent, then 
increased to 33 percent in 1999 (Myakayaka-Manzini 2004). Left-wing political 
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parties in Spain have been using gender quotas in party lists since 1988, which 
resulted in 36 percent of women in the Congress of Deputies in 2007 (Valiente 
2008). 
 
Reserved seats have been successfully implemented in Uganda, Pakistan and 
India (Krook 2009). Krook (2009) investigated the implementation of reserved 
seats in Pakistan and India and found that the British Empire introduced the 
reserved seats system in India (and Pakistan) in 1935. After independence, these 
quotas were removed, only to be reintroduced again later in 1950 by the Pakistani 
government and then in India in 1992 where 33 percent of seats are reserved for 
women in local government. According to Baviskar (2003), most states in India 
have managed to reach 33 percent in local bodies, with one state, Karnakata, 
reaching 43.6 percent of women's representation.  
 
Uganda, since adopting reserved seats, has achieved 29.8 percent of women in 
parliament in 2007. At the time this made Uganda rate in the top 20 countries with 
the highest percentage of women's representation worldwide (Bauer 2008). In 
Taiwan, which has implemented reserved seats, women make up 22.2 percent 
of parliament (Chiang 2008).  
 
Despite gender quotas successfully achieving historical leaps in women's 
representation, there are some studies indicating that gender quotas have not 
significantly increased the numbers of women. In 1999 before quotas were 
adopted, women represented 8.2 percent of the Indonesian national parliament. 
In 2004, after the implementation of party quotas, women's representation in 
Indonesia increased to 11 percent, an increase of only 2.8 percent (Bylesjo & 
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Seda 2006). Siregar's (2007) study found that implementation of quotas in 
Indonesia did not significantly increase the number of women in the national 
parliament. Similarly, women's representation in France after implementing party 
quotas (also known as the Parity Law) in 2000, increased from 10.9 to 12.3 
percent. This number increased to 18.7 percent in 2007 and 27 percent in 2012 
after political parties started taking the Parity Law seriously - indicating the 
importance of other factors in the effectiveness of quotas (Murray 2013; Sineau 
2008).  
 
1.3.3 QUOTAS AND OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS 
The successful and less successful experiences of implementing quotas 
worldwide demonstrate that the effectiveness of quotas is often influenced by 
other factors. Freidenvall and colleagues (2006) argue that these factors include 
progress made by the women's movement to promote gender equality; how 
political parties conduct their campaigns; how women are involved in political 
parties; and whether gender equality has been adopted as a state ideology. The 
Nordic countries have not adopted legal quotas but they have high representation 
of women in parliament because they have adopted gender equality as a state 
ideology. As a result of this incremental approach, it has taken 70 to 80 years 
after women won the right to vote to achieve 30 to 40 percent of women in 
parliament (Freidenvall et al. 2006).  
 
Gender quotas work well if there are laws to guarantee quota implementation. 
Araujo and Garcia (2006) contend that the success of quotas in Bolivia and 
Mexico is because there are sanctions for non-compliance. For example, in 
Mexico, parties that do not comply with the law and place women in winnable 
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positions are disqualified (Baldez 2004). This is different to the 2004 elections in 
Indonesia where there was no enforcement of the party list quotas and no 
sanctions for political parties that did not meet the requirement of at least 30 
percent of women on party lists. Most women were placed in unwinnable 
positions on party lists because the quota was voluntary.  
 
Political party commitment to equal representation influences the selection and 
placement of candidates in winnable seats. Freidenvall, Dahlerup and Skjeie 
(2006) argue that election results show that political parties with 40 to 50 percent 
quotas had more women elected compared to parties without quotas. This is 
evidenced by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Left Party that 
allocated 50 percent of their party lists to women candidates. Additionally, the 
adoption of a 50 percent quota for women on party lists at the local level by the 
South African National Congress has contributed to women's representation of 
43.5 percent (Quota Project 2009).  
 
The women's movement and gender quotas are inseparable. Across the world, 
the women's movement has played a long and important role in promoting 
quotas, advocating quota provisions, and ensuring that quota provisions are 
effective in increasing women's numbers in parliament. The women's movement 
in Rwanda was victorious in ensuring the Constitution included measures that 
guaranteed at least 30 percent of women in all decision making bodies (Powley 
2005). Women in Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa took part in 
their countries' constitutional reforms in order to guarantee equal representation 
in their constitutions (Bauer 2008; Goetz 2002; Tripp & Kang 2006). The hard 
work of the women in the Australian Labor Party resulted in 35 percent quotas of 
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women in winnable seats being introduced in 1994 (Sawer 2004). In Indonesia, 
the women's movement together with the women's caucus in parliament have 
advocated for quota provisions in the 2008 Elections and 2008 Political Party 
Laws (Undang-Undang Pemilu; Undang-Undang Partai Politik, Law no 2/2008), 
including the creation of a pool of women candidates, support for women 
candidates and the implementation of gender equality policies at the local and 
national levels.  
 
1.3.4 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION 
In addition to quotas, electoral systems play a significant role in influencing the 
level of women's representation in parliament. Many studies show that among 
the electoral system families, proportional representation (PR) tends to result in 
the election of more women (Ballington & Matland 2004; Dahlerup 2006; 
Dahlerup & Freidenvaal 2005; Larserud & Taphorn 2007; Perschard 2002). PR 
is a system in which each party or grouping presents a list of candidates for an 
electoral district, voters vote for a party and/or a candidate, and parties receive 
seats in proportion to their overall share of votes (Larserud & Taphorn 2007; 
Reynolds et al 2008). Rwanda and Sweden are countries that have the highest 
representation of women in parliament and both of them implement PR voting 
systems.     
 
There are three broad types of List PR systems: closed, open and free lists. In 
closed lists, parties present a list of party-ranked candidates, and voters vote for 
their prefered party. Seats are assigned to parties on the basis of their share of 
the total number of votes (Kuvonich 2012). The winning candidates are selected 
based on their position on the lists (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2013). In 
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open lists, voters select from a party list of candidates who may be ranked or 
unranked. Seats assigned to parties reflect the candidates share of the vote 
(Kuvonich 2012, pp 155-156) In free lists, voters are free to choose one or more 
candidates across several party lists or to cast more than one vote for a single 
highly favoured candidate (Reynolds et al. 2008).  
 
Closed lists are generally regarded as most beneficial for women candidates 
because there is an assumption that people may be reluctant to vote for women 
candidates in open lists and women generally have a lack of resources to 
compete against male candidates on open lists. Parties are reluctant to select 
women candidates as they assume that if they nominate women their party will 
lose as society is yet to percieve women as leaders (Lovenduksi and Norris 
1996). However, Kuvonich’s research on women’s representation in Poland 
offers a different perspective. She divided her findings into three categories: the 
role of parties, the role of voters and the role of candidates arguing that the 
chances of women candidates winning in the open list system improved when 
parties increased the number of women and included women in the top position 
on their lists. Kuvonich also found that voters have positive perceptions of women 
candidates and did not penalise them. However, it should be noted that open lists 
are beneficial for women candidates with two conditions: that parties put women 
at the top of the list, and voters support women candidates, which, in many 
countries is not always the case moreover in countries that hold traditional views 
of gender roles.  
 
Larserud and Taphorn (2007) provide a framework for which electoral systems 
work best with gender quotas to increase women's representation. According to 
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Larserud and Taphorn, there are 10 best-fit combinations that favour women's 
representation; three of them implement List PR voting systems. They contend 
that List PR systems work well with gender quotas in large districts with party lists 
with rank order rules (including zipper systems, meaning the names of men and 
women alternate down the list). This is significant in the Indonesian case because 
the Constitutional Court ruled in 2008 that the electoral formula for victory was 
not based on rank of order on party lists, but based on the largest number of votes 
obtained by a candidate. As such, the voting system becomes a relevant factor 
in influencing women's representation (Schmidt 2012).  
 
Other factors that influence the number of women in parliament includes 
candidate selection. The majority of the literature agrees that parties are the 
gatekeepers to nominating and selecting candidates and party leaders are the 
most influential factor in deciding who is endorsed (Dahlerup 2009). Parties set 
up rules and procedures in selecting candidates, for example whether selection 
is centralised or decentralised, what are candidate requirements. Matland (2002) 
distinguished candidate selection into two categories; one is a system that is 
patronage-oriented and the second is bureaucratic. In the patronage-oriented 
system, there are very few written rules, (indeed they are often unwritten), with 
few clear procedures. This system is suited to traditional or charismatic leaders. 
The bureaucratic system on the other hand, is more standardised, clear, and 
open. The bureaucratic system provides the opportunity for women to prepare 
and strategise actions to enter the system. Gender quotas are a good example 
of a bureaucratic selection process. 
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The next section will provide a background on the Indonesian case, in particular 
the history of quotas, the implementation of quotas and the impact of the electoral 
system on women's representation in local parliament. It will also explore the 
Indonesian women's movement and its role in advocating for equal 
representation in Indonesian parliaments.  
 
1.4 A BRIEF HISTORY OF GENDER QUOTAS IN INDONESIA 
The collective Indonesian women's movement that advocated for gender quotas 
consisted of civil society organisations, journalists, academics, members of 
political parties and members of parliament. The movement, including the two 
largest Moslem women's organisations, Muslimat and Aisyiyah, has spent 
decades advocating for the implementation of quota provisions (Bylesjo & Seda 
2006).  
 
The campaigns to implement quotas for women in decision-making bodies 
started as soon as Soeharto resigned as President in 1998. The Indonesian 
Women's Coalition (KPI) in 1998 issued a political statement requesting 
governments to provide access for women to national leadership positions and 
to allocate 50 percent of legislative, judicative and executive positions to women 
(KPI 1999). This statement was in accordance with article 4 (1) of Law 7/1984 
about the ratification of CEDAW which stipulates that governments should adopt 
temporary special measures in order to accelerate equality between men and 
women. The Indonesian Government acknowledges equal representation in 
article 46 of the 1999 Human Rights Law (Undang-Undang Hak Asasi Manusia, 
Law No 39/1999), which states that electoral systems, political parties, elections 
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of legislative bodies and appointment systems have to guarantee women's 
representation.     
 
The long and tireless advocacy by the women's movement at the national and 
local levels for a guaranteed 30 percent quota in the Elections and Political Party 
Laws was successful with the adoption of quota provisions in the 2003 Elections 
Law (Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Pambudy 2003). However, article 65 (1) of the 2003 
Elections Law stated that each political party may propose at least 30 percent of 
women in its candidate lists at the national, provincial and district levels. This non-
binding quota provision was a disappointment for women activists. Even political 
observers and commentators saw that this article had multiple interpretations 
(Pambudy 2003).  
 
Wahida Siregar's (2007) study reveals that in the 2004 national election, many 
women candidates were placed in unwinnable positions on party lists (that is, 
outside of the top one or two positions on the lists). Masruchah (2009, pers. 
comm. 28 November) found that on candidate lists for the national parliament in 
2004, only 9.7 percent of women candidates were ranked first, 16.8 percent were 
ranked second, and the rest were ranked in lower positions. Furthermore, Siregar 
(2007) argued that even if women candidates had been placed in winnable 
positions (first or second rank), this often occurred in unwinnable electoral 
districts where political parties did not have strong support. The placement of 
women in party lists resulted in a minor (2.8 percent) increase of women's 
representation in the 2004 elections (Bylesjo & Seda 2006).  
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Due to the 2003 Elections Law not containing sanctions for non-compliance, 
many political parties did not meet the quota of at least 30 percent on their 2004 
party lists. Siregar's study found that for the 2004 elections, only the National 
Mandate Party (PAN), Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and National 
Awakening Party (PKB) fulfilled the 30 percent quotas for candidate lists at the 
national level. There were no political parties that met the 30 percent quota in all 
69 electoral districts (Bylesjo & Seda 2006; Siregar 2007).  
 
1.4.1 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND GENDER QUOTAS IN INDONESIA 
Indonesia uses the List PR electoral system (Reilly 2007; Tremblay 2012). There 
are approximately 70 countries which use the List PR system, Indonesia being 
the largest of these (Reynolds et al. 2008).  
 
From 1955 to 1999, Indonesia used a closed list system where voters voted for 
the party only. Following the adoption of the new Elections Law in 2003, 
Indonesia used a semi-open List PR system for the 2004 elections where voters 
punched both the symbol of a party and a candidate within the same party. If a 
party met the electoral quotient (or bilangan pembagi pemilih - BPP), a 
parliamentary seat would be allocated to the candidate in the top position on the 
party’s list. (Individual candidates could still be directly elected if they met 30 
percent of the BPP, however this in practice was almost impossible to do). BPP 
is the total number of valid votes at the district level divided by the allocated seats. 
In 2009, following the Constitutional Court’s decision on the formula for electoral 
victory, Indonesia adopted the (full) open list system where voters could vote for 
a party or a candidate or both. This system encouraged voters to vote for 
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individual candidates. In the open list system, candidates who received the most 
number of votes (from parties that met the BPP) would be elected.  
 
The quota system legislated in Indonesia in 2008 was based on the 2008 
Elections Law and stipulated that there should be one woman for every three 
candidates on party lists. This quota suited this style of voting because the system 
not only allowed women to be elected in their own right, but it also meant that at 
least one woman candidate was ranked in the top three candidates on party lists. 
This meant that if the party was popular enough and had received a large number 
of votes, there was a chance a woman candidate was placed high enough on the 
party list to be elected.  
 
1.4.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION 
Women’s groups were pleased with the stronger quotas provision in the 2008 
Elections Law. They were confident that a combination of the gender quota (one 
woman for every three candidates on party lists), with the formula for electoral 
victory based on rank of order would result in a higher proportion of women in 
parliament. This confidence was based on studies that have shown that a 
candidate’s ranking on a party’s list (in a List PR system) is an important factor 
for electoral victory (International IDEA 2014).  
 
Despite this confidence, a judicial review in 2008 requested by a group of 
legislative candidates and political parties led to the Constitutional Court’s 
decision to change the formula for electoral victory. Whereas previously, electoral 
victory was based on a candidate’s position on party lists, the Constitutional Court 
determined that candidates who received the largest number of personal votes 
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(suara terbanyak) would be elected. This decision was a major setback for gender 
quota movement because it made the quota system powerless. Women who 
were placed higher on their party’s list no longer had improved chances of being 
elected.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS 
The objective of this research is to investigate how the implementation of the 
gender quota and the electoral system impacted on women's representation in 
the 2009 district elections in Bantul and Yogyakarta City. Because the electoral 
system influences the effectiveness of gender quotas, this research will 
specifically look at how the Constitutional Court's decision to change the formula 
for electoral victory (from rank of order on party lists to suara terbanyak) 
influenced the effectiveness of the legislated party-list gender quotas. Based on 
this objective, this research has two primary research questions and six sub-
questions: 
 
1. How did the 2008 Elections Law, specifically the formula for electoral victory, 
influence the effectiveness of legislated party list gender quotas? 
A. What was the role of the women's movement in advocating and legislating 
gender quotas? 
To answer this question, I investigate the history of the Indonesian 
women’s movement in the promotion of gender quotas into national law. I 
asses the organisational framework developed for this campaign, 
including coalition building, campaign strategies and tactics, networks, 
how these networks worked, identify and interview key actors, roles of 
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these actors, key issues promoted, as well as analise other materials and 
resources. 
B. What factors influenced the Constitutional Court's decision to change the 
formula for electoral victory? 
To answer this question, I outline the roles of the Constitutional Court and 
how it sits within the Indonesian political system, analyse court 
proceedings and outcomes. I interview one of the judges who made the 
critical legal judgement regarding the formula for electoral victory, and key 
actors from within the Indonesian women’s movement and candidates.  
C. How were gender quotas implemented by political parties at the district 
level in the 2009? 
To answer this question, I assess the gender quotas rules where to 
implemented at district level, as well as seek the opinions from key district 
level party leaders on candidate recruitment, gender quotas, and  rules, 
recruitment practices, and selection and placement of women candidates 
on the party lists.   
D. How did suara terbanyak influence the campaigns for women candidates?  
To answer the question, I look at the effects of suara terbanyak on political 
party and campaigning processes: how candidates changed their 
campaign strategies and how they used campaign funds. I also interview 
candidates and MPs on their opinions of the Court’s decision.  
 
2. What other factors enhanced or inhibited women candidate chances of being 
elected in the 2009 district elections in Bantul and Yogyakarta City? 
A. How did various personal, socioeconomic and cultural factors influence 
women candidate experiences in the 2009 district elections? 
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To answer this question, I look at the profile of women candidates and 
MPs, interview them on their organisational experiences, political 
experiences, their politics entry points, as well as their domestic roles. I 
also assess their, networks and support groups, and candidates’ 
campaign skills/abilities and how they developed campaign strategies.  
B. What was the role of the Yogyakarta women's movement in advocating 
and supporting women candidates in the 2009 district elections? 
To answer the question, I assess the organisational and advocacy 
framework of the Yogyakarta women’s movement, the nature of their work, 
including their activities related to increasing women’s representation in 
politics. I interview candidates about their experiences receiving 
assistance, and whether they used resources and materials produced by 
the women’s movement. 
These two primary research questions recognise that there are structural factors 
that influence women's representation, as well as social, cultural and personal 
factors.  
 
This research attempts to answer these questions in a holistic way by focusing 
on the experiences of those women who were involved in the 2009 district 
elections (the candidates), those women who were involved in the gender quotas 
movement (key women from the women’s movement), and those stakeholders 
who have significant control and influence over the electoral process (political 
party leaders, Electoral Commission representatives and a Constitutional Court 
judge).  
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1.6 METHODOLOGY 
This research used qualitative methods for data collection. The aims of qualitative 
research are to provide in-depth and interpretive understandings of the social 
world, and to learn about people's social and material circumstances, 
experiences, perspectives and histories (Snape & Spencer 2003, p.22).  
 
Feminist methodology was used in this research. Stanley and Wise (1990) define 
feminist research as that which is carried out by women who are feminists for 
other women; and that is overtly political in its purpose and committed to changing 
women's lives. While most qualitative methods practice a hierarchical relationship 
with the research participants, feminist methodology on the other hand creates a 
sense of connectedness and equality between the researcher and those 
researched. Feminist methodology employs feminist principles; and recognises 
that the cultural beliefs and behaviour of feminist researchers shape the results 
of their analysis (Harding 1987; Patton 2001). In light of this, it is important to note 
that in my own case, prior to undertaking the research of this thesis I worked for 
many years in the Indonesian women's movement, specifically on political 
education for women and the promotion of gender quotas. As such, the findings 
and recommendations for this research have been shaped by my experiences.  
 
Tomm (1989) argues that feminist research is fundamentally oriented towards 
social change. Mies (1991) adds that women's experiences, women's lives, 
women's histories, ideas and struggles have featured very little in dominant social 
science and hence there is a need for a methodology that focuses on capturing 
their stories. The argument here is that women perceive experiences differently 
to men and that women's experiences provide new resources for research.  
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1.7 DATA COLLECTION 
The primary methods of data collection for this research were interviews and 
focus group discussions, two key methods for generating data in qualitative 
research (Lewis & Ritchie 2003). Interviews and focus group discussions can be 
used in either a preliminary or follow-up capacity and with each other (Morgan 
1997).  
 
I interviewed 20 women candidates from Bantul and Yogyakarta City including 
those who were successful and unsuccessful in the 2009 elections. Of those 
women who were successful, six were members from the Bantul district 
parliament and four were members of the Yogyakarta City parliament. All other 
interviewees were unsuccessful in the 2009 elections. Interviewees represented 
a variety of parties: nationalist, religious, large, and small.  
 
To protect the identity of these women candidates, only their political parties 
and/or district electorates have been used to distinguish their responses. As seen 
in Table 2, I interviewed 10 women candidates from each district. The candidates 
in Bantul tended to be younger (age average and range) and as a result, had on 
average, fewer children.  
 
Table 2: Demographic profile of interviewed women candidates 
 Bantul District Yogyakarta City 
Number of women candidates interviewed: 10 candidates 10 candidates 
Age Range: 28-49 37-64 
Average Age: 34.4 years 54.4 years 
Number and percentage of: 
 Married candidates: 
Single candidates: 
 
8 candidates / 80% 
2 candidates / 20% 
 
9 candidates / 90% 
1 candidate / 10% 
Average number of children per candidate: 1.7 children 2.8 children 
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Number and percentage of candidates 
elected in 2009: 
6 candidates / 60% 4 candidates / 40% 
Highest level of education attained 
University: 
High School: 
 
10 candidates 
0 candidates 
 
8 candidates / 80% 
2 candidates / 20% 
 
 
With the exception of three candidates across both districts, all were married. Half 
of the interviewed candidates were elected in 2009. Almost all candidates had 
obtained a university education, with the exception of two women from 
Yogyakarta City.   
 
I also interviewed seven party leaders from six large parties and one small party. 
The only woman party leader was interviewed, however, her party, the New 
Indonesia Party (PIB), did not meet the requirements to contest in the elections. 
Additionally, a judge of the Constitutional Court and representatives of the 
Electoral Commission, women's organisations in Yogyakarta and Jakarta as well 
as the Islamic women's organisations Fatayat and Aisyiyah were interviewed.  
 
My background in civil society organisations and networks facilitated access to 
the 2009 women candidates. Contact with political party leaders was obtained 
from women candidates and the Yogyakarta KPU. Women candidates welcomed 
the opportunity to be interviewed and were generous in sharing their colleagues' 
contact details.  
 
The (semi-structured) interview method was used to obtain in-depth perspectives 
from research participants about their opinions and experiences on their 
candidacy, gender quota, the electoral system and women's representation in 
Indonesia. Interviews are suited to this style of research as they help the 
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researcher acquire an understanding of deep and complex systems and 
experiences because of the depth of focus and the opportunity they offer for 
clarification (Lewis & Ritchie 2003). Interviews are primarily used by feminist 
researchers to achieve the active involvement of respondents in the construction 
of data about their lives (Reinharz 1992). The one-on-one interviews were 
conducted either at respondents’ homes or offices depending on their availability.  
 
Focus group discussions with groups of women candidates from various cities 
were held in Jakarta and Yogyakarta to verify the results collected in the one-on-
one interviews. Participants of the focus groups discussions were different from 
the subject of the one-on-one interviews. The first focus group discussion was 
held in Yogyakarta at the secretariat of the Indonesian Women’s Coalition 
Yogyakarta, and was attended by candidates from Yogyakarta. The second focus 
group discussion was held in a small café in Jakarta during the Third Congress 
of the Indonesian Women's Coalition. Women candidates from several provinces 
participated in that discussion. Focus group discussions provide opportunities to 
explore how people think and talk about a topic, how their ideas are shaped, 
generated or moderated through conversations with others (Ritchie 2003). They 
also allow participants to listen, reflect on what is said, and consider their own 
standpoint. In focus group discussions, data is generated from the interaction 
between participants (Finch & Lewis 2003; Morgan 1997). The advantages of 
focus group discussions include: they are inexpensive to conduct; produce rich 
data that are cumulative and provide elaboration; stimulate respondents aiding 
recall; and offer a flexible format. Disadvantages include results cannot be 
generalised; group culture might interfere with individual expression; the risk of 
one person dominating the discussion; and the possibility of group think (James 
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& Fontana 2003). I identified myself as a feminist activist to my respondents, 
which may have influenced their responses but this includes the advantage that 
some respondents, especially those from the women’s movement, to be more 
open and generous with their information.  
 
I recorded all interviews and focus group discussions, subject to participant 
consent. Interview appointments with intended participants were organised 
ahead of time from Australia in October 2009. I also undertook document 
collection and analysis from the Electoral Commission, political parties, women's 
organisations and parliament. I also collected information available through the 
media such as newspapers, magazines, and internet. During this data collection, 
I resided in both Yogyakarta and Jakarta. I was able to triangulate my interview 
and focus group data with this broad range of resources. Quotations from 
interviews and focus groups were selected to represent common views.  
 
1.8 SELECTION OF RESEARCH AREAS 
This research was undertaken in the districts of Bantul and Yogyakarta City, 
located in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Map of Indonesia with the Special Region of Yogyakarta (highlighted 
top) and the two research districts of Bantul (highlighted bottom left) and 
Yogyakarta City (highlighted bottom right) 
 
 
Source: Wikimedia (2015) 
 
Yogyakarta is a kingdom located on Java Island. The Special Region of 
Yogyakarta is the only province in Indonesia which is a kingdom with special 
autonomy. The Sultan is the governor of the province and is appointed by the 
President, not elected like other governors in Indonesia. There are polemics in 
Yogyakarta about whether a woman can be the Sultan as the current Sultan has 
five daughters. If changes were not allowed, the oldest brother of the current 
Sultan would be his successor. There is no limitation to the number of terms of 
the governorship. The President inaugurates the Sultan as the governor and as 
such the Sultan reports to the President like any other governor. This province 
has five districts with a total of 3.1 million people. Yogyakarta is well-known as 
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the centre of education (many Indonesian universities are located there) and 
Javanese culture and art.  
 
These districts were selected for this research because women's representation 
in the Bantul district parliament increased from 8.8 percent in 2004 to 13 percent 
in the 2009 elections. However, women's representation in Yogyakarta City 
decreased from 17 percent in 2004 to 15 percent in the 2009 elections. 
Additionally, since the early 1900s Yogyakarta has housed many women's 
organisations. The early Indonesian women’s movement started in Yogyakarta. 
Bantul and Yogyakarta City are also located next to each other, making it 
logistically easier to conduct the research.  
 
Despite co-locating within the same province, these two districts are quite 
different in significant ways. While they differ in many respects, the proportion of 
men and women is the same. Table 3 summarises the statistical data of these 
two districts.  
 
 
Table 3: Bantul District and Yogyakarta City Statistic Profiles 
 
 Bantul District Yogyakarta City 
Population 
Men: 
Women: 
831,657 
408,780 (49%) 
422,877 (51%) 
 
 
 
431,235 
221,712 (49%) 
222,524 (51%) 
Sub districts: 17  14 
Villages: 75  45 
Area (km²): 506.85  32.5 
Households: 223,283  Not available 
Religion 
Islam: 
Christianity:  
Hinduism: 
Buddhism: 
 
95% 
4.6% 
0.1% 
0.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68% 
31% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
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 Bantul District Yogyakarta City 
Economy 
Regional Income: 
Economic Growth: 
Biggest sector: 
 
AUD90 million 
4.5% 
Agriculture 
 
AUD77 million 
4.3% 
Services (hotel, 
restaurant, tourism) 
Employment 
Manufacturing: 
Public service: 
Services: 
Agriculture: 
 
79,904 
12,703 
Not Available 
109,633 
 
31,847 
9,880 
173,881 
786 
Public Facilities 
Elementary School: 
Junior High School: 
Senior High School: 
Vocational School: 
University & College: 
 
346 
86 
35 
34 
0 
 
192 
59 
48 
27 
49 
Hospitals: 8 18 
Health Clinics: 93 Not Available 
 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (2008); Yogyakarta City Government (nd).  
 
 
Geographically, Bantul is significantly larger than Yogyakarta City and has almost 
twice the population. Bantul is a big producer of rice, corn, cassava and sweet 
potatoes, and its economy relies on the agriculture sector. Meanwhile, the 
economy of Yogyakarta City is driven by services related to the tourism and 
education sectors.  
 
From a demographic perspective, the number of women and men in both cities 
is the same. Yogyakarta City has a higher proportion of Christians (31 percent) 
than any other district in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Over 95 percent of 
the population in Bantul are Muslim. One third of the population in Yogyakarta 
City has finished senior high school, which is higher than the national average for 
urban areas (approximately 25 percent) (BPS 2010). There is no data on 
educational attainment for Bantul, however national trends suggest that people 
living in rural areas in Indonesia tend to have achieved basic education only. That 
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there are also significantly fewer high schools than primary schools in Bantul 
would support this assumption. Bantul is serviced by eight hospitals and 69 
doctors across general clinics and hospitals. This means that the ratio of doctors 
to people is one doctor for 12,053 people in Bantul while in Yogyakarta City, there 
is one doctor for 425 people.  
 
1.9 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter Two 
outlines Indonesia's electoral system, including its history, key stakeholders, how 
voting has changed and how votes translate into seats.  
 
Chapter Three will discuss the Indonesian women's movement and its efforts in 
advocating for gender quotas in the 2009 elections. The first part provides a 
historical overview of women's political participation in Indonesia since Dutch 
colonisation to the reformation era. The second part of this chapter focuses on 
efforts to achieve equal representation through the implementation of gender 
quotas in national laws. It outlines the actors involved in the promotion of gender 
quotas; strategies employed in advocacy, and an analysis of these actors and 
their roles in the gender quotas campaign.  
 
Chapter Four describes how the Constitutional Court sits within Indonesia's 
political system and why the formula for electoral victory in the 2008 Elections 
Law was repealed by the Constitutional Court. I present insights from a 
Constitutional Court judge that was involved in the repeal of the Elections Law. 
This chapter compares two articles in the 2008 Election Law about electoral 
 34 
victory before and after the judicial review. I also portray how the women's 
movement reacted to the decision.  
 
Chapter Five outlines how political parties act as gatekeepers in the recruitment, 
selection and placement of women. This chapter discusses how the gender quota 
as described in Chapter Two was implemented by parties at the local level. It 
provides the results of interviews with political party leaders.  
 
Chapter Six presents the results of the 2009 elections in Bantul and Yogyakarta 
City including how many seats were won by what parties and what proportion of 
seats were won by women.  
 
Chapter Seven explores how the Constitutional Court's decision on the formula 
for electoral victory impacted on women candidates and their campaigns. It 
uncovers how this decision influenced campaign funds, the flourishing of corrupt 
practices, and political party dynamics.  
 
Chapter Eight explores the range of factors that supported and inhibited women 
candidate campaigns. It gives voice to women candidates and their perspectives 
and experiences how socioeconomic and cultural factors influenced their 
campaigns. It also discusses the role of the women's movement at the local level 
in supporting women candidates.  
 
Chapter Nine, the conclusion, answers the two primary research questions and 
presents the conclusions of this research. It offers recommendations for future 
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research on policy making and on gender quotas. Following Chapter Nine is a 
postscript that updates the reader on the results of the 2014 elections.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INDONESIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE INDONESIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
As outlined in Chapter One, the effectiveness of gender quotas is influenced by 
the application of a country's electoral system. This chapter provides an 
introduction to Indonesia's electoral system, including its history, structure, 
functions and processes. Following chapters will outline how gender quotas 
interact with the electoral system and how these two factors impacted on 
women's representation in the 2009 elections.  
 
Since the 2004 elections, the Indonesian national parliament, known as the 
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), has been a bicameral institution 
consisting of the House of People's Representatives (DPR), which is the 
legislative arm of the parliament, and the House of Regional Representatives 
(DPD). The Indonesian sub-national parliaments are known as DPRD. There are 
two levels of DPRD:  the Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD Propinsi), 
and the District House of Representatives (DPRD Kabupaten). Parliaments at the 
sub-national level only have one chamber.  
 
The system used for legislative elections (to elect the DPR/DPRD) since the 1955 
elections is proportional representation (PR) with multi-member districts. As 
discussed in Chapter One, PR is the term used to describe a family of electoral 
systems where the number of seats won by parties is in proportion to the number 
of votes they receive (ECA 2012). In Indonesia, the system for electing the DPR 
and DPRD is an open list that allows voters to vote for both a political party and/or 
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a candidate2. Candidates who receive more personal votes than the specified 
electoral quotient (BPP) are automatically elected, however this rarely happens. 
Rather, all votes for the party and its candidates are combined for a party total. If 
the party's total (for example, 5,400 votes) meets the threshold (for example, 
4,000 votes) at least once, it will receive one seat in parliament. If the party meets 
the threshold two times (for example, it receives over 8,000 votes), it will receive 
two seats in parliament, and so on. Up to the 2004 elections, the candidate in the 
first position on the party's list won the seat. However, as to be discussed later in 
this chapter and in Chapter Four, the Constitutional Court's decision to change 
the formula for determining electoral victory in the 2009 elections means that 
whichever candidate received the most votes within the party, he/she is elected 
and occupies the party's seat in parliament.  
 
There are various types of elections in Indonesia: presidential, parliamentary, 
provincial and district head elections. The presidential elections are held after the 
national legislative elections. Political parties that have won more than 20 percent 
of the national vote are eligible to propose presidential candidates. Those parties 
that do not win more than 20 percent of the national vote usually form coalitions 
with other parties in order to nominate a presidential candidate. The system for 
the presidential election is majority run-off two round system (ACE Project 2013). 
This means that if there are no candidates who win more than 50 percent of votes 
nationally and 20 percent of votes in at least half of the provinces, there will be a 
second round. Candidates must stand on a joint Presidential and Vice 
Presidential ticket (Sherlock 2009). The President and Vice President candidates 
who receive 50 percent + 1 of total votes are declared the winners.  
                                                 
2 Candidate votes contribute to party votes. 
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Provincial governors and district heads have five-year terms, but the election 
schedules are varied amongst provinces and districts, despite ongoing proposals 
to hold those elections at the same time as the legislative elections to cut costs 
and to streamline management of the process. Candidates for district head and 
deputy run as a package or on one ticket. Independent candidates who do not 
represent a party are permitted. This is a result of a judicial review by the 
Constitutional Court on the Regional Government Law in 2007. Prior to 2007, 
only a party or coalition of parties were allowed to nominate candidates.  
 
The system used for the provincial and district head election is absolute majority, 
meaning a candidate wins if he/she wins at least 50 percent + 1 of the votes. If 
none of the candidates receive at least half of the total votes, then the candidate 
that obtained the most votes (above a quarter of the total votes) will be declared 
as winner. There will be a second election round if none of the candidates 
received at least 25 percent of votes. Eligibility for the second round is only for 
candidates who win the most and second most votes (District Governance Law 
32/2004).  
 
Indonesia had its first nation-wide legislative election in 1955, 10 years after the 
proclamation of independence from the Dutch. During the Soeharto era, more 
commonly known as the New Order (or Orde Baru in Indonesian), there were six 
elections: 1971,1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The New Order introduced 
"LUBER and JURDIL" as election principles. LUBER is the acronym for Direct, 
General, Free and Secret. JURDIL stands for Honest and Just. It is widely 
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acknowledged in the literature that the elections during the New Order did not 
implement these principles (Pamungkas 2009).  
 
The 1999 elections were special elections because they were held after Soeharto 
was forced to step down from his presidency during the May riots. This was the 
first election held in the Reformation Era (or Reformasi, in Indonesian) which was 
characterised by freedom of speech, expression and association. The 2004 and 
2009 elections were the first national elections to implement gender quotas on 
party lists.  
 
There is a set of political laws (Paket Undang-Undang Politik) that guide the 
implementation of Indonesia's elections. These laws are usually reviewed and 
amended every five years after the elections. These set of political laws consists 
of the Parliamentary Elections Law, Presidential Elections Law, Governor and 
District Head Elections Law, Elections Management Law and the Political Party 
Law.  
 
2.1.1 THE PARLIAMENT: THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY (MPR) 
The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), consists of 692 members of the 
House of Peoples' Representatives (DPR) and House of Regional 
Representatives (DPD). DPR and DPD members are members of the MPR. The 
term of the MPR is five years. The MPR is divided into two big groupings: party 
groupings and the DPD. Party groupings (Fraksi) consist of winning parties in the 
DPR. These groupings aim to increase the effectiveness of the DPR and DPD to 
run their functions in the MPR. The law states that leadership of the MPR consists 
of one chair from the DPR and four deputies (two from the DPR and two from the 
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DPD). There was one woman in the leadership group 2009-2014, Melani 
Leimena Suharli, an MP from Partai Demokrat. This made her the second woman 
to form part of the MPR’s leadership group.  Since its formation in 1960 until 1996, 
there was zero women’s representation in the MPR’s leadership. It took 37 years 
for an Indonesian woman, Fatimah Ahmad from PDI3 to be selected as a member 
of the MPR leadership group. As is common in bicameral systems, the DPR and 
DPD do not share equal legislative power.  
 
In 2004, the MPR consisted of 700 members: 550 were from the DPR (and 
included appointed military representatives), 65 were group representatives 
(including religious representatives, war veterans, economic groups, women's 
groups [five seats allocated], people with disabilities groups, ethnic minorities, 
scientists, journalists and artists, civil servants, non-government organisations, 
students and youth organisations) and 135 were appointed provincial 
representatives (Asia Network 1999). During Soeharto’s regime, he made the 
MPR as an institution that supported his power by increasing the number of 
appointed representatives from the military and from his political party, Golkar, 
and thus the combination of these two groups formed the majority in the MPR. 
Since the 2004 elections, the MPR no longer consists of group representatives 
and all DPR and DPRD members are elected with no positions allocated to 
military representatives. This transformation in the DPR and DPRD reflects the 
democratisation of the Indonesian electoral system.  
 
                                                 
3  PDI (Indonesia Democratic Party) established in 1973 as a result of merger of Indonesia 
National Party, Catholic Party, Christian Party, and Supporter of Indonesia Independence Party. 
Conflict within the party, divided the party into two, one is headed by Megawati Soekarnoputri 
another one is by Suryadi.  
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Previously, the MPR had the power to elect the President and Vice President. 
One of the most notable events in Indonesia’s political history was the election of 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as President in 1999. PDIP won the largest 
number of votes in the 1999 elections and so it was predicted that Megawati as 
the chair of the winning party would be elected by the MPR as President. 
However, the MPR members elected Gus Dur as the President although his party 
won just over 10 percent of the vote. Since this turbulence, the MPR's authority 
has been reduced to amending the Constitution, as well as to swearing in and 
removing the President from his or her power. As such, the MPR only holds 
plenary sessions once or twice in their five year period if there are proposals to 
amend the Constitution or to impeach the President.  
 
As seen in Figure 2, the MPR, DPR and DPD have their own general secretariats 
to provide administrative support. In the DPR, fraksi discuss party positions on 
certain issues. To run parliamentary functions, the DPR has eleven commissions 
to discuss issues and draft bills relevant to their areas of responsibility. The DPR 
also has leadership, legislation, budgeting, deliberation, ethical, budget 
monitoring and audit bodies, inter-parliament cooperation and a special 
committee.  
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Figure 2: Structure of the Indonesian National Parliament 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the Indonesian Sub-National Parliament (DPRD at the 
Provincial and District Levels) 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 THE HOUSE OF PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES (DPR/DPRDs) 
The three main roles of the DPR and DPRDs are to legislate, budget and monitor. 
The legislative power includes initiating bills as well as discussing and approving 
draft bills proposed by the executive or DPD. For the budgeting role, the DPR 
and DPRDs have the authority to approve or reject the government's budget. Its 
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budget and audit results. In addition to these powerful roles, the DPR also has 
the authority to appoint three judges to the Constitutional Court, to approve 
judges for the Judicial Commission, and to select members of the National Audit 
Body (BPK). The DPRDs through the Ministry of Home Affairs, have the authority 
to endorse (or remove) governors (gubernur) at the provincial level and district 
heads (bupati) at the district level. Additionally, DPRDs can authorise agreements 
between their government and international parties (such as donors) and other 
third parties.  
 
One seat in the DPR represents about 325,000 to 425,000 people. The number 
of seats in provincial parliaments varies between 35 and 100 seats and in district 
parliaments between 20 and 50 seats depending on the size of the local 
population. As stated in the 2008 Elections Law, districts that have a population 
of up to 100,000 people have district parliaments comprised of 20 seats. Districts 
between 500,000 to one million people have 45 seats in their DPRDs and districts 
with a population of over one million people have 50 seats in their DPRDs. All 
candidates standing for the DPR or DPRD must represent a political party. No 
candidates of both DPR and DPRD are allowed to contest as independents unlike 
candidates for the DPD (Sherlock 2009).  
 
Committees and bodies in the DPRD mirror those in the DPR, but there are fewer 
and smaller committees, usually around three to five. In terms of fraksi, major 
parties often form their own fraksi, and small parties usually join to form a 
combined fraksi. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the sub-national 
parliaments consist of only one chamber; as such the structure is simpler than 
the national parliament. 
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 2.1.3 THE HOUSE OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (DPD) 
The DPD, which only exists at the national level, has the mandate to represent 
and voice regional/provincial interests. The DPD was introduced to reform the 
Indonesian parliament in line with the principles of reformasi and decentralisation. 
As mentioned earlier, the MPR prior to 2004 had 135 provincial representatives 
appointed by their provincial DPR. These representatives played an important 
role of voicing regional and local issues at the national level. However, their 
appointment by the provincial DPR was widely viewed as undemocratic. As a 
result, MPR members decided to strengthen these provincial representatives by 
establishing the DPD that would consist of members elected through the general 
elections. Elected DPD members are meant to provide stronger representation 
of local issues.  
 
The DPD consists of four representatives from each province. The four 
candidates with the largest votes in each province are elected to the DPD. Each 
province has four representatives, regardless of the size of its population. For 
example, Jakarta Province with a population of over nine million people and 
Bengkulu province with a population of 1.7 million people have the same number 
of regional representatives.  
 
The system used for the DPD is a single non-transferrable vote. It is a candidate-
centred system with voters only allowed to vote for one independent candidate 
not nominated by a political party (Reynolds et al. 2008). The first election of the 
DPD in 2004 resulted in a relatively high proportion (21 percent, 27 out of 128) of 
women being elected, an interesting result given that there are no gender quotas 
in the DPD (Parawansa 2004). 
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The DPD is often seen as a “post office”, which only has the authority to receive 
complaints and petitions from the public, but has no authority to act on it and 
follow up the issues by creating laws (Sherlock 2006). As mentioned earlier, the 
DPD does not have equal legislative power with the DPR. Rather, the DPD has 
a narrow set of roles and authorities which are limited to matters regarding 
regional autonomy, relationships between central and regional areas, maintaining 
natural resources, and approving proposals to form new provinces or districts. 
The DPD is only able to give suggestions to the DPR on laws related to education, 
taxes and religion. Compared to the DPR that has dominant legislative 
authorities, the DPD does not have a significant legislative role. Thus, the DPD 
has no power to pass laws. Aside from this limited legislative function, the DPD 
has an oversight function on the implementation of laws where it submits reports 
to the DPR for consideration. There is no clear procedure on how the DPD can 
work with the DPR to channel their input on certain laws (Sherlock 2006).  
 
Unlike in the DPR, there is no fraksi in the DPD because DPD members are not 
from political parties but are representatives of their provinces. The DPD’s 
leadership body consists for 33 people representing the provinces. The structure 
of this leadership body is one chair, eight deputy chairs, one secretary, seven 
deputy secretaries and 16 members. The roles of this leadership body are to 
prepare contents for MPR sessions as well as DPD inputs and perspectives, to 
develop programs and disseminate them to the public, and to conduct studies 
related to the constitution and state system. This leadership acts as a voice for 
provincial interests.  
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The Constitution limits the number of DPD members to no more than one third of 
the number of DPR members. This imbalance contributes to an unequal 
relationship between the DPD and DPR. As part of the MPR, the DPD has similar 
rights to the DPR to propose amendments to the Constitution, to crown the 
elected President and Vice President, and to support or oppose impeachment of 
the President. However, only DPR members can propose an impeachment of the 
President. To discuss the impeachment, MPR leadership will call for an 
extraordinary session. An impeachment proposal has to be supported by two 
thirds of MPR members which is equal to the number of DPR members. This 
means if the DPD does not support the impeachment, the proposal can still be 
passed by the MPR.  
 
In responding to this imbalance of power, in 2012 DPD members starting calling 
themselves the "senate" although the DPD does not have the same authority of 
senates in other countries. Until now, the DPD continues to advocate for a more 
powerful role in the Indonesian parliament, including the power to pass 
legislation.  
 
2.2 POLITICAL PARTIES 
Political parties form a very important element of Indonesia's democracy. Political 
parties aim to represent the voices of citizens and act as a bridge between the 
state and community. Through parties, citizens can channel and influence 
legislation and policy-making. Indonesia has a strong multi-party system, 
meaning more than two primary parties compete for office.  
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Although in the Indonesian system, parties are meant to represent the voices of 
citizens, Indonesian parties tend to be leader-centric and dominated by a small 
circle of elite politicians (Mietzner 2008). As will be discussed later, political 
parties in Indonesia have the ability to influence or control the number of women 
in parliament. They are the gatekeepers to women's participation in elections, in 
parliament and in other leadership positions. The roles of parties and how they 
recruit and place candidates will be elaborated in Chapter Five.  
 
The number of political parties in the Indonesian political system varies from time 
to time, however there are seven large and well-established parties that have 
obtained a significant number of seats in parliament. These seven parties are: 
 The Party of Functional Groups (Golkar) 
 The Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (PDIP) 
 The United Development Party (PPP) 
 The Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat) 
 The National Awakening Party (PKB) 
 The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
 The National Mandate Party (PAN) 
These parties reflect different ideologies and dynamics within the Indonesian 
political system.  
  
Golkar was established in 1963 by the Indonesian Army as a counter-power to 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Soeharto consolidated Golkar into a 
major party of which became the backbone of the New Order (Mietzner 2008; 
Wanandi 2004). Golkar consisted of functional groupings, professional 
organisations and the army.   
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During the New Order government, to strengthen Golkar's stranglehold on the 
electorate and to remove the competitiveness of other parties, the Elections Law 
No 5/1975 ordered the consolidation of 10 political parties that contested in the 
1971 elections into three political parties. As a result, the nationalist parties 
combined into the Indonesia Democracy Party (PDI) and the Islamic parties into 
the United Development Party (PPP). The six New Order elections were 
contested by these two parties and Golkar. No new political party was allowed to 
form (Lee 2007). It is said that Soeharto perceived political parties as a source of 
chaos and instability in Indonesia's political system (Ramage in Lee 2007).  
 
Golkar consistently won elections, partly because public servants were instructed 
by the government to vote for Golkar (they were threatened with losing their jobs) 
and military force was used to intimidate people before the elections (Budiardjo 
2008). Voting day was held on a weekday at offices so it was easier for the 
government to monitor public servant voting (Pamungkas 2009). Soeharto used 
bureaucrats as his political machine to win elections. Golkar's political machinery 
existed from the national level down to the village level and as such, Golkar 
always won over 60 percent of parliamentary seats. 
 
Harris (1998), an Indonesian political scientist, argued that Soeharto and his 
ruling clique heavily dominated the elections during the New Order. An example 
to demonstrate this is that heads at the village, sub district, district and provincial 
levels were chairs of the Electoral Commissions, Electoral Committees and 
Election Watch Boards at all levels; as well as members of Golkar. Soeharto used 
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the election only as a means to legitimise his power rather than as an effort to 
implement democracy (Suryadinata 2007). 
 
The 1999 elections were the first time people were allowed to form parties other 
than the three New Order parties. President Habibie who replaced Soeharto 
announced that there were no limitations on the number of parties that could 
contest in the elections and he allowed anyone to form a party (Lee 2007). In 
responding to this political freedom, people enthusiastically embraced the 
elections and as a result, established more than 200 parties, of which only 48 
parties were eligible to contest (Ufen 2007). These parties included those during 
the New Order regime, PKB, founded by Abdurahman Wahid, a very popular 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader; PAN, led and founded by Amien Rais from the 
modernist Moslem organisation Muhammadiyah, and the Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan), a conservative Moslem party (Mietzner 2008).  
 
Compared to the 1999 elections, only half the number of political parties 
contested in the 2004 elections (24 parties compared to 48). The significant 
decline in the number of political parties contesting in 2004 can be attributed to 
the requirement in 1999 for political parties to meet a parliamentary threshold of 
two percent of the total national votes in order to be eligible to contest in the 2004 
elections. Of the 24 parties contesting in 2004, six were old parties that had 
passed the parliamentary threshold, five were old parties that did not pass the 
threshold but changed their party names (and were therefore considered as 'new' 
political parties) and 13 were newly established parties (Romli 2004).  
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A stand out feature of the 2009 elections and further evidence of Indonesia's 
democratisation was Acehnese parties being allowed to contest in the district and 
provincial elections. This recognised the Aceh province's autonomy after a long 
struggle to gain independence from Indonesia. Fourteen parties were established 
with six of them registering to contest in the 2009 local elections (Hillman 2010).  
 
2.2.1 WOMEN'S PARTIES 
Women's access to political decision-making in Indonesia is limited. Despite the 
strong multi-party system in Indonesia, the culture of political parties is very 
patriarchal and unfriendly to women. As a result, the voices and interests of 
women are not well represented in political party agendas, structures and 
policies. Women's activists have attempted to address these issues through 
various means, including establishing women's political parties. Women's political 
parties are generally established to promote women's voices and interests which 
are too rarely represented in mainstream political parties. Two women's parties 
have been established in Indonesia: one is the Women's People Party (PWR), 
and the second is the Indonesian Women's Party (PPI). 
 
PWR was the only women's party that contested the first Indonesian elections. 
None of its candidates won a parliamentary seat. Mangunsarkoro, a prominent 
Indonesian women’s activist, had established the party in 1946 to improve 
women's positions in politics and parliament (Martyn 2005). Despite this, PWR 
did not get broad support from women's activists. SK Trimurti, a minister during 
the Soekarno era, argued that establishing a women's-only party was not a 
strategic move for the political situation at the time. She suggested that to 
participate in politics, it was better for women to be involved in existing political 
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parties rather than establishing women-specific parties (Trimurti 1946). It also did 
not solve the underlying problems of women's participation in politics. Vreede-de 
Stuers (2008) added that the candidates from PWR probably did not get elected 
because they were not members of the Indonesian Women's Congress (Kowani) 
an umbrella of women's organisations. As a result, PWR did not have political 
support from Kowani organisation members. 
 
PPI was established by La Rose, a women's writer and journalist, together with 
Titi Said and Upi Tuti Sundari on 29 May 1998. They established the party 
because despite women making up 53 percent of the Indonesian population, they 
were unlikely to hold high political roles or be placed in strategic positions to 
influence policy. They hoped that this party would provide access to women and 
open the new political world for women (Suryakusuma 1999). 
 
Unfortunately, PPI did not pass the requirements to contest in the elections. 
Women did not respond to the party with great enthusiasm, possibly because it 
was not widely promoted across Indonesia and did not involve the women's 
movement. Additionally, PPI did not have a solid membership base, including 
wide spread chapters across provinces, support organisations, and strong 
grassroots connections. This lack of a membership base can be attributed to the 
fact that the party was established from a foundation belonging to La Rose 
(Suryakusuma 1999).  
 
Across the world, efforts to establish women's parties to counter male dominance 
in political parties have generally been unsuccessful. The exceptions include a 
few cases such as in Iceland where the Icelandic Women's Alliance won six 
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parliamentary seats (10 percent of the total number of seats) in 1987 (Sawer & 
Simms 1993) and post-communist countries where women's parties had some 
brief electoral success (Ishiyama 2003). The Women of Russia Party was 
established by three organisations in 1993 as an alternative to other parties that 
ignored women's issues. This party gained three seats in the 1995 elections. In 
Lithuania, the Lithuanian Women's Party was founded by the former Prime 
Minister to increase women's representation in parliament. This party won one 
seat in the 1996 election. The Shamiram Women's Party in Armenia was the only 
party with no distinct link with a women's organisation. The Party won 12 seats in 
Parliament. These three parties were not able to retain their seats for the following 
elections (Ishiyama 2003).  
 
More recently in the Philippines, the Gabriela Women's Party (GWP) won two 
congressional seats in the 2007 elections, one seat more than in the 2004 
elections. This was a milestone for the women's movement in the Philippines. 
The GWP is the political wing of Gabriela, a women's organisation founded in 
1984 and has 250 organisations as members (Karan et al. 2008). The GWP aims 
to promote the rights and welfare of marginalised and under-represented Filipino 
women. The party has over 100,000 members across the Philippines (Gabriela 
2013). This strong membership base is one difference from PPI. 
 
2.3 THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
The Electoral Commission (KPU) is an independent body that manages 
Indonesia's elections including legislative, presidential, provincial and district 
elections. The KPU is responsible for verifying and approving political parties to 
contest in elections; verifying party lists; providing election education and 
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information about ballot locations; relevant laws and regulations; and is 
responsible for the management of the electoral roll. For party registration, there 
is a requirement that a new party must have at least 30 percent of women in its 
structure at the national level. Thus, the KPU is responsible for verifying whether 
a party meets this requirement. Additionally the KPU has the significant role of 
monitoring the implementation of gender quotas on party lists. This means 
ensuring that women make up at least 30 percent of candidates on party lists. 
The KPU is authorised to return party lists that do not meet gender quota 
requirements.  
 
Management of the electoral roll is an enormous task. In the elections since the 
Soeharto regime, there have been ongoing problems related to voter registration 
and the electoral rolls. Prior to each election, the government conducts a census 
to register voters, rather than voters registering themselves. Many people have 
complained that their names were not registered and listed on the electoral roll, 
even though they were registered in the previous elections. Some people have 
also reported deceased or under-aged people being registered on the electoral 
roll. A report from the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) which 
monitored the 2009 elections in conflict areas, prisons and hospitals claims that 
there were between 25 to 40 percent of voters in those three areas that were not 
registered (Komnas HAM 2012).  
 
The KPU has offices in each province and district. The national office is located 
in Jakarta. There have been significant reforms within the KPU since the New 
Order. During the Soeharto era, members of the KPU were ministers and all 
Commission staff were public servants who were constantly reminded to devote 
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their loyalty to Soeharto's party, Golkar (Evans 1999). Then in 1998 during 
President Habibie's term, the composition of KPU's membership changed to one 
representative from each competing political party and five government 
representatives totalling 53 members at the national level. This number was 
reduced to 11 in the 2004 elections and then to seven in the 2009 elections (KPU 
2013). KPU membership is no longer comprised of party representatives; rather 
members are selected through an open process derived from the general public. 
The Commission at the district and provincial levels is comprised of five members 
who are selected every five years.  
 
Unlike in Australia where the Minister appoints the Commissioner (SMOS 2012), 
in Indonesia the President forms a selection panel to receive applications and to 
shortlist candidates. The President then submits a shortlist of potential 
candidates to the DPR for interview. Based on this, the DPR selects seven of 
these candidates to be members of the KPU (KPU 2013). At the provincial level, 
the national KPU forms a KPU selection team in each province. The team consist 
of five people, representing academics, NGOs and professionals. Of these five 
members, the governor proposes one member, the Provincial DPRD proposes 
two members and the national KPU proposes two members. This selection team 
then invites applications from the public and conducts the selection as stipulated 
by the law. A similar process is followed at the district level, with the provincial 
KPU forming a selection team to select KPU members at the district level. 
 
As stated in the 2007 Elections Management Body Law (Undang-Undang 
Penyelenggaraan Pemilu, Law No 22/2007), selection of the Commission should 
consider 30 percent of women's representation. However, in the most recent 
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national selection in 2012, the DPR only selected one woman out of seven 
members, resulting in women's representation of 14 percent. This is a significant 
decrease from the previous membership period (2007-2012), where there were 
three women Commission members at the national level.  
 
2.4 THE VOTING SYSTEM AND BALLOTS 
2.4.1 VOTERS 
Citizens who are 17 years old or married have the right to vote. Voting is not 
compulsory, although voter turnout is always high. The lowest voter turnout was 
70 percent for the 2009 elections, and the highest in a democratic election was 
93 percent in 1999 (International IDEA 2011). In 1999, President Habibie issued 
a regulation that abolished the requirement for public servants to vote for Golkar.  
 
2.4.2 ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 
Indonesia consists of 77 electoral districts. Electoral districts for the DPR are 
roughly based on provinces or parts of provinces depending on the size of the 
population. For example, 14 of the most populated provinces are divided into 58 
electoral districts, meanwhile 19 of the least populated provinces from one 
electoral district (KPU 2009). On the island of Java alone, there are 35 electoral 
districts for the DPR. On the other hand, most of the provinces in the eastern part 
of Indonesia such as Papua and North Maluku form only one electoral district. 
The number of seats allocated per electoral district for the DPR varies between 
three to 10, while the number of seats for district parliament is between 20 to 50 
seats.  
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2.4.3 BALLOTS 
Since the 2004 elections, there have been four types of ballot papers for each 
voter except for voters in the Special Regional of Jakarta where voters there only 
have to vote for the DPR, DPD and provincial DPRD. Ballots for the national, 
provincial and district parliaments contain the name of candidates and party 
symbols, while the ballot for the DPD candidates contains the number, picture 
and name of candidates. There is a separate, colour-coded ballot for each 
parliament. The size of the ballot paper can be as big as a newspaper as seen in 
Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: An example of a ballot for a provincial DPRD  
 
Source: KPU (2011) 
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Ballot papers for the presidential election contain the pictures of both the 
President and Vice President candidates (as seen in Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: An example of a ballot for the Presidential elections  
 
Source: KPU (2011)  
 
2.4.4 HOW TO VOTE 
In the 2009 elections, voters voted by ticking a party symbol or a candidate. The 
KPU undertook a large media campaign as demonstrated in Figure 6 to educate 
the public on how to cast their votes.   
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Figure 6: An example of KPU educational material on how to vote 
 
Source: KPU (2011) 
 
According to the 2008 Elections Law, voters may cast their ballot for either a 
political party or a candidate only. Many voters and political parties objected to 
this clause on the basis that it would increase the number of invalid votes. As a 
result, a few weeks before the elections, the President changed the rule and 
allowed voters to tick either the name of a party or a candidate within a party or 
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both. This choice created confusion and made voters, moreover illiterate voters, 
nervous. For some voters, this was their first experience holding a pen (Candidate 
from Partai Demokrat, Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 4 December).   
 
2.4.5 HOW VOTES TRANSLATE INTO SEATS 
In a PR system, the number of seats attributed to a political party is proportionate 
to the number of votes it receives. This means that a party or candidate will 
receive a seat in parliament if the total votes received are equivalent or more than 
the electoral quotient (BPP). The electoral quotient is determined by the total 
votes in one district, divided by the number of seats allocated to that electoral 
district in parliament (IPU 2011). For example, if there are approximately one 
million votes in an electoral district and there are 50 seats in parliament, the 
electoral quotient is 20,000 votes.  
 
A closed list system was used in the 1999 elections where voters could only vote 
a preferred party. The 'winning' candidate was selected by the political party 
leaders. Voters could not decide which candidate should be elected to parliament. 
This placed a large amount of control in the hands of party elites and was 
perceived by many to be undemocratic (Sherlock 2009).  
 
A semi-open list system was used in the 2004 elections (for the DPR and DPRDs) 
where voters could vote for an individual and a party. This meant that candidates 
who met the electoral quotient automatically won a seat in parliament. 
Unfortunately, due to the high number of invalid votes (because many voters 
failed to vote for a candidate AND a party, thus resulting in an invalid vote) and 
the method for counting individual votes, only two DPR candidates managed to 
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achieve the electoral quotient (Pelita 2014; Sherlock 2009). Once it was 
determined how many seats had been won by each party, the seats were then 
allocated to those candidates ranked highest on the party lists (regardless of 
whether that candidate received fewer personal votes compared to other 
candidates on the party's list). This system demonstrates the importance of 
placement on party lists. The box below outlines an example of this process. As 
will be discussed in Chapter Four, the process for determining the winning 
candidates was changed by the Constitutional Court shortly before the 2009 
elections.  
 
EXAMPLE 
This example aims to demonstrate how votes are translated into seats in the Indonesian 
electoral system. The description below is relevant for the 2004 elections and demonstrates 
the importance of a candidate's rank on a party's list.  
 
In District X, there are approximately 1.5 million total votes. In that district, there are 50 
parliamentary seats being contested by several political parties. Because there are 1.5 million 
total votes and 50 parliamentary seats, the electoral quotient is 30,000 votes. As seen in the 
tally below, Party Y had six candidates. None of the candidates received more than 30,000 
votes, and as a result, no candidates were not automatically elected. However, the party 
received 45,000 votes, meaning the party as whole, achieved the electoral quotient.  
 
Candidate A = 13,000 votes 
Candidate B = 7,000 votes 
Candidate C = 15,000 votes 
Candidate D = 2,500 votes 
Candidate E = 2,000 votes 
Candidate F = 5,500 votes 
PARTY TOTAL = 45,000 votes 
 
In this example, Candidate A will win the party's seat in parliament. This is because Candidate 
A occupies the top position on the party's list, despite receiving fewer votes than Candidate 
C.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the key components that comprise the Indonesian 
electoral system. As discussed, the electoral system has changed throughout 
Indonesia's democratisation and continues to evolve. One aspect of this evolution 
is the way in which the structure and function of the electoral system has 
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transformed from being a mechanism to consolidate the power of a few men (the 
President and his military supporters) to representing the social and cultural 
diversity of the archipelago. During this evolution, the electoral system has also 
increasingly accommodated women through various electoral laws, including 
gender quotas for political party lists and KPU membership. Despite these 
positive steps, the application of these quotas has not always been consistent 
with the spirit of the laws.  
 
The other notable aspect of Indonesia's electoral evolution is the speed at which 
it has changed since Soeharto's downfall. The size and makeup of the parliament 
has changed, the political party landscape has transformed, and the way in which 
candidates win their seats has also changed. The following chapters will take a 
closer look at how Indonesia's electoral evolution, in particular the Constitutional 
Court's decision on the formula for electoral victory, has impacted on the 
effectiveness of gender quotas and women's representation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT AND GENDER QUOTAS IN INDONESIA 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
Despite a long history of many prominent women leaders in Indonesia, women's 
representation in parliament remains very low. Women's representation in the 
DPR following the 2004 elections was 11 percent and in the DPD, 18 percent. 
Representation at the provincial and district levels was lower, with an average of 
10 percent in provincial parliaments and below five percent in district parliaments, 
with some district parliaments having no women MPs (Soetjipto 2011). In light of 
this situation, and similar to many other countries, the Indonesian women's 
movement has adopted inequality of representation as a core advocacy issue. 
As a result, the movement has played a key role in advocating for gender quotas 
to be enacted in law (Bauer 2004; Goetz 2002; Powley 2005).  
 
This chapter will discuss women's political participation in Indonesia and how the 
Indonesian women's movement promoted gender quotas. The first section 
provides a historical discussion on the efforts of the Indonesian women's 
movement to open women's access to their political rights. The second section 
describes how the Indonesian women's movement and other actors advocated 
for gender quotas, including their strategies and achievements.  
 
3.2 A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN INDONESIA 
Women's political participation has long been a core issue promoted by the 
Indonesian women's movement. In every period of Indonesia's history, women's 
activists and organisations have lobbied to improve aspects of women's political 
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participation relevant to that era. Before Indonesia's independence, women 
fought to be able to run for office; during the New Order era, women struggled to 
break free of the State's ideology of women; and in the Reformation Era women 
have demanded greater participation and representation in politics and public life 
at all levels, as well as lobbied for changes to discriminatory regulations. For 
example, district regulations in Kendal, Central Java, only allow the head of the 
household, which is determined in the 1974 Marriage Law (Undang- Undang 
Perkawinan, Law No 1/1974) to be the male of the household, to run for village 
council membership (Noerdin 2002). As a result, the 1974 Marriage Law prevents 
women from participating in decision making at the local level through Rukun 
Tetangga (RT) and Rukun Warga (RW) (community organisations at the sub-
village level) because invitations for relevant RT and RW meetings goes to the 
head of the household (Budhiati 2002). 
 
3.2.1 COLONIAL - OLD ORDER PERIOD 
Indonesian women in the 1900s during the Dutch Empire did not have the same 
rights as men. Kartini, an Indonesian feminist in the 1900s, motivated by her 
experiences of being denied a formal education, promoted education rights for 
women as well as lobbied against arranged marriages and polygamy (Vreede-de 
Stuers 2008; Wieringa 1999). Like Kartini, other Indonesian feminists in the 1900s 
such as Dewi Sartika and Siti Soendari viewed education as a way to emancipate 
women, to eliminate problems affecting women like child marriage, prostitution, 
polygamy, and as a key to social and moral change for women (Blackburn 2004; 
Rochiati 1983; Vreede-de Stuers 2008). Kartini and Dewi Sartika opened the door 
for women to access education, and as a result, provided women with a 
foundation for becoming politically active. This is because in Indonesia, political 
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candidates need to have obtained a certain level of education to run in elections. 
The minimum requirement is a senior high school degree, which is a barrier for 
many women who live in districts where it is uncommon for girls to get a high 
school education. Education attainment also influences placement on party lists. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
In 1912, the first formal women's organisation called Putri Mardika, translated to 
"Free Women", was established in Jakarta (Kowani 1978; Suryochondro 1984). 
The objectives of the organisation were to provide financial support for women to 
study or to further their study; give advice and information for women; build 
women's confidence; and to promote women's participation in the public domain. 
This organisation published weekly newspapers that covered issues such as 
child marriage, polygamy, arranged marriage and the results of the Feminist 
Congress in Paris in 1919 (Vreede-de Stuers 2008). From 1915 to 1937, there 
were 33 women's organisations established based on Muslim, Catholic, 
nationalist, and social/communist ideals (Kowani 1978).  
 
In 1938, Datu Tumenggung was the first Indonesian woman to stand as a 
candidate for the Batavia municipal elections. She was unsuccessful. Datu 
Tumenggung was a member of the Association for Women's Suffrage in the 
Dutch East Indies, an organisation that was established in 1908 as a branch of 
the Dutch Women's Suffrage Association, which later in the 1920s promoted the 
right to vote for educated Indonesian women. In 1930, the voting rights of women 
were debated and discussed in the second congress of the Indonesian 
Federation of Women's Organisations and then again in 1938 in the National 
Conference of Indonesian Women's Organisations (Kowani 1978). During the 
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same year, the Dutch Government appointed four Indonesian women to be 
members of the municipal council. The nationalist movement, the Indonesian 
women's movement together with the Association for Women's Suffrage in the 
Dutch East Indies in 1939 pressed the colonial government to grant female 
suffrage. As a result of this lobbying, the Dutch Government granted the right to 
vote for Indonesian women in 1942 (Blackburn 2004).  
 
Following independence, women's equal rights as citizens were guaranteed in 
the 1945 Constitution (Blackburn 2004). Martyn (2005) highlights that the 1950s 
were an important decade for women because Indonesia was a new nation state 
in which women could freely engage in political action. Women used this time as 
an opportunity to promote their rights (Blackburn 1999). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the 1955 election after independence was notable for the 
emergence of the women's party PWR, which participated in the election (Martyn 
2005; Siregar 2007; Vreede-de Stuers 2008). 
 
3.2.2 NEW ORDER ERA 
During the Soeharto regime women were forced back to the domestic domain to 
implement their roles as wives and mothers. Women's rights were limited to 
voting. Women lost their freedom to voice their political rights and were not 
allowed to form organisations that were critical of the government. This was the 
result of the Indonesian Women's Movement's (Gerwani) association with the 
Communist movement. Gerwani was established on 4 June 1950 by six women's 
organisations and had a peak membership base of 1.75 million people (Wieringa 
1999). However, the coup d'etat on the Soekarno government on 30 September 
1965 was attributed to the Communist Party and its associated organisations, 
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including Gerwani. Due to their association with the coup, many Gerwani 
members were sexually assaulted, killed, tortured or sent to jail for many years 
without trial (Birks 2006; Wieringa 1999). Following the ban on the Communist 
Party as well as Communist and Marxist teachings, books and other references 
associated with Gerwani and Communism were burnt. The Minister for Home 
Affairs issued a regulation in 1981 that prohibited ex-members of the Communist 
Party and associated organisations, like Gerwani, to be members of political 
parties, public servants, army officials and village heads (Muhammadong 2003). 
In 1999, people formerly associated with the Community Party regained their right 
to vote (Birks 2006). Their right to stand for election was returned after the 
Constitutional Court ruled out Election Laws in 2003 that prohibited Communist 
members and their families to stand for elections (Salim 2004).  
 
According to Suryakusuma (1996), an Indonesian feminist, Soeharto 
implemented "state ibuism" (womanhood) as state ideology which defined the 
ideal woman as an appendage and companion to her husband, procreator of the 
nation, mother and educator of her children, housekeeper and member of the 
Indonesian society. Put simply, this state ideology required women to be 
submissive and politically passive, the consequences of oppressing women's 
participation in decision-making (Wieringa 2003). This ideology is still seen today 
in dioramas at the Lubang Buaya Museum in Jakarta where the ideal model of a 
woman in the New Order is presented as being domestic and traditional. The 
museum also depicts how Soeharto portrayed the role of Gerwani in the coup 
d'etat: seductive temptresses torturing dying Indonesian generals. The museum 
was built by Soeharto to commemorate his victory against the 1965 Community 
movement.  
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To promote state ibuism, Soeharto supported the Family Welfare Movement 
(PKK) in 1970, a women's organisation at the village level that implemented 
activities of particular interest to women (Marcoes 2002; Robinson 1999). 
Participants of PKK were taught how to cook nutritional food, how to care for 
babies, how to dress as traditional women, and save money for the family. 
Additionally, Dharma Wanita, was established in 1974 as an organisation for 
wives to support their husbands' performance as public servants. Membership of 
Dharma Wanita was compulsory for wives of civil servants. Essentially, the 
Soeharto regime put structures in place to make women dependent on their 
husbands.  
 
The women's movement during the New Order worked underground. There was 
very little freedom of association and movement. Freedom of speech was almost 
non-existent. Yuni Chuzaifah, the current chair of the National Commission for 
Elimination of Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) testified that she 
and her colleagues had to keep a low profile when they met and organised 
women's activities. They had to hide and be careful not to be caught by local 
authorities that patrolled and monitored gatherings that involved more than two 
people (Komnas Perempuan 2010).  
 
Soeharto destroyed the women's movement that existed before he ruled 
(Mochtar 2000). As a result, there were only a few women's NGOs that existed 
during the New Order, including Yasanti, Rifka Annisa, Kalyanamitra, Solidaritas 
Perempuan and Women’s Legal Aid (LBH APIK). Yasanti was established by 
women activists in Yogyakarta in 1982 to focus on the empowerment and 
 69 
promotion of women worker's rights in formal and informal sectors (Yasanti 
2013). Yasanti was the first women's NGO formed in the New Order Era. Another 
NGO also based in Yogyakarta is Rifka Annisa which provides legal counselling 
services for women who experience violence. Rifka Annisa also forms 
community-based crisis centres and provides awareness training for perpetrators 
of domestic violence. Women activists established this organisation in 1993. 
Kalyanamitra (meaning good friend) was established in 1985. Based in Jakarta, 
the organisation works as a resource and information centre about women's 
rights (Kalyanamitra 2013). Solidaritas Perempuan (meaning women's solidarity) 
works on women's rights, including migrant worker issues. Women activists 
established Solidaritas Perempuan in 1990. LBH APIK was established in Jakarta 
in 1995 by seven feminist lawyers to provide counselling and legal services for 
women experiencing violence and to hold legal training for women (LBH APIK 
2014).  
 
During the economic crisis in 1997, Kalyanamitra and a dozen organisations such 
as the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), the Consumer 
Protection Organisation (YLKI), LBH APIK and the Cultural Working Network 
(JKB), established a cooperation for poor people and supplied meals for students 
during rallies against Soeharto's regime. At the same time, the Voice of 
Concerned Mothers' (Suara Ibu Peduli) movement emerged and advocated for 
the issue of baby formula as a means to gain political support from the wider 
community in the democratic movement. At that time, freedom of expression was 
strictly limited, therefore this group used the increased price of baby's formula 
which had increased by 400 percent to campaign for women's political rights. The 
women's movement played a significant role in the Reformation movement 
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including: forming many emergency response groups during the political and 
economic turbulence in 1998, providing counselling to women who were raped 
or had lost their loved ones in the 1998 May riots; as well as providing testimonies 
in public campaigns against Soeharto (Komnas Perempuan 2001).  
 
3.2.3 THE REFORMATION ERA 
An important milestone in the Reformation Era was the establishment of Komnas 
Perempuan in 1998 by President Habibie. The establishment of Komnas 
Perempuan was the result of lobbying by women and other human rights groups 
demanding the President take proper action in addressing sexual violence 
against the Tionghoa ethnic people in the 1998 May riots (Komnas Perempuan 
2001). Komnas Perempuan is a quasi-government organisation that is mandated 
to promote women's rights and efforts to prevent and address violence against 
women. After Komnas Perempuan was promulgated, the Indonesian Women's 
Coalition for Justice and Democracy (KPI) formally launched its first Congress in 
Yogyakarta in December 1998.  
 
In the Reformation Era, President Abdurrahman Wahid changed the name of the 
Ministry of Women's Affairs to the Ministry of Women's Empowerment. The name 
change signified an improvement in the government's approach to women: from 
passive objects to active participants in the country's development. This meant a 
shift from state ibuism to giving women the space and opportunity to voice their 
opinions, participate in public roles and decision making both at the national and 
local levels. As a consequence, there was an increasing demand to address the 
underrepresentation of women in public office.  
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Freedom of organisation and association were the foundations for a flourishing 
women's movement in this era. The movement focused on advocacy, providing 
education to communities, and providing essential services. To prepare for the 
upcoming elections, women's organisations delivered voter education in 1999 
(Komnas Perempuan 2001). In the Reformation Era, the relationship between 
NGOs and government bodies opened up and provided room for dialogue and 
collaboration. The government also recognised the existence and role of NGOs 
in the community.  
 
3.3 THE CAMPAIGN FOR GENDER QUOTAS IN INDONESIA 
In Indonesia, like internationally, gender quotas would not have been adopted 
without the persistent and tireless lobbying of grass roots, national and 
international women's groups. Generally, gender quota promotion has not started 
until women's groups have identified quotas as a legitimate means to improve 
women's political representation.  
 
Studies have shown that women's campaigns for quotas tend to be successful 
when quotas are identified as a strategic benefit to the political elite; linked to 
existing notions of equality and representation; and supported by international 
organisations and transnational networks (Araujo & Garcia 2006). Additionally, 
political parties can have different motivations for adopting gender quotas, 
including wanting to be seen as modern; as part of electoral competition; meeting 
international norms; and/or achieving political advantages (Caul 2001; Matland 
2004; Tripp & Kang 2008). For example, in France, large parties supported 
gender parity because male incumbents expected voters to favour male 
candidates (most of them incumbents) over new female candidates (Frechette & 
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Piscopo 2008). Meanwhile in Norway, the Socialist Left Party adopted gender 
quotas to distinguish itself from the Labour Party. In this case, the implementation 
of quotas was seen as a strategy to attract leftist women away from the Labour 
Party. Meanwhile, the reason for the Liberal Party's adoption of quotas was to 
establish a new party identity (Matland 2004).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, women's representation 
following the 2004 elections at the local level is an average of 10 and five percent 
in provincial and district parliaments respectively. Gadis Arivia (2006), a founder 
of Jurnal Perempuan, argued that the “male stream” approach in politics has 
produced rules that have benefited men and marginalised women in the political 
arena. As a result, feminists want to feminise democracy in order to construct a 
just, open, equal and participatory world for women. This can be achieved by 
adopting quota provisions to increase the proportion of women in parliament. The 
Indonesian women's movement argued that gender quotas had to be 
implemented or it would take 75 years to achieve equal representation without 
adopting special measures (KPI 2002).   
 
3.3.1 THE PUSH FOR QUOTAS IN INDONESIA 
The term "quota" was introduced for the first time on 22 December 1998 in a 
Political Statement made by KPI. The statement called for the Indonesian 
Government to provide access for women to national leadership positions and to 
provide a 50 percent quota in legislative, judicial and executive arenas (KPI 
1999). This statement was made not long after Soeharto resigned as President 
in May 1998. KPI is a women's mass organisation established by feminists from 
various organisations as a result of the Congress of Indonesian Women in 
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December 1998. Around 600 activists from across Indonesia attended the 
congress (KPI nd). In this congress, participants highlighted the urgent need for 
women to be represented in decision-making bodies and for national leaders to 
voice women's interests. Until 1998, women's political representation in 
parliament had never exceeded 13 percent, despite Indonesian women having 
the same right to vote as men since independence in 1945.  
 
After the 1999 elections, there was strong opposition to women's leadership by 
PPP and several Moslem organisations. These Moslem groups argued that a 
woman could not be the President as it is against the Quran (Blackburn 2004; 
Robinson 2009). Much of this opposition was in relation to the victory of PDIP, 
led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, a daughter of the first Indonesian President, 
Soekarno. PDIP gained the largest proportion of votes in parliament, and as a 
result, it was expected that MPs would vote for Megawati as President. Among 
the parties that won parliamentary seats, PDIP was the only party led by a 
woman. Despite gaining the most number of parliamentary seats, PDIP did not 
manage to gain support from other parties to elect Megawati (Sherlock 2004). 
Megawati received 313 votes, while Abdurrahman Wahid received 373 votes 
from members of the MPR (Ismail 2013). This result made Abdurrahman Wahid 
the President and Megawati, the Vice President. Prior to the elections, Moslem 
leaders at a national consultation organised by Nahdlatul Ulama concluded that 
women were allowed to be voted as Vice President, but not as the President 
(Robinson & Bessell 2002). PAN, PPP and other Moslem parties formed an 
alliance to maintain power in the MPR and to oppose the idea of a female 
President to prevent Megawati from becoming President (Bessell 2004). This 
contributed to decreasing support from parties to elect Megawati as President.  
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The women's movement continued to consolidate, discuss advocacy strategies 
and agreed on the percentage of quotas they demanded. There were two 
different proposals, a group that demanded 20 percent and another group that 
demanded 30 percent. The main argument for the group that proposed 20 
percent was because there were not many women in political parties and 
therefore it would be too difficult to meet a higher quota. Meanwhile the group, 
including the Women's Parliamentary Caucus, that proposed 30 percent argued 
that 30 percent was the required number for women to be able to have a voice in 
decision-making (Siregar 2007). KPI had promoted 50 percent of women's 
representation, however the international community had set a target of at least 
30 percent of women as stated by the United Nation's Economic and Social 
Council. Therefore, after a series of discussions, the Indonesian women's 
movement advocated for at least 30 percent in decision-making bodies 
(Katjasungkana 2002).  
 
The slogan used by the women's movement to promote quotas was "No 
democracy without women's representation" (Budhiati 2003; KPI 2001). The main 
arguments used by KPI for gender quotas included: 
 women's representation is a key principle of democracy and implementing 
gender quotas is one way of achieving this; 
 affirmative action is promoted in international conventions ratified by 
Indonesia, thus the government is obligated to implement the 
recommendations as set out in the conventions.  
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In addition to these international conventions, the 1999 Indonesian Human Rights 
Law states that the electoral system, political party systems and judicature and 
executive appointment mechanisms must guarantee 30 percent women’s 
representation. Women's activists argued that women constitute more than 50 
percent of the population and therefore, should be represented equally in 
decision-making bodies as a form of democracy. Also, the Indonesian women's 
movement believed that only women can speak and advocate for women's 
interests in policies (Siregar 2007).  
 
3.4 ACTORS 
Based on international studies and observations, Krook (2007) identified three 
groups of actors that have campaigned for gender quotas: civil society, state and 
international organisations. Similarly in Indonesia, these three actors and various 
others have participated in the gender quotas campaign. There are inter-linkages 
and interactions among these actors in the promotion of gender quotas. These 
actors have included civil society organisations (CSOs), academics, women in 
parliament, women in political parties, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment 
(MOWE), media and international organisations.  
 
Prominent women's organisations and other CSOs have taken up the issue of 
gender quotas adoption as their main advocacy focus. This was likely the result 
of their attendance at the 1995 Beijing conference which was reportedly attended 
by 150 Indonesian women activists (Sjarifudin 2009). Following the conference, 
these actors formed a network called the NGOs Communication Forum to monitor 
implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action. Civil Society actors that have 
promoted gender quotas have included KPI, the Centre for Electoral Reform 
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(CETRO), the Centre for Women's Empowerment in Politics (P2Pol), Kowani, 
Fatayat, Aisyiyah, the Empowerment of Women's Voice Movement (GPSP), the 
Association of Women's Small Entrepreneurs (ASPPUK), Jurnal Perempuan and 
several women's student associations including the Islamic Women's Student 
Association. Women academics have included those from the Faculty of Social 
and Political Science at the University of Indonesia. Individual women from 
various backgrounds have also supported the campaign. They formed national 
networks with state actors to legislate gender quotas. Civil society actors have 
been the drivers of gender quota advocacy.  
 
Women in parliament and political parties including their relevant organisations 
such as the women's caucus in parliament and women's caucuses in political 
parties have played an important role in advocating for gender quotas. Women 
MPs worked across parties to influence policy within parliament and their own 
parties. MOWE had a significant role in ensuring gender quotas were adopted in 
the national laws. This ministry, led by the Minister Meutia Hatta also actively 
reminded the KPU to enforce the gender quota provision on party lists.  
 
3.4.1 NATIONAL NETWORKS FOR GENDER QUOTAS 
For each of the gender quota campaigns before the 2004 and 2009 elections, 
women's CSOs and other groups formed networks to lobby for the adoption of 
gender quotas in the relevant election laws. During the gender quotas campaign 
in 2002 to 2003, the Women and Politics Network consisted of 78 CSOs actively 
advocating quotas. This network, in addition to the women's caucus in parliament, 
women's caucuses in political parties and academics formed a network called the 
Women's Group who are Concerned about Politics (Androgini in Siregar 2007).  
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The campaign for gender quotas has united women activists despite differences 
in ideology, programs, backgrounds and interests. For example, Kowani, an 
umbrella of women's organisations established in December 1928 emphasises 
women's responsibility towards the wellbeing of the nation, family, community 
and youth (Kowani 2011). Whereas the ideology of the more recently established 
women's NGOs such as Kalyanamitra and LBH APIK is to promote feminism and 
abolish the unequal gender roles supported by Kowani. One example of the 
different points of view between Kowani and other women's NGOs was on the 
issue of the 2008 Anti-Pornography Law (Undang- Undang Anti Pornografi, Law 
No 44/2008) which was viewed by Kowani as a form of child protection. Rather, 
other women's NGOs viewed the law as a form of state control over women's 
sexuality. Despite these ideological differences, Kowani and other women's 
organisations, including Fatayat and Aisyiyah, women's academics and women 
from different political parties put aside their ideological and political differences 
to promote gender quotas.  
 
In 2007, the women's movement responded to the government's plans to revise 
the package of political laws by establishing a national network called the Civil 
Society Alliance for the Revision of Political Laws (ANSIPOL). ANSIPOL was 
established and led by several women's organisations to promote the adoption of 
gender quotas in the revision of laws for the 2009 elections (Masruchah 2009, 
pers. comm. 28 November). To gain support from wider civil society 
organisations, the network invited other organisations to join, including Kowani, 
non-women's organisations and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI). 
ANSIPOL consisted of around 40 organisations (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 
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December). Unlike the previous quota campaign in 2002-2003, Kowani was not 
as actively involved in this network due to internal leadership changes.  
 
The women's movement was aware that it had become very important to build 
alliances and partnerships with women in parliament to advocate for the package 
of political laws within parliament. This would benefit both sides: women MPs 
could work within parliament and within parties for better policies on women's 
representation, while women's organisations could lobby parliament and party 
leaders by supporting women MPs with data, advice, media relations, theoretical 
backgrounds and position papers. This meant that the roles of women MPs and 
women's organisations complemented each other. MOWE played an important 
role in the gender quota campaign. Together with CSOs, the Minister frequently 
lobbied the KPU and DPR for the implementation of gender quotas. The Minister's 
presence not only pressured the task force to implement gender quotas, but she 
also provided the women's movement with important updates from meetings that 
were closed to the public (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 December).  
 
Women MPs and women activists have shared the same platform and agenda in 
multiple campaigns. However as Ani Soetjipto who was part of the 2003 and 2008 
campaigns revealed to me, the roles of each group had become clearer with each 
campaign: 
 
The difference [in gender quota campaigns] between 2003 and 
2008 was that women inside the DPR knew the movement better. 
There was a common understanding, there was trust. We divided 
our roles: they fought within parliament and we fought from the 
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outside. So it was not like earlier campaigns where we had to 
monitor sessions in parliament until morning prayers... we [women 
MPs and CSOs] texted each other... if they asked a question, we 
would provide the answer [referring to a series of questions that 
might be asked by the head of the Special Committee to women 
MPs in discussions on the package of political laws]. They [the 
women MPs] would call us if there was a deadlock in the Special 
Committee discussion (Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December).  
 
The exchange of text messages between women MPs and women's activists 
during discussions regarding the Elections and Political Party Laws (Undang- 
Undang Pemilu and Partai Politik) in the DPR was common practice in both 2002 
and 2008 (Siregar 2007; Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December). These text 
messages contained strategic information, advice and updates about the 
sessions. This exchange of information was based on the foundation of trust that 
took several years to build between women MPs and women's CSOs.  
 
3.4.2 INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
The success of the quota campaigns in Indonesia were made possible with 
assistance from international organisations. International organisations 
supported the local/national networks through various capacity building 
exercises. At the initial stages of the gender quotas campaign, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) supported a series of dialogue between women's 
organisations and political parties about women's representation and voter 
education. This dialogue and campaigns were aired on national television and 
radio. Since 1999, International IDEA has sponsored initiatives to strengthen 
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women's political participation as well as facilitated the sharing of knowledge 
between Indonesian women's activists and international feminists about quota 
implementation and increasing women's representation in decision-making 
(International IDEA 2011). Funding was made available for study visits to India, 
Philippines and Thailand as well as workshops at the provincial level about the 
implementation of gender quotas in the next elections. These cross-national 
learning opportunities served to exchange experiences and strategies in 
increasing women's representation in public office. International IDEA also held 
a national workshop in Jakarta and invited international experts on gender quotas 
to give lectures on quotas and to share quota implementation experiences from 
other countries (International IDEA 2003).  
 
The Asia Foundation, an international organisation based in Washington with an 
office in Jakarta, delivered a women's political participation program that assisted 
women's organisations to campaign for a quota system in the Elections Law and 
30 percent of women in political party structures (Satriyo 2009, pers. comm. 16 
December). The United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) supported dialogue 
between women's activists and Moslem leaders about women and politics in the 
Islamic context and training for women's candidates (Masruchah 2009, pers. 
comm. 28 November). The Regional Network of the Centre for Asia-Pacific 
Women in Politics (CAPWIP) provided training on how to achieve 50-50 women's 
and men's representation in politics. CAPWIP and KPI conducted workshops on 
women in politics, leadership, campaigning skills and fundraising campaigns. 
Some Indonesian women's organisations also attended meetings and trainings 
organised by CAPWIP on women in politics.  
 
 81 
International organisations also helped to develop a network of women in political 
parties. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a non-
profit organisation funded by the United States government and linked to the 
Democrat Party has delivered training for women in politics and capacity building 
for the Indonesian Political Women's Caucus (NDI 2003). The networks between 
the Indonesian women's movement and international organisations on gender 
quotas were also built in conferences and seminars with women activists and 
political parties. These occasions informed Indonesian women of the experiences 
of how other countries implemented gender quotas.  
 
3.5 STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 
As just discussed, the Indonesian women's movement worked within and outside 
of the parliamentary system to campaign for national laws to adopt gender 
quotas. Within parliament, the movement worked with women MPs and political 
parties, meanwhile outside of parliament, the movement built good relationships 
with the media, strengthened their international networks, provided training for 
women to run for public office and garnered support from the public. The women's 
movement chose a constitutional path and a legal reform strategy to promote 
greater representation of women in political institutions.  
 
The strategy employed by the women's movement for gender quotas was holistic: 
hulu ke hilir. This approach uses the analogy of a river that streams from 
beginning to end. In this context, the quota movement focused on every step in 
the political process from recruitment, to nomination, to selection, to elections as 
a means to increase women's political representation. This included guaranteeing 
women's representation in regulations and policies, in party structures, candidate 
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selection, the placement of women in winnable positions on party lists and 
representation in the parliamentary commissions and bodies.  
 
In the Political Party Law, we requested that gender quota be a 
requirement in establishing a new party. Why? Because established 
parties often make excuses that they cannot meet quota 
requirements as there are not enough qualified women. So we 
thought that if new parties already have 30 percent of women as 
party founders, this would be used as an initial pool of candidates. 
So we used the hulu ke hilir approach where the Political Party Law 
is hulu [the beginning] ... then we made sure that there is a quota 
requirement in the party's leadership. We also demanded that there 
is at least one woman among three candidates on party lists... We 
thought that if there is a party that won three seats in an electoral 
district, then one of them would go to a female candidate. This was 
supported by the formula for electoral victory [at that time] (Irlang 
2009, pers. comm. 9 December).  
 
The women's movement used a combination of interventions in and outside of 
party structures. This approach focused not just on gender quota policies, but 
also on how these policies were implemented, including creating a pool of 
aspirants as feeders for party lists. Strategies and tactics employed by the 
women's movement in promoting gender quotas are described further below.  
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3.5.1 RESEARCH ON PARTY REFORM AGENDA 
The Centre for Political Studies at the University of Indonesia (Puskapol UI) 
conducted research in 2007 on party reform agenda, including party perspectives 
on women's representation and what methods parties were proposing to increase 
women's representation. Seven political party leaders were interviewed to inform 
working papers that would be used to lobby and advocate for changes in the 
Political Party and Elections Laws. According to feminist political scientist, Ani 
Soetjipto (2009, pers. comm. 16 December), the Indonesian women's movement 
has very little political influence over political party agendas, and therefore it was 
more effective to take advantage of the reform agendas of parties to promote the 
adoption of the gender quota. This approach also avoided resistance from 
parties. The research found that political parties were no longer opposed to the 
idea of affirmative action, and no longer questioned why gender quotas were 
necessary. This was a big shift considering that when gender quotas were first 
introduced, none of the political parties embraced it. The research also found that 
parties were not in favour of closed list PR as it was seen to be less democratic, 
but they favoured a semi-open or open system. Large parties like Golkar and 
PDIP were in favour of open lists while medium-sized parties like PKB, PAN, 
PKS, and PPP preferred semi-open lists. Puskapol UI then presented the results 
of the research to women's organisations to inform their advocacy strategies. 
Given party opposition to closed lists and that gender quotas are ineffective with 
open lists, the women's movement promoted semi-open PR and advocated for a 
zipper system on party lists with sanctions for non-compliance (Soetjipto 2009, 
pers. comm. 16 December).  
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3.5.2 GUARANTEEING QUOTAS IN NATIONAL LAWS 
Following a failed attempt to get gender quotas inserted into the Indonesian 
Constitution in 2001, the women's movement turned its attention to inserting 30 
percent gender quotas in the Elections and Political Party Laws. Usually, the DPR 
reviews the package of political laws including the Elections and Political Party 
Laws between two and three years before the next round of national elections. 
This means the laws change every five years following the legislative and 
presidential election terms. The women's movement used this legislative reform 
to have quotas included in the new laws (Political Party, Legislative Election and 
Legislative Election Administration Laws) that underpinned Indonesia's transition 
to democracy (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 December).  
 
3.5.2a POLITICAL PARTY LAW  
In 2002, the DPR approved a newly revised Political Party Law. Article seven of 
this law stated that gender equality should be considered in party recruitment and 
article 13 stated that party structures at every level should be democratically 
selected taking into consideration gender equality (Siregar 2007). The women's 
movement was unhappy with this result, not only because they had lobbied to 
have a quota of 30 percent of women in the party structure included in the revised 
law, but also because the law did not recognise that the process of decision-
making within parties was often unfair and involved foul play.  
 
Initially, the Working Committee for the Political Party Law had accepted the 
women's movement's proposal for 30 percent of women in political party 
structures, however this policy was reviewed and then removed from the 
legislation by the Committee in an afternoon meeting when Aisyah Amini, a 
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woman MP from PPP who was a member of the Committee was absent. 
Following this, Amini sent a protest letter to the chair of the Working Committee 
and requested that the quota be put back in the Political Party Law (Sadli 2002). 
This action was supported by women's organisations such as KPI, the Women's 
Caucus in Parliament, the Indonesian Women's Council and the Women in 
Politics Network who also sent letters to the chair. In response to these letters, 
the chair of the Working Committee explained that because there was not enough 
women interested in politics, it would be too difficult for political parties to 
implement the 30 percent quota in their party structures.  
 
For the next review of the Political Party Law in 2007, the women's movement 
continued to campaign for 30 percent women's representation in party leadership 
at the national, provincial and district levels. Parties continued to reject this idea 
arguing that it was too burdensome to find women interested in being party 
members and involved in the party leadership at the sub-national levels, 
especially at the district levels.  
 
Tyas Iskandar, a woman MP from Golkar who was a member of the Special 
Committee informed women's groups that parties rejected their proposal in the 
Special Committee meeting which was closed to the public. In response, 
women's groups spoke to the chair of the Golkar fraction in DPR, Andi Matalatta, 
and explained the importance of gender quotas in party leadership. The Golkar 
chair suggested that it would be more palatable to parties if there were quotas of 
30 percent at the national level, 20 percent at the provincial level, and 15 percent 
at the district level. Tyas Iskandar rejected this idea arguing that it was necessary 
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to have the same quota of 30 percent at all levels or else it would never happen 
(Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December).  
 
In 2008, the women's movement successfully advocated to have gender quotas 
included in the Political Party Law. This included the requirement for newly 
established parties to have national structures comprised of 30 percent of women 
(Masruchah 2009, pers. comm. 28 November). However, at the provincial and 
district levels, parties were only encouraged to have gender quotas and to update 
the party's constitution to reflect gender quota requirements.  
 
3.5.2b THE ELECTIONS LAW 
In 2003, the DPR passed the Elections Law that included article 65 that 
encouraged political parties to have at least 30 percent of women in their party 
lists. This empty gesture encouraged the women's movement to request stronger 
sanctions for non-compliance in the next election cycle. The women's movement 
also proposed a zipper system which alternates men and women on party lists. 
No parties accepted the idea of 50 percent of women on party lists as they argued 
that there were not enough qualified women interested in joining parties. As a 
result, it would be too difficult for parties to meet a 50 percent requirement of 
women on their party lists. Instead, parties wanted to have one woman for every 
four candidates. After lobbying and discussion, the DPR supported the provision 
to have parties include one woman for every three candidates on their lists.  
 
Given that the previous gender quota provision in the 2003 Elections Law was 
ineffective without strong sanctions for non-compliance, in 2007, the women's 
movement proposed that parties that did not fulfil the quota should not receive 
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funding from the government. This demand for sanctions for non-compliance was 
rejected (Masruchah 2009, pers. comm. 28 November). Instead, parties were 
given three opportunities to complete the 30 percent quota for women on their 
party's lists. If a party could not fulfil this quota, then the KPU would announce 
non-compliance in the national mass media as a type of sanction, however the 
party would still be able to contest in the elections. This was disappointing for the 
women's movement as the “name and shame” sanction has very little influence 
over voters. This differs from quotas in Argentina and Timor Leste where parties 
cannot contest in elections if they do not meet the gender quota requirement.  
 
3.5.2c THE ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATION LAW 
The women's movement also aimed to have gender quotas implemented at all 
levels of KPU selection and in the appointment of the Election Monitoring Body 
(PANWASLU). Placing more women in the KPU is essential to monitor and to 
ensure that the party list quota is implemented properly. The intention of 
increasing the numbers of women in the PANWASLU was so they could follow-
up on any elections violations. This effort was successful with quotas being 
adopted in the 2007 Elections Administration Law which states that women 
should make up at least 30 percent of membership in the KPU and PANWASLU 
at all levels (Masruchah 2009, pers. comm. 28 November).  
 
3.5.3 SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS 
The achievements of the gender quotas campaign in Indonesia are summarised 
in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Gender Quota Achievements in 2004 and 2009 Elections Legislation 
Laws 2004 Elections Cycle 2009 Elections Cycle 
Elections Law: 
Party Lists 
Parties are encouraged to have at 
least 30 percent of women on 
their lists 
Party lists should have one woman 
for every three candidates on party 
lists.  
 
The KPU to return party lists that do 
not have at least 30 percent of 
women. If the party is still not able to 
fulfil the minimum of 30 percent of 
women on their list/s, the KPU will 
announce non-compliance in the 
mass media.  
Political Party 
Law: 
Establishment of 
a new party: 
Party structure 
 
Party structure is elected 
democratically according to its 
bylaws and considers gender 
equality.  
Establishment of a new party 
considers 30 percent of women.  
 
There should be 30 percent of 
women in the structure of a new party 
at the national level.  
 
Parties at the provincial and district 
levels should have at least 30 
percent of women in their structures.  
Law on Election 
Administration 
 Women should make up at least 30 
percent of membership in the KPU 
and PANWASLU at all levels. 
Law on the 
Structure of the 
People's 
Assembly and 
People's House 
of 
Representatives 
 Leadership in the DPR section and 
commission should take into account 
women's representation.  
 
 
3.5.4 PRESSURING POLITICAL PARTIES 
Due to the nature of the Indonesian electoral system, political parties act as 
gatekeepers for women's representation. This is because parties make the rules 
for recruitment, selection and placement of candidates on party lists and 
therefore, the implementation of gender quotas. Put simply, political parties have 
significant power to determine whether women candidates get elected or not. 
Recognising this power, the women's movement lobbied the main political parties 
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to support gender quotas in the Elections and Political Party Laws. Women's 
organisations frequently met with party leaders to encourage them to implement 
the quotas, support women candidates in their parties and to request parties 
place women at the top position on the party's lists (Masruchah 2009, pers. 
comm. 28 November).  
 
Women's organisations have also provided party leaders with lists of women 
aspirants willing to be nominated as candidates. They encouraged and supported 
women to be members of political parties and to fund for elections (Irlang 2009, 
pers. comm. 9 December). This was to challenge party excuses that there were 
not enough qualified women interested in contesting elections. The Centre for 
Political Science and Centre for Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University 
of Indonesia produced two books containing almost 1000 names of women 
aspirants. The first book contained a pool of women aspirants from CSOs and 
the second book contained women aspirants from political parties. These 
aspirant lists were presented to political parties which resulted in some women 
from the lists to be nominated as party candidates. Parties were less likely to 
nominate women from civil society as they argued that such women did not have 
the relevant political party experience. Since there were no sufficient resources 
available, the Centre did not follow up on how many women were nominated and 
elected (Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December). Soetjipto noted that 
anecdotally, only a few women were nominated by parties and won a seat in the 
election.  
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3.5.5 PARLIAMENTARY SPECIAL TASKFORCES 
Parliament forms a special taskforce every time a new law is proposed. 
Taskforces usually consist of representatives from political parties and 
government ministries. The number of representatives each party has in a 
taskforce is proportional to the number of seats the party won in parliament. 
Women are aware that without women's representation in these taskforces, 
women's interests would not be included in taskforce meetings. In the case of the 
Elections Law, women MPs lobbied their parties to nominate them to be members 
of the special taskforce a year before membership selection (Irlang 2009, pers. 
comm. 9 December; Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December) 
 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono assigned the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Ministry of Human Rights, and the State Secretariat to represent the government 
in the DPR when it discussed the package of political laws. Initially, MOWE was 
not involved in the special taskforce to discuss the political laws because it was 
assumed that the laws were not related to the roles and responsibilities of the 
Ministry. In an effort to add women's voices to the special taskforce on political 
laws, the women's movement urged the MOWE minister to write to the President 
to request the inclusion of MOWE in the special taskforce on the basis that the 
political laws (in particular gender quotas) were related to women's issues. 
Having MOWE as a member of the taskforce would increase the number of 
women in this taskforce and as a result, provide further support to women MPs 
who were advocating for gender quotas. The President approved the proposal 
and added MOWE as a government representative. This was a milestone for the 
women's movement as it was the first time that MOWE had been included in the 
government's team (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 December). The presence of 
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MOWE changed the dynamics within the special taskforce as MPs saw that they 
were being monitored by the minister. Now there was a faction within the special 
taskforce, supported by the women's movement that lobbied the taskforce chair 
and other members to discuss and adopt the zipper system in the Elections Law. 
Success in the adoption of 30 percent of women in the 2008 Elections Law is 
evidence of the importance of the partnership between the women's movement, 
MOWE and women MPs.  
 
3.5.6 AWARENESS RAISING 
In 2007, ANSIPOL coordinated political campaigns through postcards that were 
distributed to the public requesting people to send text messages (or to return the 
postcard) as a sign of support for increased women's representation. The 
postcards and texts were then collated and submitted to the DPR. The purpose 
of this was to raise peoples' awareness of women's representation and to 
demonstrate that the general public wanted to have women represented in 
parliament (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 December).  
 
As additional awareness raising measures, regular rallies at the national and 
regional levels were held in popular public venues and the women's movement 
delivered political education in communities (like it had done since 1999). As a 
result of this continued political education, Masruchah, the (now former) 
Secretary General of KPI stated that 500 KPI members ran as candidates for all 
levels of parliament in 2009 (2009, pers. comm. 28 November). Unfortunately, 
there is no data collected on how many of these women were elected. Similarly, 
Fatayat and Aisyiah had cadres run for the elections. In 2009, the number of 
women in NGOs who ran as candidates increased significantly. This is quite a 
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new phenomenon, given that NGOs in Indonesia generally advocate from outside 
the political system.  
 
3.5.7 MAINTAINING GOOD MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS 
The mass media was seen as a very important and effective means to promote 
gender quotas. The women's movement lobbied the mass media to educate the 
general public on the importance of women's representation in parliament. Press 
conferences about women's representation were used by the women's 
movement to deliver campaign messages. Two main feminist journalists from a 
mainstream newspaper continually promoted gender quotas from 2001 to now. 
Jurnal Perempuan which has a network with local radios in several provinces also 
aired regular programs on women's representation. In addition to this, ANSIPOL 
used its Facebook page and existing mailing lists as a tool to communicate to the 
public on gender quotas. ANSIPOL also utilised various kinds of existing mailing 
lists to advertise their events. These media strategies enabled the gender quotas 
issue to be quickly and easily promoted to the public.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The gender quotas adopted in Indonesia are the result of continuous advocacy 
by the women's movement at the local, national and international levels. 
Women's organisations are the key players in promoting gender quotas with 
support from international organisations. As Galligan (2013) highlights, the 
women's movement plays a significant role in advancing gender equality and to 
support women in political and government institutions. Strong networks, clear 
roles for women in parliament as well as strong support from various women's 
organisations were essential elements of the campaign's success.  
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The movement's demands were presented using a range of strategies. Effective 
strategies in advocating gender quota policies included building alliances with 
women MPs, applying pressure to political parties and using media relations. The 
advantage of employing a wide range of strategies was that the women's 
movement was able to cover a range of issues and lobby a range of actors in 
their campaign for gender quotas. This came at a considerable cost, in terms of 
human resources, time and energy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION ON THE FORMULA FOR 
ELECTORAL VICTORY 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
The Constitutional Court, or Mahkamah Konstitusi in Indonesian, was adopted in 
the 2001 amendment of the Indonesian Constitution and began its operations in 
2003 after the DPR passed the 2003 Law on the Constitutional Court. It is an 
independent body that authorises reviews on laws, settlements on the power of 
state institutions, determinations on the dismissal of political parties and election 
result disputes (Mahkamah Konstitusi 2011).  
 
The presence of the Court allows Indonesians to propose a review of a law that 
they believe contravenes their constitutional rights, as defined in the Indonesian 
Constitution (Mahfud 2009). Anyone may propose a review, including individual 
citizens, indigenous peoples groups, organisations and government bodies. The 
Constitutional Court allows proposals for judicial reviews to be submitted online 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi 2013). In every proposal submitted, the Court forms a 
panel of at least seven judges. All Court sessions are open to the public including 
journalists. In its first five years, the Court received 151 general cases and 274 
cases related to disputes of the 2004 elections results (Assidiqie 2009).   
 
There are nine judges in the Constitutional Court (Budiardjo 2008). These nine 
judges select the Chair and Deputy Chair. The judges work for a period of five 
years and can be appointed for two terms only. Eligibility to be a judge includes 
having a law degree, at least 10 years experience working in the field of law, be 
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reputable and over 40 years old. Only the President, DPR and Supreme Court 
can select judges of which each stakeholder can put forward three names. The 
selection process for these judges varies amongst the three stakeholders. 
Transparency International Indonesia (2013) has claimed that the selection 
process by the Supreme Court is not a transparent and participative process 
because it is not disclosed to the public. This is in contrast to the DPR and 
President which both form selection panels to select the judges. The President 
inaugurates the nine appointed judges. 
 
This chapter outlines the Constitutional Court’s review of the 2008 Elections Law 
and what factors influenced the Court’s determinations. This chapter includes 
insider perspectives obtained through my interviews with women’s activists and 
a Constitutional Court judge who was involved in the Elections Law 
determinations.  
 
4.2 JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THE 2008 ELECTIONS LAW 
Celebrations following the passing of gender quotas did not last long. On 1 
September 2008, two groups submitted proposals to the Constitutional Court to 
review provisions in the 2008 Elections Law concerning the criteria for electoral 
victory. The first group was led by Muhammad Sholeh, a male legislative 
candidate for the East Java Provincial Parliament from PDIP. Sholeh requested 
the review of article 55 about the party list gender quota and article 214 about the 
formula for electoral victory based on rank of order on party lists. Article 55 stated: 
1. The names of candidates on the party list be placed in rank of order 
2. The party list consists of at least one woman for every three candidates 
3. The party list has to display recent photographs of each candidate 
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Article 214 stipulated that a candidate would be declared a winner if he or she 
managed to get at least 30 percent of the electoral quotient. If no candidate 
obtained the electoral quotient, then candidates placed highest on the list of those 
parties that met the electoral quotient would be declared the winners. Sholeh 
claimed that these articles were unfair and prevented him from winning a 
parliamentary seat.  
 
The second group included Sutjipto, Septi Notariana and Jose Dima Satria. 
Sutjipto and Septi Notariana were legislative candidates from Partai Demokrat for 
the East Java DPR, while Jose Dima Satria was a voter. This group requested to 
have articles 205 and 214 on how votes translate into seats reviewed.  
 
According to Sholeh, the primary reason to review article 55 about gender quota 
requirements was based on the discriminating nature of the article; that male 
candidates were disadvantaged because it gave privileges to female candidates 
to be placed higher on party lists. As a result of this gender quota, Sholeh was 
prevented from being elected. Sholeh argued that to be placed higher on the party 
list required an active and long-term involvement in the party. Therefore, 
determining the placement on the party lists should be based on the candidate's 
loyalty and their contributions to the party, and not be based on a candidate's sex. 
Further, he argued that voters would be more likely to identify candidates who 
are placed higher on the party list and therefore, they would be more likely to 
receive votes.  
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Regarding article 214, the second group argued that it did not treat candidates 
equally before the law. According to this group, candidates who were placed 
higher on party lists had privileges other candidates did not have, particularly in 
cases where no candidates are automatically elected because they did not meet 
the electoral quotient. Further, they contended that it was unfair for candidates 
placed lower on their party’s list to work hard to increase the party's vote without 
certainty of benefiting from the result. Secondly, this group argued that this article 
was against the elections principles of honesty and justice, highlighting that 
candidates who received the largest number of votes should win the seat 
regardless of their placement on party lists. Thirdly, they argued that this article 
gave too much power to the parties and that it should be voters who have the 
authority to elect candidates to represent them. Lastly, the article was 
inconsistent with the system used in the DPD and presidential elections where 
candidates with the largest number of votes win the election.  
 
4.2.1 THE REVIEW PROCESS 
In reviewing certain laws, like the 2008 Elections Law in this case, the 
Constitutional Court requests representatives from the government and 
parliament to provide statements and explanations. For the judicial review of the 
Elections Law, the Court asked the DPR to provide verbal and written statements 
about the specified articles. They also requested experts to provide evidence 
and/or statements. The Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights represented the Government. The Court summoned the KPU and Komnas 
Perempuan to represent groups or institutions that might be affected by the 
stipulated articles.  
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In its statement, the DPR denied that articles 55 and 214 harmed the 
constitutional rights of the applicants. Further, the DPR stated that article 55 was 
based on article 28 in the Indonesian Constitution about affirmative action as a 
means to increase women's representation in parliament. This article is linked 
with article 52 that states that women must make up 30 percent of party lists to 
ensure that women make up at least 30 percent of people in decision-making 
bodies. The DPR reiterated that article 55 is part of the Indonesian government's 
commitment to realising the political rights of women mandated by international 
conventions. For article 214, the DPR explained that this article combined the 
power of parties to place their best candidates and the power of voters to elect 
their preferred candidates. This was also a transitional article towards 
implementing majority votes in future elections. The DPR also explained that 
comparing the presidential and DPD electoral systems which use largest votes 
to determine the winner/s was irrelevant. The DPR questioned whether the 
applicants met the criteria to have the law challenged as according to the DPR, 
the 2008 Elections Law did not harm the applicants' constitutional rights. 
Therefore, the DPR asked the applicants through the Constitutional Court to 
provide evidence of harm. The DPR requested the Court to reject the applicants' 
proposal. 
 
Similarly, the government through the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry 
of Law and Human Rights argued that the specified articles did not harm the 
applicants. Therefore, the Constitutional Court was requested to reject the 
applicants' proposals. In its verbal and written statements, the government 
highlighted that article 55 is related to one of the government's commitments 
under the Beijing Platform for Action, CEDAW and to eliminate discrimination 
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against women. Furthermore, the government argued that this quota was an 
affirmative action policy that had been adopted in many countries including 
France, Argentina, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The government reaffirmed that 
women's participation and representation needs to be increased through 
regulations and laws to achieve equality in parliament. The government added 
that article 214 provided a higher chance of female candidates being elected 
assuming there were parties that would win three seats in an electoral district, 
and one of those seats was held by a woman. 
 
Komnas Perempuan in its verbal and written statements stated that article 55 is 
the government's mechanism for implementing positive discrimination as stated 
in the Constitution and CEDAW, the Beijing Platform for Action and Millennium 
Development Goals. This positive discrimination was necessary to increase 
women's roles in decision-making and the proportion of women in parliament that 
was far from the critical mass of 30 percent. Komnas Perempuan argued that 
articles 55 and 214 are to balance the lack of good will and commitment of political 
parties to promote gender equality. The Commission argued that the applications 
should not be accepted and that the 2008 Elections Law did not conflict with the 
Constitution. Supporting Komnas Perempuan, the KPU reaffirmed that political 
parties would have to meet gender quota requirement.  
 
4.3 THE COURT'S DETERMINATION ON ARTICLE 55 
The Constitutional Court determined that all the applicants met the criteria to 
request the judicial review of the 2008 Elections Law. This decision contradicted 
the submissions made by the DPR, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Komnas 
Perempuan. However, in response to the proposal to review article 55, the 
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Constitutional Court rejected the proposal. The Court argued that the article was 
to implement affirmative action for women in politics. As outlined in the 
submissions, this affirmative action was a means to meet the country's 
commitments under the Beijing Platform for Action, CEDAW and laws on civil and 
political rights, therefore it did not contradict the Constitution. The Court 
emphasised that since women make up more than 50 percent of the population, 
it was therefore important for a gender perspective to be included when making 
social, political, legal, economic and cultural decisions. Further, the Court 
explained that the 30 percent quota was seen as an initial step to provide 
opportunities for women and at the same time, allow the public to judge and test 
out the acceptability of women in politics not just because of their sex, but their 
capability as legislators. Additionally, the Court acknowledged that the gender 
quota provision in the 2008 Elections Law was a public aspiration represented by 
women's organisations and was submitted to the DPR special taskforce.  
 
The Constitutional Court reassured the public that article 55 would have a 
significant impact on increasing the number of women in parliament. Therefore, 
the Court made the decision that article 55 did not contradict the Constitution, 
thus the Court rejected the review. The Court assumed that 30 percent of women 
on party lists would translate to 30 percent of women in parliament (Member of 
the Judge's Panel 2009, pers. comm. 11 December).  
 
4.4 THE COURT’S DETERMINATION ON ARTICLE 214 
Regarding article 214, in its session on 19 December 2008, the Constitutional 
Court approved the appeal and declared that this article was against the 
Constitution. The primary reason for this was that it was deemed unfair that a 
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candidate should win a parliamentary seat based on his/her placement on the 
party list, not because of how many votes they obtained. This decision was based 
on a basic principle in the Constitution of people supremacy, meaning that in 
elections, people are free to vote for any candidate they desire and that these 
votes/desires should be respected and not compromised by giving power to 
parties to decide the winning candidates based on their rank of order on party 
lists. Secondly, the Indonesian electoral system is open list PR, hence according 
to the Court, it is simpler and more consistent with this system if the winners of 
the elections are determined based on the largest votes (known as suara 
terbanyak in Indonesian) rather than rank of order. Thirdly, with respect to 
fairness to voters and candidates, the winning factor would no longer depend on 
political parties, but the support received from voters. This is also to minimise 
internal conflict within parties that could impact society.  
 
The Deputy Judge of the panel added that the Court's decision was aimed at 
eliminating money politics or corrupt practices in party decisions regarding 
placements on party lists. He explained that it is general knowledge that to get a 
place higher on a party's list, candidates need to give money to their respective 
parties. The higher the position on the party list, the more money a candidate had 
to give to the party. Additionally, placement on party lists was one way of 
maintaining the dominance of party elites. He claimed that the majority of 
Indonesians wanted to end the long-standing dominance held by party elites.  
 
Additionally, the Court recognised that the recruitment processes for party 
leadership positions generally done by party elites, needed to be changed in 
order not to violate the principles of people supremacy. Also, the roles of political 
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parties in political recruitment needed to finish at the stage of making party lists, 
and therefore the electability of legislative candidates should not be shifted from 
voters to the hands of political party leaders.  
 
The Constitutional Court did not recognise that article 214 was needed to 
implement the gender quota provision as presented in article 55. However, by the 
Court finding article 214 as being unconstitutional meant that article 55 lost its 
effectiveness.  
 
The Court did not reach an unanimous decision on article 214. Out of the eight 
judges, the only female judge, Maria Farida Indrati, put forward a dissenting 
opinion, not agreeing with the decision to approve the appeal of article 214. She 
argued that articles 55 and 214 were a package and part of the hulu ke hilir 
approach to ensure the adoption of affirmative action for women and to increase 
women's representation in parliament. This hulu ke hilir approach was a 
combination of giving protection to women candidates from internal political party 
mechanisms regarding placements on party lists, and giving women the 
opportunity to develop constituent support in their electoral districts. Indrati 
argued that the decision to support the suara terbanyak formula for electoral 
victory ignored the affirmative action policies adopted by the government, 
including CEDAW which was ratified by the Indonesian government in 1984.  
 
4.5 RESPONSES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION 
There were mixed responses to the Court's decision. The decision split the civil 
society movement and women candidates. Occurring just three months before 
the voting day of 9 April 2009, the decision hit the women's movement hard.  
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4.5.1 RESPONSES SUPPORTING THE COURT'S DECISION 
There were different stakeholders that supported the Court's verdict. Women 
candidates at the local and national level were among the groups in favour of the 
decision. The majority of these people believed that they would directly benefit 
from the decision. Two women candidates, one from PAN in Bantul and the other 
from Golkar in Yogyakarta City supported the decision as both of them were 
placed second and third on their party lists in the 2004 elections. In 2004, both 
candidates obtained the largest votes but did not win a parliamentary seat as the 
formula for electoral victory was determined by placement on the party's list. They 
felt that the rank of order formula did not do them justice; therefore they welcomed 
the Court's decision, although they were both placed first on their party's lists in 
the 2009 elections.  
 
Two other interviewed candidates supported the Court's decision because they 
thought the decision would increase their chances of winning. One of these 
candidates (from Bantul) described the Court's decision as a "blessing" for her. 
These candidates tended to be placed lower on party lists. The Court's decision 
provided them with motivation to campaign harder, with one of the Bantul 
candidates who was placed second on the party list saying she was very eager 
to compete with her party leader who was placed first on the party's list. 
Interestingly, one candidate from PPP in Bantul felt that the Court's decision 
made women candidates compete fairly and provided them with an opportunity 
to prove their abilities. She was against the gender quota provision as she felt 
that parties often put forward women without considering their capabilities.  
 
 104 
The proposal to appeal the Elections Law was also supported by a number of 
civil society organisations, including CETRO, an organisation that promotes 
political rights through legislation and provides civic education. This organisation 
celebrated the Court's decision as it had been promoting suara terbanyak to 
eliminate party oligarchy. CETRO argued that the rank of order formula provided 
parties with too much power, and that an open list system is more democratic as 
it gives more power to voters. Additionally, CETRO argued that the open list 
system would bring more women into parliaments (Supriyanto 2010). The 
women's movement found that one of the challenges of the Court's decision was 
that they had to work against CSOs like CETRO that supported the decision. This 
was unusual given that such organisations generally work hand-in-hand 
advocating legislation in parliament. This difficulty is reflected in Soetjipto's (2009, 
pers. comm. 16 December) statement that it is ‘hard to fight against your own 
friends’.  
 
This was not the first instance that the women's movement had a different political 
ideology compared to other CSOs working on human rights issues. Another 
example was during the preparation for the 2004 elections where a group of 
CSOs established the National Movement to Not Vote for Dirty and Corrupt 
Politicians. This was a campaign for people to vote for good and clean legislative 
candidates. The women's movement put forward domestic violence as one of the 
criterion for determining which candidates were dirty, and those that were clean. 
Initially, the idea was rejected as larger CSOs perceived domestic violence as 
being a domestic issue that should not be included in the political sphere. 
However, after several discussions with these CSOs, the movement eventually 
considered dirty politicians as those who are perpetrators of domestic violence.  
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Surprisingly, political parties were the third group that were in favour of the 
decision. Soetrisno Bachir, Chair of PAN at the national level, stated that the 
Court's decision was a win for democracy, allowing candidates with the largest 
votes to be elected to parliament. Partai Demokrat was in favour of the decision 
as one of its candidates submitted the proposal to the Court. According to the 
party's Chair, Anas Urbaningrum, the verdict would make elections fairer. Golkar 
shared the same opinion, citing that suara terbanyak would improve party 
representativeness. This is a notable change in Golkar's standpoint which during 
the discussion of the amendment of the Elections Law in 2008, had been a major 
supporter and promoter of the semi-open list. It was not clear why Golkar had 
changed its position.  
 
4.6.2 RESPONSES AGAINST THE COURT'S DECISION 
Women candidates who were placed first on their party's list opposed the Court's 
decision. They argued that they earned that position as a result of their hard work. 
Because of the Court's decision, they had lost a significant advantage to win a 
parliamentary seat and had to campaign hard like the rest of the candidates. A 
second group of candidates argued that the decision had ultimately made the 
gender quota meaningless. Eva Sundari, an MP from PDIP, said that the 
Constitutional Court's decision had set back the affirmative action policy that had 
been adopted in the Constitution. The decision was not gender-sensitive.  
 
Very few political parties openly opposed the decision, but some did express 
concerns about the implications of the decision. For example, the PKS chair in 
the DPR was concerned that the Court's decision would increase internal conflict 
amongst candidates in the same party. The head of the PPP fraksi in the DPR, 
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Lukman Hakim Saiffudin, said that the Court's decision would negatively impact 
the party as PPP had plans to put several women candidates at the top of the 
party's list, but this would now be difficult for those women who had to compete 
with other candidates who had more resources. Further, Tjahyo Kumolo from 
PDIP questioned the right of the Constitutional Court to change the electoral 
system from being a semi-open to open list. He argued that the Court had 
destroyed the existing electoral system and that the Court should have allowed 
parties to choose which electoral system they wanted to follow.  
 
All of the women's organisations interviewed were critical of the Constitutional 
Court's decision about changing the formula for electoral victory. This was not 
only because they had worked hard to advocate for the legislation of gender 
quotas, but also because once the DPR had approved the 2008 Elections Law, 
the women's movement had lobbied party leaders and party election teams to put 
women candidates at the highest position on party lists. The Minister for Women's 
Empowerment was disappointed with the Constitutional Court's decision because 
the decision abolished the affirmative action principles in the 2008 Elections Law. 
The Director of Jurnal Perempuan, Mariana Aminuddin (2009, pers. comm. 10 
December) explained that the Court's decision disadvantaged women candidates 
as the formula for electoral victory based on rank order was intended to give more 
chance for women candidates who were not yet popular. Under an open system, 
only celebrities and the famous would have an opportunity to win parliamentary 
seats. Sri Budi Eko Wardhani (2009), the Director of Puskapol UI explained that 
the decision undid several years of advocacy work done by the women's 
movement. Rocky Gerung (2009), an academic from the University of Indonesia, 
added that the Court’s judges did not understand the historical side of why the 
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affirmative action principles were proposed in the 2008 Elections Law, for 
example protecting vulnerable groups such as women. The judges treated the 
2008 Elections Law like any other regular law.  
 
The judicial review was not good timing for the women's movement, which was 
focused on preparing women candidates and voters for the elections. Yuda Irlang 
(2009, pers. comm. 9 December), the Coordinator from ANSIPOL explained: 
 
There are limited human resources in the women's movement. We 
did not advocate and monitor the process in the Constitutional Court 
as the judicial review was proposed only a few months before the 
elections. At that time, our energy was focused on preparing for the 
elections. We were busy delivering voter education, awareness 
about affirmative action, working with the women's movement at the 
sub-national level, and training women candidates. We did not have 
enough resources to monitor the Court process.  
 
Ani Soetjipto (2009, pers. comm. 16 December) seconded Irlang's statement by 
saying that her organisation did not engage earlier in the process as they thought 
that the review would not be approved by the Court. This is possibly because in 
late 2007, the Court turned down a proposal to repeal an article in the 1974 
Marriage Law about polygamy. A businessman from Jakarta, M Isna, requested 
that the requirement for a man to have permission from his first wife before taking 
another wife violated his constitutional right. He argued that based on Islamic 
teachings, no permission was necessary, thus he complained that the state was 
interfering in his personal life. The Court did not agree with this argument. As a 
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result of this experience on the 1974 Marriage Law, the Indonesian women's 
movement thought that the request to repeal articles in the 2008 Elections Law 
would not be granted.  
 
4.6 FIGHTBACK TO UPHOLD GENDER QUOTA EFFECTIVENESS 
The women's movement was determined to maintain the effectiveness of 
affirmative action outlined in article 55. After the Constitutional Court's decision 
was made, the women's movement consolidated and sought advice from a 
former judge of the Constitutional Court, Jimmy Assidiqly on how to proceed. 
Assidiqly suggested that the movement request the KPU to make a regulation on 
how to transfer votes into seats by counting women and men candidates 
separately. In line with article 55 of the 2008 Elections Law, party lists would have 
one woman for every three men, but winning candidates would be selected from 
a combination of men candidates who obtained the largest number of votes, and 
likewise for women candidates. Mahfud MD (2009), the Court chair explained that 
the Constitutional Court's job was finished and that it was now up to the KPU to 
make regulations to implement the Constitutional Court's decision, regardless of 
whether it reflected affirmative action or not. Arsyhad Sanusi, a judge of the 
Constitutional Court stated that the KPU could implement the Constitutional 
Court's decision immediately and that it did not have to wait for the DPR to review 
the Elections Law or for the President to issue relevant regulations.  
 
Armoured with Assidiqly’s recommendation, a group of women MPs and activists 
led by the Minister for Women's Empowerment, Meutia Hatta, met with the KPU 
and requested that the KPU issue a regulation guaranteeing women's 
representation in parliament. This group proposed to the KPU that votes be tallied 
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separately for women and men candidates and that winners would be determined 
based on the largest number of votes obtained for one woman for every two men 
(Masruchah 2009, pers. comm. 28 November). The women's movement also 
proposed an alternative of replacing every three male MPs within the party with 
a woman who obtained the largest vote (Aminudin 2009, pers. comm. 10 
December). The KPU was willing to consider this proposal which was furiously 
rejected by political parties (Irlang 2009, pers. comm. 9 December). Golkar and 
Gerindra rejected the idea with the Partai Demokrat leader, Anas Urbaninrum, 
arguing that the KPU as the institution that administers and manages the 
elections just needed to follow the Constitutional Court's decision. Hadar Gumay, 
the Director of CETRO (and now KPU member for 2012-17) said that it was better 
for the KPU to make an agreement with political parties to allocate 20 percent of 
their parliamentary seats to women rather than the KPU wasting its time to issue 
a regulation to implement the Constitutional Court's decision. Some party leaders 
refused this idea arguing that the KPU is an institution that implements laws, not 
issues laws. Out of the eight Constitutional Court judges, only Maria Farida, 
supported the KPU's plans to have affirmative action for winning seats.  
 
Following the failed attempt to influence the KPU, the women's movement lobbied 
the President's advisors to request a Presidential Decree that revokes the Court's 
decision. Only the President has the authority to annul Court decisions or to issue 
a decree to implement Court decisions. The President did not respond to the 
women's movement's request, possibly because he did not understand the 
importance of this decision on women's representation (Masruchah 2009, pers. 
comm. 28 November). The movement also lobbied the Minister for Law and 
Human Rights. In a meeting with representatives from MOWE and women's 
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groups, the Minister for Law and Human Rights explained that it would be difficult 
for the President to issue a decree due to the time needed for the DPR to approve 
the decree. While the KPU could issue a new regulation, it would be subject to 
intense scrutiny from interested stakeholders to make sure that the regulation did 
not contradict the Constitutional Court's decision.  
 
4.7 STRATEGIES FOR AN OPEN LIST SYSTEM 
The ANSIPOL coordinator argued that the annulment of article 214 on electoral 
victory without replacing it with a new article was invalid. This created uncertainty 
for several months as a new article or provision on how votes were translated into 
seats and how MPs are elected was yet to be issued by the KPU or the President. 
By February 2009, with no positive response from the government regarding the 
movement's requests, the women's movement changed its strategy to how 
women could be elected in an open list system. This included providing capacity 
building to women candidates and using the slogan "vote for women if you want 
change". The campaign was conducted through national and local media to 
promote women's leadership. The movement also worked with religious leaders 
in areas like West Nusa Tenggara and Aceh (Masruchah 2009, pers. comm. 28 
November). 
 
For its longer-term agenda, the women's movement sought to raise the 
importance of women's issues and representation in parliament and the 
Constitutional Court. Additionally, the movement encouraged women in political 
parties to lobby their parties to have gender quota provisions in their party's 
constitution (Sjarifudin 2009).  
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Court's decision on article 214 transformed Indonesia's 
electoral system from a semi-open list into a (fully) open list system. This was 
viewed by some groups as being a more democratic system than closed lists. 
These groups, including some political parties, argued that shifting power from 
political party elites to voters to determine their representatives would result in 
better election outcomes, including more accountability of MPs to their 
constituents. They also thought that by the change to suara terbanyak as the 
formula for electoral victory would equalise the campaigning conditions for men 
and women candidates and result in better representation in parliament for 
women. The women's movement, on the other hand, believed that an open list 
system would greatly disadvantage women candidates and ultimately reduce the 
proportion of women in parliament because the change in electoral victory 
weakened the gender quota legislation. The impact of the Court's decision on 
women's representation and campaigning strategies will be discussed in 
Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Finally, despite opposition to the changes to the 2008 Elections Law from the 
women's movement and various parts within Government, the fact that the 
changes passed with opposition from only one Constitutional Court judge, the 
only woman, demonstrates the importance of fulfilling quotas and having equal 
representation in State bodies such as the Courts and KPU.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND PLACEMENT OF CANDIDATES 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
Chapters Three and Four have outlined how structural factors such as gender 
quotas and Indonesia's electoral system can influence women's representation 
in parliament. As important as these structural factors are, their effectiveness 
depends largely on how political parties choose to implement them. As a result, 
this chapter will discuss the role of political parties in influencing women's 
representation, in particular how parties recruit, select and place women 
candidates on their party lists. This chapter presents the results outlined in 
interviews with party leaders in Bantul and Yogyakarta City.  
 
As outlined in Figure 7, there are generally three key steps to women becoming 
elected. According to Matland (2002 & 2005), these steps are: 1) women need to 
decide to become aspirants (and have the resources to do so); 2) the party needs 
to select the women as candidates; and 3) women need to be elected by voters.  
 
Figure 7: The legislative recruitment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will focus on the second step (circled in Figure 7) in Matland's 
framework: the selection of candidates by parties. This chapter will discuss how 
political parties in Bantul and Yogyakarta City recruited and selected their 
Eligible Aspirants Candidates MPs 
Resources Party Gatekeepers Voters 
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candidates, including what criteria and processes parties used to recruit women 
candidates. This chapter will also present an analysis on the implementation of 
gender quotas in Bantul and Yogyakarta City by political parties, including how 
gender quotas influenced the demand and supply of women candidates.  
 
5.2 RECRUITMENT 
The general criteria for legislative candidates in Indonesia are set out in the 2008 
Elections Law. The criteria states that a candidate must be:  
 An Indonesian that resides in Indonesia; 
 21 years old or older; 
 Pious; 
 Loyal to the Pancasila (the five philosophical foundations of Indonesia) and 
the Constitution; 
 Literate; 
 At least a senior high school graduate; 
 Not convicted of criminal charges; 
 No longer a public servant or employee of a government company; 
 Physically and mentally fit; 
 Able to work full time; 
 Able to become a member of a political party; and 
 A registered voter.  
 
Political parties apply internal and external measures to source aspirants that 
meet these criteria. Internally, parties can source aspirants from its own 
members. This generally happens for long and well-established political parties 
that have a broad membership base to source candidates. Meanwhile, parties 
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that have limited aspirants in their cadres or need new thinking or "fresh blood" 
will employ external measures.  
 
5.2.1 INTERNAL RECRUITMENT 
In Bantul and Yogyakarta City, PKS and Golkar internally recruited their 
candidates. Even though these parties have very different ideologies, both 
claimed that as cadre-based parties, party membership was an important pre-
requisite for selection. Golkar listed a minimum of five years active participation 
in party activities and completion of a series of party trainings as prerequisites for 
its candidates. Golkar is a well-established party and has a strong cadre process 
that has resulted in large pools of aspirants. The PKS leader in Yogyakarta City 
was confident that he had sufficient party cadres to fill candidate lists.  
 
Despite both undertaking internal recruitment and both considering themselves 
as partai kader, that is parties that are focused on building party cadres, PKS and 
Golkar employed different recruitment procedures. PKS used a more democratic, 
bottom-up process, being the only party that gave the privilege of electing 
candidates to its members. PKS gave their members the power to select their 
nominees. The PKS leader in Yogyakarta City explained that his party had an 
internal four-step process where: 
1. Members would nominate candidates they thought were capable of being an 
MP; 
2. A committee would assess the history and track record of those nominees 
and put forward a list of names for internal election; 
3. Members would vote for up to five people to create an initial party list; and  
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4. The party would then place the elected names on a list based on a criteria set 
out by the party.  
 
Golkar on the other hand, did not hold internal elections. Its members were not 
involved in the recruitment process but rather, the party gave the authority to 
nominate candidates to the party's executive. Party leadership at the sub-district 
level were allowed to propose up to twice as many aspirant names than there are 
seats allocated to that electorate. For example, Bantul Electorate 3 has nine 
seats, and so the Golkar leadership at that sub-district may propose 18 names. 
Golkar cadres used the word penugasan (tasking and deployment) which means 
that candidates need to nominated by others in the party (and not self-
nominated).  
 
5.2.2 EXTERNAL RECRUITMENT 
Partai Demokrat, PDIP, PAN and PPP allowed their members and the general 
public to apply to be party candidates. Parties that recruited non-members such 
as PAN and Partai Demokrat advertised their recruitment drives through local 
television channels, radios, and newspapers. The Chair of PAN in Yogyakarta 
City explained that his party started advertising for candidates one year before 
the election in order to secure aspirants before larger parties started their 
recruitment. PAN’s rules and procedures of recruitment and placement were 
discussed in its national meeting. PAN also approached individuals that the party 
believed would be able to boost support and votes for the party. PAN was aware 
that it would have to compete with well-established parties such as PPP and PDIP 
to recruit aspirants. The other reason for advertising so early was to provide 
interested aspirants with enough time to prepare the relevant documentation, 
 116 
consult with their families and start gathering community support. PAN used the 
principle of "candidacy for all", meaning that anyone could apply to become a 
PAN candidate so long as they met the requirements in the Elections Law. 
Aspirants would then be required to attend a series of capacity building exercises. 
Although PAN is associated with Muhammadiyah, one of the two largest Muslim 
organisations in Indonesia, it allowed non-Muslim aspirants to apply. This is in 
line with PAN’s principle as a party open to anyone and that respects the diversity 
that exists within Indonesian society. 
 
Partai Demokrat had a standard requirement for applications consistent with the 
law. According to the party's leader in Yogyakarta City, the reason for following 
these standard requirements was to broaden the general public's access to the 
party. He added that Partai Demokrat was a new party and therefore it wanted to 
open candidacy opportunities to the public. Additionally, the party wanted to be 
able to select candidates who knew and understood the needs of the community 
and could represent their constituents.  
 
In contrast to Partai Demokrat and PAN, although PDIP had an external 
recruitment process, the party set out hefty additional requirements for non-
members to become party candidates. Firstly, an aspirant needed to receive 
endorsements from the party's structure at the village level to the provincial level. 
Secondly, the aspirant had to provide copies of the identification cards of those 
party members that supported his/her candidacy. Thirdly, the aspirant needed to 
obtain an endorsement from the party's branch at the provincial level. 
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Of the recruitment strategies described in this research, the description of the 
internal recruitment strategies of PKS and Golkar appeared to be the least 
women candidate-friendly. This is primarily because their recruitment processes 
relied heavily on long-term membership and participation in the party. For 
example, candidates of PKS had to be party members, nominated by other party 
members and then elected as party candidates. Similarly, to be a candidate from 
Golkar, an aspirant had to be a member for the past five years and nominated by 
the local party structure. 
 
Right wing parties according to Caul (2001) are less inclined to adopt affirmative 
action policies to increase women’s representation. Regardless of their 
ideologies, none of the parties in Yogyakarta and Bantul adopted an affirmative 
action policy to increase women’s participation within the party. For example, the 
parties did not differentiate recruitment methods for women and men. In the case 
of PKS, the party believed that women should participate in an open competition 
like other candidates. Despite the PKS party leader being confident that he had 
enough cadres to fill the party’s candidate lists, he admitted that recruiting female 
aspirants was difficult because many female cadres were unwilling to become 
candidates.  
 
Party leaders also recruited their family members to be candidates. A PDIP party 
leader from a Yogyakarta City sub-district recruited his wife to become a PDIP 
candidate. A women candidate from PKB Yogyakarta City shared similar story: 
 
My son joined one of the parties here. He is the party leader and he 
wanted me to become a candidate so he could fulfil the gender 
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quota. I said “yes, count me in”. My son said “if you win, thanks be 
to God, but if you lose, it is no problem” (Candidate from PKB, 
Yogyakarta City). 
 
5.3 SELECTION AND PLACEMENT 
Throughout their interviews, women MPs and women candidates from the six 
largest parties revealed that party elites dominated the processes for selecting 
and placing candidates on party lists. Despite these six parties having different 
criteria and procedures to select and place their candidates on party lists, there 
were some similar criteria including: position in the party leadership, party loyalty, 
education attainment, popularity in the community and the length of party 
membership. In addition to this criteria all six parties adopted “political 
considerations” when deciding placements on party lists. These political 
considerations refer to how a candidate's placement is influenced by his or her 
perceived electability and influence on party stability. Factors considered 
included popularity and rank in the party's leadership. This is where the party 
elites are most influential. They use their authority as gatekeepers to screen and 
place candidates. This confirms Matland's theory (2002 & 2005) that one of the 
primary considerations in the selection and placement process is how to put 
forward candidates that maximise the party's votes.  
 
5.3.1 PLACEMENT CRITERIA 
Matland (2002) highlights that the factor that most influences a candidate's 
placement on a party’s list is the aspirant's track record in the party's organisation 
and constituency. Similarly, this research found that the factors that most 
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influenced placement were: length of party membership, capability and 
popularity.  
 
PKS emphasised a candidate's active involvement in party programs, 
commitment to the party, competency, level of membership, and popularity in the 
community. Commitment to the party was measured by years membership, and 
their duration and position in the party's leadership. These criteria were scored 
higher than other criteria in the party’s assessment of candidates. Even though 
competency was an important factor, if a candidate was not popular enough, 
he/she would be placed at a lower rank on the party list as voters are more likely 
to vote for a popular figure over a candidate's competency. In other words, PKS 
as a cadre-based party did not automatically prioritise the best cadre members 
on its lists. 
 
Despite PAN being linked to Muhammadiyah, religion was not used in the criteria 
to select and place candidates. As discussed earlier, PAN has an inclusive policy 
of recruiting non-Moslems. Similar to other parties, the party assessed a 
candidate's loyalty, participation in party activities, education attainment, and 
length of time in the party executive and the results of a psychological test. PAN 
required candidates to undergo this test similar to regular employment 
recruitment in Indonesia.  
 
Partai Demokrat ranked its candidates based on their years of membership, 
loyalty, education attainment, commitment to the party and community, and 
commitment to anti-corruption. Partai Demokrat was the only party that listed a 
commitment to anti-corruption which was in-line with the program of the party’s 
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leader, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This party also established teams to monitor 
a candidate's competency and their interaction with the community. These results 
were used to inform candidate placement on the party list. 
 
A less common criterion employed by Moslem party PPP related to Quranic 
reading competency. According to the chair of PPP, Quranic literacy, followed by 
knowledge of Islam are basic requirements for candidates. To assess this, 
candidates must prove their competency by reciting the Quran before a selection 
committee. Other requirements included knowledge of organisational and 
political matters, party vision and objectives, knowledge of legislative matters, 
including the roles of Parliament, budgeting, legal drafting, how the party 
promotes its programs in the community and the ability to communicate a 
candidate's individual programs into the electorate.  
 
5.3.2 SELECTION PROCEDURES 
PPP's leadership at the village level undertook the bulk of candidate recruitment 
both from its internal cadres and from local community leaders. Based on the 
proposed list of names from the village, leadership at the sub-district level 
shortlisted the nominations. This shortlist was then compiled and selected by the 
party’s elections taskforce. After checking the paperwork, this taskforce 
interviewed the candidates to test their capabilities against the criteria. The 
results of the interview were then used to place the candidates on the party’s list. 
PPP selection procedures somewhat resembled the Liberal Democrat Party’s 
selection procedure in the 2001 British elections: a selection committee shortlists 
candidates based on an agreed selection criteria, then the committee interviews 
prospective candidates (Lovenduski 2005). One substantial difference was that 
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the Liberal Democrat Party required that out of three shortlisted candidates, at 
least one candidate had to be a man and at least one had to be a woman. PPP 
did not have this quota requirement.    
 
PAN required its candidates to attend a series of trainings on leadership, political 
systems, budgeting and policy making. Candidate participation and the results of 
the training's examination were used as the basis for placement. Candidate's 
communication skills were tested through their consultations with local 
communities and organisations. For Moslem candidates, the party suggested 
candidates to consult with organisations within Muhammadiyah and for non-
Moslems to consult with their religious organisations. For community 
consultations, candidates were tasked to hold a series of consultations at various 
levels to collate inputs from the community.  
 
PAN, Golkar, PPP and PDIP used a scoring system to determine the placement 
of candidates on their party lists. PDIP had a policy that the chair of the party at 
the district level is automatically placed at the top of the party list. The scoring 
process was usually done by a selection committee consisting of the party's elite. 
Without a high education, long party membership, and a position within the party’s 
structure, it was a challenge for women to be placed in winnable positions on 
party lists.  
 
PPP’s elections taskforce determined the rank of order and electorate of 
candidates based on how they met the party’s criteria. The result of this 
assessment did not guarantee that the candidate with a high score would be 
placed higher on the party’s list. Other important considerations related to the 
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party's interests and winning strategy. The leader of PPP confirmed that 
placement could not only be based on the results of the candidate assessment, 
but also other factors: 
 
If we used the test results as the only parameter to rank candidates 
on the party’s list, members who have been in the party for a long 
time would be unhappy. If we only considered party leadership as 
the basis for placement, potential cadres who were placed at the 
bottom of the list because of their position in the party leadership 
would be unhappy. Therefore, we combined both these factors, 
then we decided to undertake political communication within the 
party. The party Chair at the district level instructed the elections 
taskforce to invite all party elites at the sub-district level to discuss 
the candidate recruitment nomination process, how to solve political 
differences and interests and to prevent conflicts which may lead to 
splitting within the party. We reconciled all political and 
organisational backgrounds. Then, before we submitted the party 
list to the KPU, we had fortnightly meetings with all candidates (PPP 
Leader, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 30 December). 
 
An example of “other factors” includes, in electorate 1 in Yogyakarta City, PPP 
calculated that the number of women voters in this electorate had increased since 
the last election, therefore the party placed a woman candidate as number one 
on the party’s list, despite that candidate being a relatively new member of the 
party. By doing this, the party hoped that women voters would vote for the woman 
candidate. This decision was controversial as the party chair at the sub-district 
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level (who was usually placed as number one on the party’s list) and the 
incumbent were placed below this woman candidate.  
 
Tests were done through interviews on knowledge about Islam, 
roles of the party and members of parliament, and loyalty to the 
party. After this, these tests were used to rank candidates on the 
party list. Then when people asked the reasons for this placement, 
they [the party elites at the district level], said that it was their 
authority. My placement as number one on the party list created 
conflict between candidates placed below me. Rank of order [on the 
party list] reflects a certain image and prestige, therefore everyone 
wants to be placed as number one. There was a complaint to the 
party about why a newcomer was placed as the number one 
(Candidate from PPP, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 5 
December). 
 
A candidate's educational attainment is also influential in determining rank order 
on a party's list. This can also often be the weakest criterion for women. For 
example, an older woman candidate who is the Chair of the women's 
empowerment wing in Golkar and had been a party member for 28 years, was 
placed low on the party's list because she had only finished high school. Two 
Golkar candidates confirmed that higher education attainment meant a higher 
position on the party's list. Three of the older interviewed candidates were at a 
disadvantage on this criterion. They claimed that if they had a university degree, 
they would be placed higher on the list as they were all in their respective party's 
leadership group and had been party members for over 20 years.  
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As mentioned earlier, even though parties implemented criteria to inform 
candidate placements on party lists, the results of this criteria were not the only 
determining factor. For example, if candidate A scored 85 and candidate B scored 
70, the results would indicate that candidate A should be placed highest on the 
party's list. However, if the party determined that candidate B was politically more 
popular and was more in line with the party's interests and strategies, candidate 
B would be placed highest on the list. The same principle was applied for 
determining a candidate's electorate. Despite most parties placing candidates in 
electorates consistent with their residency, parties can shift candidates to a 
different electorate if the party deems that to be strategically viable. These 
political considerations are decided by party elites who are usually men. 
 
I competed with a member from the selection committee. My score 
was 85 and higher than his score. Because he was a member of 
the selection committee, he requested to have the same score as 
mine. There was tension at that time. He did not want to be placed 
below me on the party’s list because he was more senior than me. 
Then the party held a plenary meeting to decide. He received 12 
votes and I got 14 votes. My colleagues who did not give their votes 
to me explained to me that they voted for him because they were 
uncomfortable not to do so (Candidate from Golkar, Yogyakarta 
City 2009, pers. comm. 24 December).  
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5.4 PARTY IMPLEMENTATION OF GENDER QUOTAS ON PARTY LISTS 
Interviewed party leaders were aware of the gender quota requirement. They 
were aware that their parties needed to comply with the 2008 Elections Law to 
have one woman on the party list for every three candidates. Although parties 
tended to support this measure, this did not necessarily translate into the adoption 
and implementation of gender quotas in internal party policies and activities. For 
example, Golkar, PAN, Partai Demokrat, PDIP and PPP agreed with the gender 
quota policies. They believed that the gender quota provided women with 
opportunities to demonstrate and prove their knowledge and abilities rather than 
viewing the quota as opening access for women into politics. According to the 
PAN district leader, meeting the gender quota requirement was important for the 
party's public image as PAN did not want to be perceived as being unsupportive 
of women. Aside from this public image, the PAN leader also hoped that by 
placing more women candidates on the party's list would encourage women 
voters to vote for his party's candidates. In other words, he hoped that by meeting 
the gender quota requirement would lead to electoral success. This insight 
demonstrates that gender quota compliance does not automatically mean that 
the party is committed to increasing women’s representation in parliament. As 
pointed out by Tripp and Kang (2008) political party leaders may have different 
reasons for supporting gender quotas that are not necessary linked to a 
commitment to gender equality.  
 
According to Golkar, this quota provision also meant that women had to first 
increase their capacity to be taken seriously by men in the party, reaffirming that 
women should be elected based on merit. Additionally, the Partai Demokrat 
leader said that the success of the party's gender equality measures depended 
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on how women used those opportunities. In order to meet the quota requirement, 
the Partai Demokrat leader said that women's organisations have to prepare 
women to be involved in politics and to prepare women to seek parliamentary 
seats. These responses indicate that party leader attitudes toward gender quotas 
are still unfavourable. Additionally, it demonstrates that the responsibility of 
implementing the gender quota within parties can be shifted to women. When 
quota requirements are not met, political parties often argue that they lack a pool 
of qualified women to put forward. They do this rather than view and utilise the 
gender quota as a means to promote gender equality and the participation of 
women in their parties.  
 
Golkar and PDIP at the national level have issued internal party regulations on 
gender quota implementation on party lists. The interviewed PDIP leader 
believed that it would not be possible to achieve party goals without women's 
representation. According to him, PDIP is a party that promotes the gender quota 
not only because the party leader (Megawati Soekarnoputri) at the national level 
is a woman, but also because the party genuinely wants to promote gender 
equality. The PDIP leader confirmed that his party had regulations for determining 
party lists: 
 
The first regulation is about the position within the party structure; 
the second is about placement on the party’s list; and the last one 
is about 30 percent of women on the party's lists. PDIP is concerned 
about the gender quota and placement on party lists, at least one 
woman candidate has to be placed as number three on the list... If 
the lists positioning is based on scoring, a woman candidate who 
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gets a higher score than a male candidate will be placed as number 
one on the party's list (PDIP leader, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. 
comm. 29 December).  
 
5.4.1 COMPLIANCE  
There were 529 candidates (33 percent of which were women candidates) from 
33 political parties that contested in the 2009 Bantul district election. This district 
consists of 17 sub-districts which are divided into five electorates (Yogyakarta 
KPU 2009).  
 
In Yogyakarta City, there were 524 candidates from 32 parties of which just over 
a third of candidates were female. The 14 sub-districts in Yogyakarta are grouped 
into five electorates (Yogyakarta KPU 2009). 
 
Out of the 33 parties in Bantul, 14 parties (41 percent) did not meet the gender 
quota requirement, including the four largest parties (Partai Demokrat, PAN, 
PDIP, and PKB). Even Partai Demokrat which was established by the President 
at the time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, only had 21.4 percent of women on its 
party lists. This result made Partai Demokrat one of the parties with the fewest 
number of women on its party lists. PDIP, the dominant party in the Yogyakarta-
Bantul area, placed 12 women out of 47 candidates, slightly more than Partai 
Demokrat.  
 
As seen in Table 5, PKS had the highest proportion of women on its party lists at 
38.9 percent in Bantul and 45.8 percent in Yogyakarta City, followed by PPP in 
Bantul at 37.8 percent and Partai Demokrat in Yogyakarta City at 36.4 percent. 
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PKS is an Islamic party established in 1998 and was inspired by the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood (Machmudi 2006). PPP is also an Islamic Party founded in 
1973 as a result of the merger of Islamic parties under the Soeharto regime 
(Sherlock 2004). PKS's apparent commitment to upholding women's rights is 
contradictory to the polygamous practices by its leaders. The President of PKS, 
Tifatul Sembiring and Secretary General, Anis Matta both have two wives, and 
the Vice Treasurer, Didin Amarudin has three wives (Solidaritas Perempuan 
2009)4. Polygamy in Indonesia is an issue that is perceived by some Indonesians 
and women's groups as a form of gender inequality. In addition to polygamous 
practices, the Central Sharia Board of PKS issued a fatwa stating that women are 
not allowed to become the party's President (PKS Tangerang 2011). As stated in 
the PKS's bylaws, the Central Sharia Board sits at the national level and has a 
five year term to issue fatwas and guidelines to be followed by lower party 
structures. Siregar (2007) found in her research that PKS female cadres are 
required to ask for their husband’s permission to stand for elections. These 
examples shed light on the party's attitude towards women in politics, despite 
being one of a few parties that implemented the gender quota.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
4 Solidaritas Perempuan an NGO that campaigns against polygamy implemented a campaign in 
2009 called "Do not vote for candidates who practice polygamy in the 2009 elections". For the 
2009 elections this NGO released the names of the candidates who practice polygamy 
(Solidaritas Perempuan 2009)  
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Table 5: Percentage of women on party lists in the 2009 Bantul District and 
Yogyakarta City Legislative Elections 
 
 
No Bantul District Yogyakarta City 
Political Party % of Female 
Candidates 
Political Party % of Female 
Candidates 
1 Indonesian Political Party 
Marhaenism - PNI 
100% Regional United Party - PPD 75% 
2 Indonesian National Populist 
Fortress Party - PNBK 
100% Concern for the National 
Functional Party  - PKPB 
50% 
3 Indonesian Justice and Unity 
Party – PKPI 
71.4% The National Sun Party - PMB 50% 
4 Indonesian Business and Workers 
Party – PPPI 
50% The Archipelago Republic Party - 
RepublikaN 
50% 
5 Regional United Party - PPD 50% United Democratic Nationhood 
Party - PDK 
50% 
6 Crescent Star Party - PBB 50% The Freedom Party - Merdeka 50% 
7 Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Devotion – PDK 
50% Prosperous Justice Party - 
PKS 
45.8% 
8 Prosperous Indonesian Party - 
PIS 
50% The National Front Party - Barnas 45.5% 
9 Indonesian Unity Party - PSI 50% Party of Functional Group 
Struggle - PKP 
44.4% 
10 United Democratic Nationhood 
Party – PDK 
44.4% Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Devotion 
41.7% 
11 Great Indonesia Movement Party 
– Gerindra 
41.4% Prosperous Peace Party - PDS 41.7% 
12 Prosperous Justice Party - PKS 38.9% Ulema National Awakening Party 
- PKNU 
38.5% 
13 Reform Star Party - PBR 38.5% Justice and Unity Party 37.5% 
14 United Development Party - 
PPP 
37.8% Democrat Party - Partai 
Demokrat 
36.4% 
15 Functional Groups Party - 
Golkar 
35.3% National Mandate Party  PAN 35.7% 
16 Peoples Conscience Party – 
Hanura 
33.3% National Awakening Party - 
PKB 
35.7% 
17 Pembaruan Democratic Party – 
PDP 
33.3% Great Indonesia Movement Party 
- Gerindra 
34.5% 
18 The Pioneer's Party - Partai 
Pelopor 
33.3% National People's Concern Party 
- PPRN 
33.3% 
19 Indonesian Youth Party 30.0% Functional Groups - Golkar 31.8% 
20 National Sun Party - PMB 30.0% People's Conscience Party - 
Hanura 
29.4% 
21 Archipelago Republic Party – 
Republikan 
27.3% The Indonesian Youth Party - PPI 28.6% 
22 Concern for the National 
Functional Party – PKBP 
26.3% The Reform Star Party - PBR 28.6% 
23 National Mandate Party - PAN 26.2% Democracy Reform Party - PDP 27.8% 
24 Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle – PDIP 
25.5% Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle - PDIP 
27.3% 
25 The National Front Party - Barnas 25.0% Indonesian Political Party 
Marhaenism - PNI 
25% 
26 The Patriot Party 25.0% United Development Party - 
PPP 
25% 
27 Ulema National Awakening Party 
– PKNU 
25.0% The Patriot Party - Patriot 20% 
28 National Awakening Party - 
PKB 
22.2% Crescent Star Party - PBB 18.8% 
29 Democrat Party - Partai 
Demokrat 
21.4% Indonesian Workers and 
Employers Party - PPPI 
16.7% 
30 Prosperous Peace Party - PDS 21.4% Indonesian National Populist 
Fortress Party - PNBK 
0% 
31 National People's Concern Party 
– PPRN 
0% Indonesian Unity Party - PSI 0% 
32 Freedom Party - Partai Merdeka 0% The Labour Party - Partai Buruh 0% 
33 Labour Party - Partai Buruh 0%  
 
Data source: KPU Yogyakarta. Tabulated by researcher. Bold fonts indicate main parties.  
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As seen in Table 5, small and new parties tended to put more women on their 
party lists. Nine parties in Bantul placed 50 percent or more women on their list. 
Although these percentages look promising, these small parties only submitted 
one or two candidates and are therefore unlikely to meet the parliamentary 
threshold. PPRN, Partai Merdeka and Partai Buruh had no women candidates on 
their lists in Bantul. In Yogyakarta City, PNBK, PSI and Partai Buruh had no 
women candidates.   
 
In Yogyakarta City, 19 parties (including four major parties) implemented the 
gender quota requirement, while 13 did not (41 percent). Similarly in Bantul 
District, of the six main parties PKS had the highest percentage of women 
candidates on its list. Two large parties (PDIP and PPP) did not meet the quota.  
 
Judging by the results in Bantul and Yogyakarta City, it appears that large parties 
are less likely to nominate more women candidates than the gender quota of 30 
percent except Golkar and PKS.  Meanwhile smaller parties have higher 
percentages of female representation, possibly to use women as "vote getters".  
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Figures 8: Proportion of women on party lists in Bantul electorates for the seven 
largest parties 
 
 
  
 
Figure 9: Proportion of women on party lists in Yogyakarta City electorates for the 
seven largest parties 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show that among the seven largest parties that contested in the 
2009 elections for the Bantul and Yogyakarta City parliaments, only PKS had at 
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least 30 percent of women on its lists in all 10 electorates. Meanwhile, PKB had 
at least 30 percent of women in eight electorates and Golkar and PAN met the 
gender quota in seven electorates. PKS has consistently met the gender quota 
requirement across multiple elections and at multiple levels of government. For 
example, in the 2004 elections, PKS placed 40.3 percent of women for the 
national parliament (Siregar 2007). In the 2009 elections, PKS placed 36.6 
percent of women on its party lists for the national parliament, however the 
majority were not placed in winnable positions.  
 
Despite the Constitutional Court’s decision to implement suara terbanyak as the 
formula for electoral victory in the 2009 elections, this decision came late in the 
preparation for the election and most parties had already been through a process 
of determining the placement of candidates on party lists. Even in open list 
systems, placement on a party’s list remains an important factor for a candidate’s 
electoral success (Soetjipto 2009, pers. comm. 16 December). As a result, this 
research also assessed the ranking of women on party lists.  
 
5.4.2 RANK OF WOMEN ON LISTS 
Parties in Bantul and Yogyakarta City still preferred to place male candidates at 
the top of their lists. Figures 10 and 11 demonstrate how parties placed women 
candidates in the top three positions on party lists for Bantul and Yogyakarta City. 
Figure 10 demonstrates that only 17.5 percent of the top positions in party lists in 
Bantul were filled by women. In second position on party lists, women were still 
outnumbered by men. Only in the third position on a party's list did women 
outnumber male candidates (66 percent to 34 percent).  
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Figure 10: Placement of men and women candidates on party lists for the Bantul 
District Parliament in 2009 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Placement of men and women candidates on party lists for the 
Yogyakarta City Parliament in 2009 
 
 
  
 
It is a similar story in Yogyakarta City. Only 35 female candidates out of 183 
candidates (19.1 percent) were placed in the first position on a party's list. As 
figure 11 demonstrates, the lower the rank on the party list, the more women 
candidates can be found. Of the almost 40 percent of women on PKS’s party lists, 
none of those women (22 candidates) were placed as number one. PKS was not 
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the only one. PAN, Demokrat and PDIP placed women in lower positions in 
Bantul and Yogyakarta City. Of the 12 women candidates placed by PDIP, the 
highest rank filled by a woman was number two. Golkar put two women 
candidates as number one. This made Golkar the only party in Yogyakarta City 
that put more than one woman in the top position for its lists.  
 
The Elections Law did not specify that women should be placed in the third 
position on party lists. Additionally, according to a member of the KPU in 
Yogyakarta, the KPU had delivered several information sessions on article 55 
emphasising that one woman for every three candidates did not translate into 
women being placed in third position. Despite this, parties still interpreted article 
55 as placing women candidates in positions, three, six, nine and so on. For 
example, PDIP and PKS consistently placed women candidates as number three 
on their party lists.  
 
Placing women candidates as number three or below indicates a lack of good will 
on behalf of parties to increase the proportion of women in parliament. It also 
demonstrates the ability of the party leadership to adjust their lists to satisfy the 
quota requirement in the 2008 Elections Law. For example the PAN Leader in 
Yogyakarta City explained that the party leadership had the privilege to add more 
candidates to fulfil the quota requirements:  
 
The public could actively apply to us [to be candidates]. But at the 
end, PAN decides the policies; we [party leadership] have the 
authority to add more candidates outside of those candidates that 
joined the selection process. When we were doing the ranking, we 
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also looked at how we could fulfil the gender quota requirement… 
if we thought that we needed more candidates to meet this 
requirement, the party leadership could recruit additional 
candidates (PAN Leader, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 28 
December).  
 
A woman MP from PDIP brought her case to the party's provincial and national 
office when she was placed as number three on the party's list. She wanted to be 
placed second given that the party had a policy to place those candidates who 
had won the majority of votes in the 2004 elections in winnable positions on its 
2009 party lists. According to her, the number three position on a party's list was 
an unwinnable position because PDIP in her electorate had never won more than 
two seats. She received the largest votes in 2004 and had a strong support base 
in the communities. Without this appeal and intervention at the national level, she 
would not have been placed second on the list.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the party leaders viewed the gender quota as a means of promoting 
women's participation in politics. Several parties had clear selection and 
placement criteria and procedures even though in many cases, the party elite 
retained the power and flexibility to place candidates based on “other factors”. 
This party elite is dominated by men. They are the gatekeepers to placing women 
on party lists. Additionally, the criteria for selecting and placing candidates tend 
to advantage men candidates. This is particularly the case for criteria such as 
educational attainment and years of party membership or placement in the party’s 
leadership. This is similar to Siregar’s (2007) findings on the 2004 elections. This 
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means that five years later, despite the inclusion of the gender quota into the 
Elections Law, parties had not yet included gender equality policies into their 
recruitment and placement of candidates.  
 
The results in this chapter also demonstrate how political parties can “use” the 
gender quota to their advantage, including to obtain more votes from women, 
some parties even found and “used” women as candidates to fulfil the quota. 
Additionally, even when parties do meet (or exceed) the gender quota 
requirement, such as PKS, these women candidates are not always placed in 
winnable positions on party lists. The PKS example also demonstrates that by 
meeting the gender quota requirement does not automatically mean that a party 
or its leadership has or practices gender equality principles, it is more of an empty 
gesture in keeping their public image as a progressive party.  
 
Overall, despite party leaders expressing good intentions about the gender quota, 
in practice parties viewed the quota as a tick-a-box exercise. The lack of 
affirmative action policies in parties to facilitate their implementation of the gender 
quota and the placing of women mostly in third position on party lists support this 
conclusion.  
 
Chapter Six will look at how likely it was for women candidates to win a 
parliamentary seat. It will also assess whether their placement on party lists 
determined whether they were elected or not.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
ELECTION RESULTS IN BANTUL AND YOGYAKARTA CITY DISTRICTS 
 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
Many scholars have argued that a combination of closed lists with placement 
mandates (such as the one-woman-in-three candidates quota stipulated in 
Indonesia's Elections Law) will result in a greater proportion of women in 
parliament (Htun 2005, Jones 2008). However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the 
Constitutional Court's decision in 2008 to change the formula for victory to suara 
terbanyak changed Indonesia's electoral system from that based on semi-open 
to (fully) open lists. Given that the gender quota was specifically designed for the 
semi-open list system, the women's movement feared that this change would 
negatively impact on the number of women elected into district parliaments.  
 
This chapter will assess the results of the 2009 election, in particular the 
effectiveness of the gender quota combined with suara terbanyak. To 
contextualise the results of the 2009 election, this chapter starts with an overview 
of previous elections results. To understand how the political parties implemented 
the gender quota, an overview of how the parties performed in the election as 
well as a more detailed look at where they placed women candidates is provided. 
The last half of the chapter dissects the results of women candidates to 
understand the effectiveness of the gender quota in the 2009 elections.  
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6.2. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION 1955-2004 
Women have long been underrepresented in the Bantul and Yogyakarta City 
DPRDs. As seen in Figures 12 and 13, women's representation has never peaked 
above 20 percent from 1955-2004.  
 
For the Bantul DPRD, women accounted for only five percent of the seats in 
parliament in 1955. After the first New Order election in 1971, this number 
dropped to 2.6 percent - one woman from Golkar out of 19 representatives. In the 
next election in 1977, this figure then increased to 12.5 percent with five women 
from Golkar being elected. Since then, women's representation has hovered 
between nine and 11 percent.  
 
For the Yogyakarta City DPRD in 1955, 7.5 percent of seats were held by women. 
In 1977, this increased to 17 percent with one-third of Golkar's representatives 
being women. Women's representation was lowest in 1992 with 5.4 percent. In 
2004, women's representation returned to the 1977 level of 17 percent.  
 
During the New Order period, women's representation in both Bantul and 
Yogyakarta City was mostly through the Golkar party - reflecting Golkar's 
dominance in politics. The Army (ABRI) which had the privilege of appointing its 
representatives, never appointed a woman MP in both DPRDs.  
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Figure 12: Women's Representation in the Bantul District DPRD 1955-2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Women's Representation in Yogyakarta City DPRD 1955-2004. 
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The gender quota for party lists was implemented for the first time in 2004. This 
was a voluntary quota: a call for parties to have 30 percent of women on their 
lists. Because this quota was voluntary, it had little impact in increasing the 
proportion of women in both DPRDs (in the case of Bantul, women's 
representation decreased in 2004). 
 
As seen in Table 6, Golkar which had been the party with the highest number of 
women during the New Order had no women elected to the Bantul DPRD in the 
2004 elections. PAN made the largest contribution of two women MPs, followed 
by Partai Demokrat and PDIP which both had one woman MP.  
 
 
Table 6: Women's Representation According to Party in the Bantul DPRD in 2004 
 
Party Number of 
Men 
Number of 
Women 
Total % of women 
MPs  
Partai Demokrat 0 1 1 100 
PAN 5 2 7 29 
Golkar 5 0 5 0 
PDIP 15 1 16 6 
PKS 5 0 5 0 
PKPB 2 0 2 0 
PPP 3 0 3 0 
 
PKB 6 0 6 
Total 41 4 45 8.9 
 
 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that although PDIP in 2004 had more representatives 
elected to the Yogyakarta City DPRD than any other party, none of those 
representatives were women. Golkar, PKS and Partai Demokrat each had one 
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woman MP, meanwhile, similarly to Bantul, PAN contributed the highest number 
of women to parliament (three women).  
 
 
Table 7: Women's Representation According to Party in the Yogyakarta City 
DPRD in 2004 
 
Party Number of Men Number of 
Women 
Total % of women 
MPs  
Partai Demokrat 3 1 4 25 
PAN 6 3 9 33 
Golkar 4 1 5 20 
PDIP 11 0 11 0 
PKS 4 1 
 
0 
5 20 
PPP 1 1 0 
Total 29 6 35 17 
 
 
 
 
6.3. 2009 ELECTION RESULTS BANTUL DPRD 
There are 45 seats in the Bantul DPRD, with each electorate represented by eight 
to 10 seats. There were 34 parties that competed in the 2004 election with only 
nine parties winning seats. These nine parties, with the exception of PKPB are 
major political parties that also won seats in the DPR.  
 
In 2009, Partai Demokrat swept the national elections holding just over one 
quarter of the seats in the DPR. Despite winning more seats than the 2004 
election, this national trend was not replicated in Bantul with Partai Demokrat only 
winning five seats (11 percent) in the DPRD (see Table 8). Although PDIP won 
the most seats (11) - this was a decrease of five seats since 2004. Gerindra, a 
new party, won three seats following a major promotional push in the national 
media and more generous benefits for members compared to other parties. PPP 
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gained an additional seat compared to the 2004 elections. This seat was won by 
a woman candidate who obtained the largest number of votes in her party. PAN, 
Golkar, PKS, and PKPB retained the same number of seats since the 2004 
elections.  
 
Table 8: Number of Votes and Seats Obtained by Parties in the Bantul 2009 
Election 
 
Party Seats Change since 
2004 (number of 
seats) 
PDIP 11 -5 
PAN 7 0 
Partai Demokrat 5 +4 
PKS 5 0 
Golkar 5 0 
PPP 4 -1 
PKB 3 -3 
Gerindra 3 +3 
PKPB 2 0 
Total 45  
 
 
 
 
6.4 2009 ELECTION RESULTS YOGYAKARTA CITY DPRD 
Five seats were added to the Yogyakarta City DPRD for the 2009 election, an 
increase from 35 seats in 2004 to 40 seats in 2009. This increase was due to 
population growth in the city. Both small and large parties expected this to 
increase their chances of winning more seats in the parliament.  
 
There were 32 parties that contested in the 2009 Yogyakarta City election with 
just seven parties winning seats. The majority of these parties are large and 
established, with the exception of Gerindra which gained three seats in its first 
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election. As seen in Table 9, following the national-level trend, Partai Demokrat 
performed well in Yogyakarta City, obtaining 10 seats - 25 percent of the DPRD 
and four more seats compared to the 2004 elections. Golkar and PDIP managed 
to keep the same number of seats as the 2004 elections. PAN's representation 
almost halved since the 2004 election - from nine seats to just five in 2009. PPP 
doubled its representation to two seats in 2009.   
 
 
Table 9: Number of Votes and Seats Obtained by Parties in the Yogyakarta City 
2009 Election 
 
Party Seats Change since 
2004 (number of 
seats) 
PDIP 11 0 
Partai Demokrat 10 +6 
PAN 5 -4 
PKS 5 0 
Golkar 5 0 
PPP 2 +1 
Gerindra 2 +2 
Total 40  
 
 
 
 
6.5 2009 ELECTIONS RESULTS FOR WOMEN CANDIDATES 
As discussed in Chapter Five, on average, parties in Bantul and Yogyakarta City 
met the 30 percent gender quota. There were 177 women candidates in Bantul 
and 183 women candidates in Yogyakarta City that competed in the 2009 
elections. For some parties such as PNI, PKPI, PBB,PPD and PIS at least half of 
their lists were comprised of women candidates.  
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Even when parties had a higher proportion of women on their candidate lists, this 
did not necessarily translate into a high number of women being elected. One of 
the factors influencing this was that those parties with higher percentages of 
women on their candidate lists tended to be new and small parties, unlikely to 
meet the electoral quotient for parties. For example, PMB, Republikan, Barnas, 
PIS, PDP and PKP were new parties established just before the 2009 elections. 
Meanwhile, although parties such as PPD, PNBK and PSI were established in 
2002, these parties had never gained enough support to win seats in the Bantul 
and Yogyakarta City DPRDs.  
 
Big parties such as PDIP and Demokrat that hold significant numbers of seats in 
both parliaments failed to meet the legal requirement of 30 percent of women on 
their party lists. The KPU had no power to meaningfully sanction those parties 
that did not meet the quota, other than to return the lists for the parties to rectify, 
and then if those parties still did not meet the quota, announce this failure in the 
mass media. 
 
The problem with the KPU was the 2008 Elections Law which had no 
perspective on women's representation... the other problem is that in 
this law there is no clear regulation on sanctions. There is a sanction 
but it did not force parties to comply. What is the sanction? We were 
asked to return those party lists that did not meet the 30 percent 
gender quota. Then what happened if the revised lists still did not 
meet the quotas? There are two sanctions: the first is that the party 
had to provide explanation for why it did not meet the quota; the 
second is to publish the names of those parties that did not meet 30 
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percent. This second sanction was a negative campaign for those 
parties so voters who have a gender perspective would not vote for 
those parties. But this was ineffective because voters are not yet 
aware of the importance of women's representation (KPU Member, 
Yogyakarta 2009, pers. comm. 7 December).  
 
This KPU Member added that so long as parties provided a written explanation, 
it did not matter what the reason was for not meeting the quota requirement. The 
most common reason put forward by parties was a lack of qualified aspirants. 
Once this explanation was submitted to the KPU, those parties then qualified to 
contest for the elections.   
  
The 2009 elections only resulted in 13.3 percent of MPs (six out of 45 MPs) in 
the Bantul DPRD being women. As seen in Table 10, Golkar had the highest 
percentage of women in parliament followed by Gerindra, PPP, PAN and PDIP. 
No party that put 50 percent of women on their candidate lists won a seat in the 
election. Demokrat, PKS, PKPB and PKB had no women represented in 
parliament even though PKS had 45.8 percent of women candidates.  
 
The increased number of allocated seats in the Yogyakarta City DPRD did not 
result in an increased number of women MPs. In 2009, women's representation 
in the Yogyakarta City DPRD reached 15 percent. Despite receiving most of the 
votes, PDIP and Partai Demokrat did not significantly contribute to increasing 
women's representation in both parliaments. Partai Demokrat that had its seats 
increase two-fold, had zero women's representation.  
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Table 10: Women's Representation by Party in Bantul and Yogyakarta City 
DPRDs in 2009 
 
 
 
   Bantul   Yogyakarta City  
 # Seats # Female % Female # Seats # Female % Female 
PPP 4 1 25 2 1 50 
Gerindra 3 1 33 2 1 50 
Golkar 5 2 40 5 2 40 
PKS 5 0 0 5 1 20 
PDIP 11 1 9.1 11 1 9.1 
PAN 7 1 14.3 5 0 0 
Partai 
Demokrat 
5 0 0 10 0 0 
PKPB 3 0 0 0 0 0 
PKB 2 0 0 0 0 0 
   Total      45                   6          13.3               40               6          15 
 
 
 
6.5.1 PLACEMENT ON PARTY LISTS 
Despite predictions before the election that a candidate's placement on a party 
list would not influence the outcome of the elections, the results shown in Table 
11 indicate the opposite: that placement was an important factor for being 
elected. Almost half of the male and female candidates in Bantul and Yogyakarta 
City were placed first on the list. One quarter of elected candidates in Yogyakarta 
City and one third of winning candidates in Bantul were placed second.  
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Table 11: Placement of Winning Candidates 
 
 
Placement 
on party list 
Bantul  Yogyakarta City 
Male Female Male Female 
1 17 2 14 2 
2 12 3 8 3 
3  1 2 1 
4 2  3  
5 4  2  
6 3  1  
7   1  
8   1  
9 1  1  
10   1  
Total 39 6 34 6 
 
 
 
Voters were more inclined to vote for candidates placed higher on the party lists. 
Of the six women MPs elected in Bantul, two were placed in the first position and 
three were placed in the second position as seen in Table 12. Almost two thirds 
(65.8 percent) of the 177 women candidates were placed in the third position. Of 
these third ranked women, only one was elected. Compared to male candidates, 
there were no women candidates ranked fourth or lower who won a seat in the 
DPRD.  
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Table 12: Placement and Vote Numbers of Elected Women Candidates in Bantul 
 
 
Party Placement 
on List 
Electorate Name Individual 
Votes 
PAN 2 Bantul 4 Suratun 4,895 
Golkar 2 Bantul 2 Sri Sulistyaningtyas 2,485 
PPP 2 Bantul 4 Maslakah 2,347 
PDIP 1 Bantul 5 Tustiyani 2,280 
Gerindra 1 Bantul 2 Ita Dwi Nuryanti 997 
Golkar 3 Bantul 1 Arni Tyas Palupi 967 
 
 
 
As seen in Table 13, in Yogyakarta City, three of the women candidates who 
were elected were placed in first position, two women were placed second and 
one candidate was placed third. This once again indicates the importance of 
placement, even in an open list system. 
 
 
Table 13: Placement and Vote Numbers of Elected Women Candidates in 
Yogyakarta City 
 
Party Placement 
on List 
Electorate Name Individual 
Votes 
PDIP 2 Yogyakarta 5 Dewi Irawati 1,928 
Golkar 1 Yogyakarta 5 Sri Retnowati 1,231 
PKS 3 Yogyakarta 4 Azizah 590 
PPP 1 Yogyakarta 1 Ida Ariyani 557 
Gerindra 2 Yogyakarta 3 Christina Agustiani 523 
Golkar 1 Yogyakarta 2 Fatchiyatul Fitri 489 
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6.5.2 COMPARING WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION UNDER DIFFERENT 
FORMULAS FOR ELECTORAL VICTORY 
The electoral quotient, or BPP, as explained in Chapter Two is a certain number 
of individual votes that a party or candidate must obtain in order to win a 
parliamentary seat. For parties, this number is derived from the total number of 
valid votes in one electorate divided by the number of allocated seats in that 
electorate. Table 14 outlines the electoral quotient for each electorate in Bantul 
and Yogyakarta City.  
 
Table 14: Electoral Quotient for Bantul and Yogyakarta City for the 2009 Elections 
 
Electorate Electoral Quotient Electorate Electoral Quotient 
Bantul 1 10,645 Yogyakarta 1 5,647 
Bantul 2 10,112 Yogyakarta 2 5,275 
Bantul 3 9,755 Yogyakarta 3 4,737 
Bantul 4 11,588 Yogyakarta 4 4,533 
Bantul 5 10,728 Yogyakarta 5 5,305 
 
 
 
Candidates will automatically win a seat if they are able to get at least 30 percent 
or more of the BPP in their respective electorate. In 2009, there were 15 
candidates in Bantul who received more votes than 30 percent of the BPP. Of 
these 15 candidates, only one was a woman. The highest individual vote attained 
in Bantul was for a male candidate, Hanung Raharja ST, from PDIP from 
electorate Bantul 4 who won 64 percent of the electoral quotient. The highest vote 
for a woman candidate was for Suratun from PAN who gained 42.3 percent of 
the electoral quotient in electorate Bantul 4. Suratan was the only woman 
amongst the top 20 MPs with the highest number of votes.  
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The Yogyakarta City BPPs were approximately half of the Bantul district quotas. 
The highest number of votes received for one candidate was for Agung Damar 
Kusumandaru, a PAN candidate from electorate Yogyakarta 3 who received 59.2 
percent of the required electoral quotient. Dewi Irawati from PDIP received the 
highest number of votes amongst the women candidates, gaining 36.3 percent of 
the electoral quotient. Similar to Bantul, there was only one woman amongst the 
top 20 MPs with the highest number of votes, indicating that electoral victory 
based on suara terbanyak is difficult for women.  
 
Despite the increased number of seats in the Yogyakarta City DPRD from 35 to 
40 seats, the number of women in parliament remained at six members after the 
2009 elections. This number decreased when on 29 August 2009, 17 days after 
being sworn in, one of the women MPs, Azizah, passed away due to pregnancy 
complications. She was five months pregnant with her sixth child (Aspirasi 2009). 
The Yogyakarta KPU gave authority to PKS to find a replacement for Azizah. 
PKS selected Bambang Anjar Jalumurti, the PKS candidate who received the 
second largest number of votes in the electorate after Azizah.  
 
The Constitutional Court's decision to change the formula for electoral victory 
from rank of order to suara terbanyak changed the 'rules of the game'. This ruling 
took place after candidate lists were formalised and announced by the KPU. As 
a result, these lists were created when candidates were competing and 
negotiating with parties to be placed higher on the lists.  
 
For Bantul, almost half (47 percent) of all MPs (both men and women) would not 
have been elected if rank of order had of been used to determine electoral victory. 
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This is because most of the winning candidates were placed lower on the party 
lists. Almost one quarter (22 percent) of the MPs - all men, were placed between 
positions four and nine on their party lists. As seen in Table 15, four out of six 
women MPs would have not won the election should placement on the party list 
had of been used to determine electoral victory. Additionally, at least two women 
candidates who did not win in the 2009 election would have won based on rank 
of order. More women were elected applying suara terbanyak than rank of order 
(six women to four). 
 
 
Table 15: Bantul DPRD Elected Women Candidates as per Suara Terbanyak and 
Rank of Order Formulas for Electoral Victory 
 
No Suara Terbanyak Formula Placement on Party List Formula 
 Name Party Name Party 
1 Tustiani PDIP Tustiani PDIP 
2 Ita Dwi Nuryanti Gerindra Ita Dwi Nuryanti Gerindra 
3 Maslakah PPP Siti Nurjanah PPP 
4 Sri Sulastyningtyas Golkar Ari Indah Hayati PDIP 
5 Arni Tyas Palupi Golkar   
6 Suratun PAN   
 
 
In the case of Yogyakarta City, if rank of order was used to determine electoral 
victory, 15 MPs (37.5 percent - both men and women) who won their seats in the 
2009 election, would have lost to candidates placed higher on their party lists. 
Table 16 outlines which women candidates would have won under the two 
different methods of electoral victory in Yogyakarta City. It indicates that under 
both methods of determining electoral victory, the same number of women would 
have been elected, however at least two of those women would have been 
different.  
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Table 16: Yogyakarta City DPRD Elected Women Candidates as per Suara 
Terbanyak and Rank of Order Formulas for Electoral Victory 
 
No Suara Terbanyak Formula Placement on Party List Formula 
 Name Party Name Party 
1 Ida Ariyani PPP Ida Ariyani PPP 
2 Facthiyatul Fitri Golkar Facthiyatul Fitri Golkar 
3 Sri Retnowati Golkar Sri Retnowati Golkar 
4 Dewi Irawati PDIP Dewi Irawati PDIP 
5 Christina Agustiani Gerindra R Ayu Siti 
Sudariyah 
Partai Demokrat 
6 Azizah PKS Febiola Ludmila PDIP 
 
 
 
 
6.6 PROFILES OF ELECTED MPS 
6.6.1 BANTUL 
The majority (73 percent) of all MPs (both women and men) in Bantul had 
received at least a university qualification. All of the women MPs had graduated 
from university.  
 
The youngest MP was 28 years old (a woman from Golkar), while the oldest was 
65 years old from PAN. The majority of men MPs (54 percent) are between the 
ages of 31 and 40 years, meanwhile the majority of women MPs (67 percent) 
tended to be older, between 41 and 50 years old. This reflects that women who 
stand in elections a generally older than men due in part because older women 
have finished their domestic duties of raising children and taking care of the 
family.  
 
Of the 45 elected MPs in the Bantul DPRD for 2009-2014, 15 were incumbents. 
The top parties had the highest number of members re-elected, including PDIP 
with five incumbents; PKS with four incumbents and Golkar with two incumbents. 
One third of the women MPs were incumbents. Tustiani was first elected in 1999, 
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and so she was elected for a third term in 2009. Meanwhile Suratun was elected 
for her second term. Incumbency increases the chances of electoral success 
because voters know the candidates and their performance. Additionally, 
incumbents have more developed networks and campaigning skills. 
 
6.6.2 YOGYAKARTA CITY 
The majority of MPs (68 percent) in the Yogyakarta City DPRD held a Bachelor's 
degree, just over one quarter (27.5 percent) held a high school degree and the 
remainder held a Diploma degree. Of the women MPs, 83 percent held a 
Bachelor's degree while the remainder held a high school degree. The 
educational attainment of women MPs was higher than that of men MPs.  
 
The youngest MP was a male, 26 years from PKS. The youngest women MP was 
29 years old from Gerindra, and the oldest was 52 years from PDIP. Similar to 
Bantul, the age range of women MPs is older than that of men MPs.  
 
Of the 21 incumbents from 2004 that campaigned in the 2009 elections, nine 
were reelected. Two women incumbents, Siti Majmu'ah from PAN and Justina 
Paula Suyatmi from Partai Demokrat failed to be reelected, possibly because they 
were placed fifth and fourth respectively on their party lists. Other factors could 
include the dramatic loss of support for Siti Majmu'ah's party, from nine seats in 
2004 to five seats in 2009. As a result of these two incumbents not being 
reelected, no women candidates from Partai Demokrat and PAN won 
parliamentary seats.  
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6.7 CONCLUSION 
Gender quotas for party lists are implemented with the intention to boost women's 
representation in parliament. Theoretically, the more women there are on party 
lists, the more women should be elected to parliament. In Bantul and Yogyakarta 
City, women made up 30 percent of the total number of candidates, but this did 
not transform into 30 percent or anything near this number of women in 
parliament. In fact, women’s representation for 2009 looks somewhat similar to 
the percentage of women in both district parliaments in 1977. Because there was 
no significant increase in women’s representation, one can conclude that the 
gender quota did not work in an open list system. Weak quota provisions with 
symbolic sanctions might be one factor for why there was no significant increase 
in women’s representation. In Timor Leste, Belgium and Argentina, parties that 
do not comply with the quota provision have their lists rejected (Peschard 2002; 
Quota Project 2014). In Spain, parties that fail to comply are given a period of 
time to revise their candidate lists. If those lists are not rectified, they are rejected 
by the Electoral Authority. This sanction has proven to be effective as the 
proportion of women in Spain's parliament is 36 percent (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 
2013). Although gender quotas did not significantly increase the number of 
women in parliament, gender quotas appeared to have opened the door for 
women to become candidates and lift some of the cultural and political barriers 
to enter politics.  
 
Established large parties provide women with more chance of being elected. 
Ninety percent of women who succeeded in being elected came from well 
established, major political parties. Women candidates also seem to do well when 
they come from a party with a high-profile presidential candidate such as Partai 
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Demokrat (Yudhoyono) and Gerindra (Prabowo). Small parties failed to gain 
seats because they tend to be less popular and as a result, do not gain enough 
votes to meet the electoral quotient. Even if a women candidate manages to 
receive a large number of votes, if her party fails to garner enough votes, she will 
not be able to win a seat. Most of the parties did not get enough votes to win even 
one seat, so a gender quota is irrelevant.  
 
It was predicted that the Constitutional Court's decision would provide increased 
chances to those candidates placed low on the lists, however, the election results 
show that placement in positions one to three was a significant contributor to 
electoral success. This is despite the electoral formula being suara terbanyak.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION INFLUENCED THE 
CAMPAIGNS OF WOMEN CANDIDATES 
 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
As discussed briefly earlier, the Court's decision was issued a few months before 
the 2009 elections which required candidates to adapt their campaign strategies. 
Whereas previously in a semi-open list system, lower-order candidates had little 
chance of being elected, in an open list system, all candidates now had a chance 
of being elected. Chapter Seven reveals how the Court's decision impacted on 
the campaigns of women candidates. Findings presented in this chapter are 
based on the views of respondents.   
 
7.2 ELECTORAL SYSTEM IMPACTS 
7.2.1 CAMPAIGN COSTS 
This research found that the Constitutional Court's decision resulted in significant 
financial consequences for candidates. Almost three quarters of the women 
candidates confirmed that they multiplied their campaign funds, ranging from two 
to 10 times more, than originally planned in the semi-open list system following 
the Court's decision.  
 
As there was no spending limit or requirement for candidates to lodge their 
campaign funding details, candidates competed to spend as much as money as 
they could without fear of being penalised or held accountable for their campaign 
spending. One candidate calculated that she would need to spend three times 
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more in the 2009 elections compared to 2004, however the final amount ended 
up being much more.  
 
I spent IDR 10 million [AUD 1,250] in the 2004 elections so I projected 
that I would have to spend IDR 30 million [AUD 3,750] in the 2009 
elections. However it turns out I had to spend 10 times more than I 
predicted because my political party did not provide financial support 
[for candidate campaigns]. In previous elections where rank of order 
was the formula for electoral victory, the political party covered the 
campaign costs, including meeting with voters (Candidate from 
Golkar, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 24 December).  
 
These individual candidate campaigns became very expensive. Increasing the 
levels of funding was necessary and unavoidable as candidates had to 
personalise and multiply their campaign materials to compete with other 
candidates.  
 
We budgeted IDR 25 to 50 million [AUD 3,125 to 6,250] for the 
campaign in the city. However with the suara terbanyak formula, we 
were way under budget because other candidates were very 
competitive [in spending money for their campaigns]. We had to do 
the same, if we did not, we would disappear. It was like swimming in 
a strong river stream, if we do not follow the flow [to increase 
campaign funds], we would drown (Candidate from PPP, Yogyakarta 
City 2009, pers. comm. 5 December). 
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There were four main campaign costs: materials, donations, campaign team and 
meeting packs. Campaign materials included t-shirts, ballots, stickers, books, 
calendars, prayer books and banners. In terms of donations, one candidate from 
PAN in Yogyakarta City told of a local leader requesting candidates to donate to 
the leader's residential community. She added that the community openly 
requested a donation and asked how much she could give. They bargained with 
her, asking her to give more than other candidates. One candidate from PPP in 
Bantul donated IDR 1.5 million (AUD 188) to selected villages. Some 
communities requested televisions, support for community events, money for 
building a road or public security station, or a donation to community funds in 
exchange for their support and time to meet with the candidates. Costs to run 
campaign teams included allowances, phone credit, transportation costs, meals 
and cigarette money. Meeting packs included meals, refreshments, money for 
fuel and cigarettes and sometimes door prizes and grocery packs.  
 
A candidate from Yogyakarta City complained that she felt like a "cash cow" 
during the election as people were constantly asking her for money. This includes 
party members and the general public. For winning MPs, they needed to allocate 
money to celebrate their victory and distribute gifts or cash as ways of expressing 
their gratitude to their supporters.  
 
Before the Constitutional Court's decision, most candidates had already 
budgeted and set aside money to fund their campaigns. However, their planning 
assumed that there would be party funds for a general campaign as well as for 
their own campaign. Following the Court's decision, some candidates (four) 
sought additional money for campaign funds by seeking loans from their relatives 
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or the bank. Candidates learned that party support was not provided under the 
new circumstances of individual campaigning. Given the timing of the Court's 
decision (only a few months before the elections), four candidates said that they 
found it difficult to get additional funds in a short period of time. One candidate 
remarked that she was lucky to have siblings that were willing to lend her money.  
 
Although candidates had to raise additional funds for their campaign, only two 
candidates disclosed the specific amount they spent. One candidate from PPP in 
Yogyakarta City said that she spent IDR 70 million (AUD 8,750) and one 
candidate from PDIP in Bantul reported spending IDR 200 million (AUD 25,000). 
The candidate from Yogyakarta City said that she spent the least amount of 
money among the elected MPs. Respondents reported to have spent between 
IDR 10 million (AUD 1,250) and hundreds of millions of rupiah. One candidate 
said that she knew of another candidate who spent up to IDR 750 million (AUD 
93,750).  
 
For the seven candidates who could not afford loans or were unable to source 
money elsewhere, they campaigned with the money they had already budgeted. 
Although they were aware of the need to increase their campaign funds, their 
activities were constrained by their limited funds. A candidate from Golkar party 
in Bantul said that she had set a limit on how much money she would spend on 
her campaign and that she could not afford any more. She said that she spent 
one quarter of what she knew other candidates (on average) spent.  
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7.2.2 REGULATIONS ON CAMPAIGN SPENDING 
There were no amendments made to the regulations regarding campaign funds 
following the Court's decision. According to the law, it is not compulsory for 
individual legislative candidates to disclose details about their campaign funds, 
including sources of their funding. As a result, well-resourced candidates were 
advantaged in the 2009 elections. The reporting requirements under the 
Elections Law 10/2008 on campaign spending were only relevant for parties. This 
law stipulates that parties that receive funding from individuals, groups, 
companies or organisations between IDR 1 billion to a maximum of IDR 5 billion 
(approximately AUD 125,000 to 625,000) need to report the funding source. 
However, according to the KPU, very few parties report their campaign funding, 
even with the threat of being disqualified from the election. Despite this strong 
sanction, implementation of the law depends on the good will of the KPU at the 
provincial level. No parties were prohibited from contesting in the 2009 elections.   
 
Following the 2009 elections, the KPU requested financial audits to be 
undertaken on all political parties at the national level. According to the law, the 
audit can only examine sources of funds, how much money the party received 
and spent for the campaign and whether the party received a donation above the 
legal limit. The results of this audit were: Partai Demokrat could not verify 51 
percent (IDR 120 billion – AUD 15 million) of its donations, while the sources of 
83 percent of PPP's funding could not be verified (KPU 2012). The KPU was not 
active in responding to the audit findings. Furthermore, Indonesian Corruption 
Watch (ICW) revealed that Golkar, PPP, PAN, Hanura, PDIP and PKS did not 
report all of their media advertising expenditure. ICW found significant 
discrepancies between expenditure for media advertising with actual reported 
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funds (ICW 2013). AGB Neilsen, a large and respectable research company, 
found similar findings. In some cases, party expenditure was 10 times higher than 
reported to the KPU for at least six to nine political parties that won seats in the 
DPR (Palmer 2009).   
 
The government does not provide specific financial support for party campaigns. 
Each party contesting in Indonesian elections is responsible for sourcing its own 
campaign funds. However, the government allocates funds in the national and 
local budgets for political parties that win parliamentary seats. These funds are 
disbursed proportionally based on how many votes are obtained by the parties. 
Under government regulations, parties are only able to spend this funding on 
political education and operational costs such as office administration.  
 
7.2.3 BALLOT STRUCTURE 
Candidates reported being concerned that the size and number of ballot papers 
could confuse voters, especially illiterate voters. As a result, seven candidates 
delivered sessions on how to cast votes as an opportunity to promote themselves 
with voters. This was different to the 2004 elections where candidates 
collaborated with their party colleagues on similar activities.  
 
Candidates ordered copies of ballot papers and conducted mock elections in the 
communities. These training sessions were different to those delivered by the 
KPU that were more focused on general election information and the validity of 
vote casting. These mock elections performed by candidates were personalised 
and targeted to ensure that voters knew how to mark the ballot paper correctly 
and where the candidates were positioned on the ballot paper. Candidates 
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employed different strategies, such as quizzes about the name of the candidate, 
their placement on the list, and the party logo. Prizes were given to individuals 
who had the correct answer.  
 
7.2.4 NARROWING CAMPAIGN AREAS 
With limited funds and time, candidates were forced to be smart and strategic in 
their campaigns following the Court's decision. The pressure to obtain the largest 
number of votes encouraged candidates to selectively campaign in areas where 
they could get more votes for their limited financial resources.  
 
Before the Court's decision, candidates who were ranked higher on the party list 
made less of an effort to campaign and meet with their constituents than 
candidates ranked lower on the list who had to work hard to meet the electoral 
quotient. The candidates who were ranked higher benefited from the efforts of 
those ranked lower. The Court's decision was a wakeup call for the higher-ranked 
candidates. They realised that every vote counted and could make a difference.  
  
...[After the Constitutional Court issued its decision] I followed the 
update then studied the electoral rules; that one vote difference could 
make a candidate win. This meant that we had to compete and race. 
One week after the decision was issued, I had to give it my all. Thus 
I started [campaigning]... I prioritised campaigning in the nearest 
areas: Piyungan, Pleret, Imogiri sub-district. I did not target Dlingo 
sub-district as it was unimaginable because at that time I had a baby 
only a few months old (Candidate from PPP, Bantul 2009, pers. 
comm. 23 December).  
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In addition to selecting locations that would maximise results with minimum effort 
and finances, candidates also chose groups that would be more likely to support 
and vote for them. Examples include Moslem prayer groups, small entrepreneur 
groups, women's organisations and elderly groups. These groups were chosen 
because candidates had existing relationships or an emotional connection with 
them. A candidate from Golkar in Yogyakarta City decided to focus on and nurture 
women's groups around her neighbourhood that she had worked with for a long 
time. She did not want to go to new communities that she was not familiar with.  
 
7.3 PARTY SYSTEM IMPACTS 
7.3.1 LOOSENED TIES TO PARTY 
Before the Constitutional Court's decision, parties initiated and organised group 
campaigns for all of their candidates. Candidates within the party worked together 
to campaign for their party's programs.  
 
In the 2004 elections, we did not campaign in the community as 
much. We just followed or sat comfortably during big campaign 
activities organised by the party. The intensity of the campaigning 
was not high. But in the 2009 elections, we intensified the campaign. 
From the financial side, it was more expensive, we also needed more 
energy and we had to put our lives at stake. If you did not work hard, 
you could not expect to gain significant support and votes. I think that 
in the 2009 elections, I felt so tired physically and emotionally. There 
were tensions with my colleagues in the party (Candidate from PDIP, 
Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 30 December).  
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Because the Constitutional Court's decision focused on individual victory and this 
resulted in individual campaigns, political parties could not afford to support each 
individual candidate. According to six interviewed candidates, none of the parties 
provided funds for their campaigns. Instead, the candidates had to give donations 
to their respective parties for the general campaign. Only a few parties provided 
materials such as t-shirts, calendars or flags but only in limited numbers.  
 
Now that candidates were campaigning for themselves, they had to differentiate 
themselves from other candidates, including those in their own party. A Golkar 
candidate who ran in both the 2004 and 2009 elections explained the different 
campaign strategies: 
 
Of course there were changes in campaign strategies. I had to go to 
the communities and campaign my program, to promote my vision 
and mission. The difference [between the elections] is that in 2004, I 
campaigned the party's programs: Golkar's party programs, and now 
I must campaign my programs. It is more difficult to promote my 
program to people I do not know (Candidate from Golkar, Yogyakarta 
City 2009, pers. comm. 4 December). 
 
Other candidates (three) said that their parties only provided background 
information to candidates, as voters looked more at the individual's profile. This 
also triggered a decrease in candidate loyalty to the party. To promote their 
profiles, candidates used campaign materials that highlighted their picture, a 
catchy photo or phrase, their position on the party list and general information for 
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voters such as police and hospital contact numbers. Candidates also had to put 
their name and picture on campaign materials given by the party, at extra cost to 
them.  
 
A candidate from Bantul employed a different strategy to get voters acquainted 
with her and to remember her face: 
 
During the campaign, I targeted to have 50 people attend each of my 
campaign sessions in order for people to focus on me and to see my 
face and to listen to what I had to say. I also wanted to listen to them 
and to see if they did not agree with what I had said. I did not aim to 
have 300 or 500 people in one campaign gathering because most of 
them would not be able to listen to me. I used venues that could 
accommodate these smaller audiences in one room so they could 
focus on me... If rank of order on the party list [had of been used as 
the formula for electoral victory], then the campaign would have 
involved large audiences as the focus would have been on getting 
people to know the party (Candidate from Golkar, Bantul 2009, pers. 
comm. 21 December).  
 
In previous elections, it became very common for parties to hold campaigns 
attended by hundreds to thousands of supporters. These campaigns regularly 
involved popular figures, celebrities, artists or singers as entertainment, or 
famous religious leaders to attract supporters. Entertainment had been a very 
important element in election campaigns geared towards engineering party 
loyalty. In the 2004 elections, party leaders delivered orations on party programs 
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and achievements, followed by candidate speeches. In the 2009 campaigns, 
party leaders played very limited roles in facilitating meetings with constituents. 
In fact, party leaders who were also running for a parliamentary seat were busy 
campaigning for themselves.  
 
7.3.2 CONFLICT WITHIN PARTIES 
Solidarity amongst candidates within parties disappeared following the Court's 
decision. Candidates intensified their campaigns to ensure that they were ahead 
of their colleagues. Two candidates from PAN and PDIP in Yogyakarta City said 
that in previous elections, first-ranked candidates on their party lists always 
brought them (as new comers) along to gatherings to campaign together as well 
as to introduce them to constituents. However, this did not happen in the 2009 
elections. Candidates who were also in the party leadership did not help promote 
their colleagues in the same electoral district. New women candidates admitted 
that it was very difficult to engage with constituents and to campaign without 
having a support system and a network provided by party officials.  
 
In addition to competition, conflict within parties also escalated. A candidate from 
PDIP in Yogyakarta City reported that a candidate from the same party as her 
removed her banners. She could have reported this to the police, but she was 
reluctant and did not want to add to the tensions within the party. However, 
another candidate from PAN in Yogyakarta City refused to remain silent and 
brought her case to the Election Watch (Panwalsu). The Panwalsu is a 
government body at the sub-national level that monitors every stage in the 
election including verification of the political party, monitoring of irregularities in 
the KPU and inspection and follow up of corruption claims.  
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In the 2009 elections, colleagues in the same party did not work 
together. They were enemies. Suara terbanyak triggered candidates 
to play dirty. They used all possible ways. I reported my colleague 
from the same electoral district as me to the Panwalsu and to the 
party leadership at the provincial level. But the party leaders were 
unhappy that I reported my own colleague. They questioned why I 
would do this to a party colleague. But to me, if my friend is wrong, I 
will say that he/she is wrong. I value honesty and truthfulness 
(Candidate from PAN, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 2 
December).  
 
The Panwalsu rejected her claim citing a lack of evidence.  
 
Six women candidates reported other candidates as becoming territorial of their 
electoral district. These “territorial” candidates prevented others from entering 
and campaigning in certain villages and communities through hiring local thugs. 
Although there are no regulations that state that only one candidate can 
campaign in a particular community, one candidate from Partai Demokrat in 
Bantul, did not go to a community where her colleague had already campaigned 
as a courtesy. Not all women candidates did this. One candidate from Golkar in 
Yogyakarta City campaigned in communities where her colleagues had already 
been. She argued that there were no party bylaws or policies that regulated this. 
She also argued that it was beneficial for the party to have two candidates from 
the same party campaign in one community rather than two candidates from 
different parties.  
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A candidate from PDIP in Yogyakarta City described how she had to change her 
mobile phone number as she often received sexual and verbal harassment 
including death threats via text messages and phone calls. Fearing for her safety, 
she never visited or campaigned in communities alone. Her team, some of whom 
were extended family members, always accompanied her. She recalled that 
when she was campaigning one night in the community, supporters of her 
colleague from the same party intimidated her and her team. They banged the 
gate of the house using a knife where the community gathering was held.  
 
7.4 CORRUPTION IMPACTS 
7.4.1 VOTE BUYING 
Vote buying, or also known in Indonesian as uang politik is a widely reported and 
researched election strategy in the literature on Indonesian politics. This term 
refers to a practice where candidates give money or other benefits to constituents 
in exchange for their vote. International IDEA defines vote buying as a form of 
political swindling that is intended to increase the number of votes a particular 
candidate or political party receives in an election (International IDEA 2013). 
Hidayat (2010) categorises vote buying into direct and indirect vote buying. 
Indirect vote buying refers to candidates giving out goods such as gifts, food 
staples, sarongs, head scarves, and cement. Direct vote buying refers to cash 
payments to voters. Vote buying has long been a common practice in other Asian 
countries. In the Philippines, seven percent of voters in the 2002 community 
elections reported receiving various sorts of payment; meanwhile in Thailand, 30 
percent of surveyed voters were offered money in the 1996 elections; similarly in 
Taiwan, 27 percent of voters reported receiving cash during the 1999 elections 
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(Scaffer 2005). In his study on direct elections for local leaders, Hidayat (2010) 
found that vote buying was widely practiced in Indonesian districts by candidates 
who paid both political parties and voters. Candidates were asked by parties for 
billions of rupiah to pay for their nomination and support.  
 
In Indonesia, vote buying practices often happen a few days or a few hours before 
polling day. As money or goods for votes are usually given out before the morning 
prayer call or sunrise, this form of vote buying is known as a dawn attack. The 
usual form of dawn attack is to distribute money in envelopes by candidates or 
their supporters or "middle men" to individual voters or households on election 
day.  
 
Candidates interviewed for this research reported that vote buying was frequently 
practised by other candidates during the 2009 elections, although none of the 
candidates interviewed in this research admitted to the practice. One candidate 
reported that her campaign team requested her to prepare money for voters 
however after weighing up the issues, she decided not to distribute money to 
voters. There was a lot of pressure from her campaign team to buy votes.  
 
According to the candidates, the price to buy one vote varied between IDR 5,000 
(AUD 62 cents) to IDR 150,000 (AUD 19). They claimed that vote buying reduced 
the number of votes that they should have received.  
 
This research also found that the practice of vote buying disrupted relationships 
and changed the dynamics between candidates and their constituents. An 
unsuccessful PAN candidate from Yogyakarta City expressed her 
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disappointment that in a community where she thought she had strong support 
because she was a regular speaker in the Moslem prayer group, the members 
did not vote for her because they had received gifts from other candidates.  
 
The changed formula for electoral victory created the phenomenon of the "middle 
man" (perantara). The perantara are middle men who approach candidates for 
payment in exchange for a certain number of votes from his/her community. The 
payment to the perantara can be paid as a lump sum or in weekly instalments. 
One candidate said that she knew of another candidate who paid IDR 3 to 4 
million (AUD 375 to 580) per week to perantara. Perantara can be regular or 
important people in the community. 
 
Between one to five days before voting day, my success team were 
informed that a certain area had requested money per head [to buy 
votes]. At that time I had no money left. The informal leader who 
asked for the money said he could arrange support if the candidate 
came to their community, so it was kind of a vote transaction. For 
example, the community would provide 50 votes if the candidate 
provided 10 packs of cement (Candidate from PDIP, Bantul 2009, 
pers. comm. 1 December). 
 
According to a candidate from PPP in Yogyakarta City, many people offered 
assistance including a member of her party board who claimed that he would be 
able to boost her support. This person asked her how much money she had. She 
gave him money for campaign materials which never arrived. One candidate from 
PDIP in Bantul reported that a perantara offered to arrange votes for her on the 
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condition that she paid IDR 10,000 to 20,000 (AUD 1.25 to 2.50) per vote. She 
reported that in order to win a seat in the district parliament, a candidate should 
get at least 30 percent of the electoral quotient which in her electoral district was 
equivalent to 3,500 votes. This calculation is conservative as candidates usually 
need to multiply the targeted number of paid voters in order to secure enough 
votes for electoral victory. This is because some voters might give their vote to a 
candidate who handed out more cash. She refused the offer.  
 
Although none of the interviewed candidates admitted to direct vote buying, 
seven did admit to making donations to in the form of money or goods to 
communities. Donations are perceived as giving back to communities and not as 
bribery. A candidate from PPP in Bantul felt betrayed by a community that had 
received her donation of an expensive generator. She was promised 150 votes, 
but only received 70 votes.  
 
7.4.2 VOTING SCRUTINEERS 
The high level of competition in the 2009 elections resulted in scrutineering of 
votes at polling places becoming more critical and a source of conflict. In previous 
elections, parties had sent scrutineers to every polling station to monitor the 
party's votes. However in 2009, this was insufficient as such scrutineers could 
not be responsible for monitoring and calculating votes for each candidate as well 
as comparing official records with party polling to see if there were discrepancies. 
Candidates employed their own scrutineers to monitor the tally as vote theft was 
frequently reported.  
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In some cases, candidates reported that scrutineers who represented the party 
at a polling station sometimes took sides with particular party candidates, for 
example when the scrutineer was part of the party structure and the candidate 
was his/her superior. One candidate claimed that there was a significant 
difference between the tally recorded by her scrutineers at the polling place count 
and the official records of the tally lodged at the sub-district level. She suspected 
that votes in the party were moved around to advantage party leaders. Vote theft 
tended to occur when the results from a polling station were transferred to the 
sub-district office.  
 
Having a scrutineer at every polling station was an additional cost that not many 
candidates could afford, as it required payment of honoraria, meals, cigarette and 
petrol money. Only three candidates were able to employ a scrutineer at each 
polling station. For candidates who could not afford scrutineers at every polling 
station, they appointed monitors in selected sub-districts where there was the 
possibility of getting a higher number of votes. One candidate claimed that she 
could have won the election if she had more scrutineers. In addition to the 
expense of having scrutineers, two candidates who won a seat in parliament were 
asked to pay back the cost of those scrutineers provided by the party: 
 
I had to pay for the scrutineers at the polling stations their honoraria 
and lunches. There was no financial contribution from the party... 
Indeed they are the party's representatives, but we were asked to 
cover those costs. This commitment was stated in a party document 
that says candidates who won parliamentary seats had to pay back 
the party for the costs of witnesses. It was up to candidates as to how 
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much they wanted to contribute... I won the election and therefore I 
had to pay back the money to cover the cost of the witnesses. This 
means that at the end, I paid the honoraria for the party witnesses 
[even though] I bought them uniforms and I built their capacity... 
witnesses have very strategic roles. If you want to play dirty, yes, you 
did that [bribe the scrutineers], men are more used to all of those 
tricks (Candidate from Golkar, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 24 
December).  
 
One candidate from Bantul described how her votes disappeared between the 
polling booth and sub-district office in areas where she did not place witnesses. 
At that time, she wrote down how many votes she obtained in a particular polling 
booth then she compared it to the official record in the sub-district office. She 
explained that she did not report this to the Panwalsu as she did not have enough 
evidence. Similarly, a candidate from PAN in Bantul claimed that 150 of her votes 
disappeared in the sub-district tally. She claimed that discrepancy of records is a 
common occurrence.   
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Court's decision has two sides: on the one side it gave women 
ranked lower on party lists a chance of being elected; on the other side, it created 
more barriers for women to get elected.  
 
The 2009 elections were less accessible for women as the campaign costs 
skyrocketed. Only a small number of women were able to afford these campaign 
costs. As the Court's ruling was made only a few months before polling day, 
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candidates had limited time to sought additional campaign funds. This 
disadvantaged women candidates who had difficulty accessing additional 
funding.  
 
The unequal power of women and men in society meant that women candidates 
were more vulnerable to violence. Candidates used any means to get elected 
including hiring thugs and intimidating their competitors (even those from the 
same party) in the same electorate.  
 
Although some women candidates believed that the Constitutional Court's 
decision would enable them to win seats in Parliament, they explained that the 
system in 2004 was preferrable. This is because in the 2004 elections, there was 
less conflict amongst candidates and parties. Campaigning was more party-
oriented, there was less money politics and the campaign was more affordable. 
The 2009 elections were described as using "jungle rules".  
 
The Court's decision spread corrupt practices to lower levels in society. The 
Government of Indonesia needs to regulate campaign finances and to enforce a 
spending limit for campaigns. The practice of vote buying exists because there is 
no spending limit for legislative candidate campaigns and there is no obligation 
for them to create a designated account for their campaign that is open to 
financial audit.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
WOMEN CANDIDATE CAMPAIGNS – BARRIERS AND SUPPORTING 
FACTORS 
 
8.1 OVERVIEW 
As highlighted by Norris and Inglehart (2001) and reiterated by Tremblay (2012), 
there are political, structural and cultural factors contributing to the low number of 
women in parliament. Tremblay (2012) argues that the electoral system alone 
cannot automatically increase the percentage of women in parliament and that it 
needs to be combined with supportive socioeconomic, cultural and political 
factors.  
 
Chapter Five on recruitment, selection and placement of candidates uncovered 
the structural and political factors that influence women's political representation, 
particularly how political parties act as gatekeepers for the recruitment and 
placement of candidates. Party elites hold power to determine the rules and 
regulations of the party and how these apply to the implementation of the gender 
quota and the placement of women within their parties. Chapters Six and seven 
showed how the electoral system influenced women's electoral success in the 
DPRDs of Bantul and Yogyakarta City. This chapter (Eight) will explore other 
factors, including socioeconomic and cultural factors that helped or hindered 
women candidates campaigning in an open list system in Bantul and Yogyakarta 
City.   
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8.2 ASPIRANT STAGE 
It is at the aspirant stage that a potential candidate needs to consider her 
motivations for running for parliament as well as the factors within her life that will 
either support or hinder her candidacy. Two primary motivating factors 
highlighted in the interviews included an affiliation or close history with a political 
party and family support. Over one quarter (6) of women candidates interviewed 
said that these two factors combined influenced them to run for parliament. These 
candidates often referred to themselves according to the colour of their party 
logos. Red people (orang merah) were from PDIP and yellow people (orang 
kuning) were from Golkar. These candidates were very loyal to their parties and 
were unwilling to “jump ship” to other parties. A PDIP candidate volunteered in 
her party during a local election when she was a student. After she graduated 
from university, she worked at the local PDIP office. She grew up in a "Soekarno 
family", the term she used to refer to her family's devotion to PDIP. As an 
incumbent from PDIP, she ran for office because her family was nationalist and 
as a result, she had "nationalist blood" running through her veins. She felt that 
PDIP as a party was abused during the New Order and that it was her duty to 
fight for the party.  
 
Similarly, a candidate from Golkar whose father was a former Golkar MP, felt 
indebted to Golkar. She felt that everything she had achieved as an adult, 
including a good education, was because of Golkar. Since she had become 
eligible to vote (at 17 years old), she joined Golkar in 1997 and helped her father's 
campaign as his accountant.  
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... the initial objective [to run for office] was because my father had 
been in politics since 1971 and thanks to God, he was also an MP. 
Second, I saw that in the 2004 elections, women's roles were not 
yet optimal. I saw that 2009 was the right moment since there was 
a 30 percent women's representation quota, there were discussions 
about gender equality everywhere. So, I thought that it was the right 
time for me to enter politics. Also, my father is old now. He asked 
me whether I wanted to run this year or in five years’ time. I said this 
year (Candidate from Golkar, Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 21 
December). 
 
The Golkar candidate from Yogyakarta City shared a similar story: that her father 
was an MP representing the army for two terms. Her husband is also in the Golkar 
leadership. She said that she was "Golkar" since she was born and joined as a 
member when she was eligible to vote. A candidate from Demokrat added that 
she grew up in a political family that exposed her to politics and offered her 
political experiences from a young age. Her mother was an MP and often took 
her to various different political activities. Similarly, a PAN candidate's husband 
was a good friend of one of the party's elites who offered her the opportunity to 
run as a candidate.  
 
While family support combined with a strong political motivation were promoting 
factors for the candidates above, not all candidates received similar family 
support.  
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In accordance with the traditional gender roles in households and families, some 
husbands made the decision about whether their wives would run for parliament. 
Three candidates interviewed said that they had to request permission from their 
husbands to run for office (the husband of one of these candidates did not provide 
his approval, but she ran regardless).  
 
Initially I did not want to enter politics because I was afraid that I 
would have no time for my children. I know this because my 
husband was already involved in politics. So I chose to stay at home 
to raise my children. But PPP people kept visiting me every week 
and proposed me to become a candidate representing PPP. They 
convinced me that PPP wanted to promote women. Despite this, I 
still asked for my husband's permission to be a candidate. If he said 
yes, I would proceed. But if he said no, I would not do it. Therefore 
once my husband had given me permission and support to run, then 
it was possible for me to become a candidate and represent PPP 
(Candidate from PPP, Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 23 December).   
 
A PDIP candidate from Bantul remarked on the double standard between men 
and women candidates: that women candidates are expected to consult with their 
husbands (to use family money for the campaign) but it is acceptable for men 
candidates to run without consulting their wives. 
 
More than half of candidates (13) interviewed said that their husband supported 
them to run for parliament. Three candidates discussed the impacts of 
campaigning (including financial impacts) with their husbands before running.  
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8.3 CANDIDATE STAGE 
During the interviews, candidates raised four key factors that either helped or 
hindered their candidacy: financing, domestic arrangements - including family 
support, religion and support from women's groups.  
 
8.3.1 FINANCING 
It is paramount for women to have their own financial independency in order for 
them to run as candidates. A former MP from Demokrat in Bantul emphasised 
that one of the key factors for increasing women's representation is for women to 
have their own money. Women cannot compete and run for office with their 
husband's money as this often results in problems. If a woman does not have a 
paying job, she needs to negotiate with her family to use its money, and in many 
cases, this requires negotiating with her husband.  
 
Income was one of the main sources of campaign funds. According to a candidate 
from Golkar in Bantul, earning her own income and being single gave her an 
advantage because there was no need for her to negotiate with her husband or 
borrow money from elsewhere. A candidate from PAN who is a single mother 
with two adult sons and a daughter raised a similar point. She explained that 
women are different to men; even though women have their own money, women 
tend to put the family’s needs such as education for the children before thinking 
her own needs. In contrast, men tend to put their needs as a priority.  
 
Sixteen candidates used their own income for their campaigns. Many considered 
this to be an important factor for their candidacy as money was required for 
 180 
registration, health checks, donations to parties, establishing and paying for 
witnesses, security teams, support teams, campaigning in the community, and 
for a celebration with their community and campaign team if elected.  
 
I have my own income. My husband never makes a big deal that I 
have my own savings. Thanks to God, I do not have to go into 
debt... this was a relief. No burden after the campaign (Candidate 
from PAN, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 2 December).  
 
Before running for parliament, we discussed the political, 
psychological and financial burdens. We agreed not to borrow 
money, just to use the family's savings. We did not want to go into 
debt because this would create tensions in the family which in many 
cases leads to divorce (Candidate from Partai Demokrat, Bantul 
2009, pers. comm. 4 December).    
 
While the majority of candidates used their own income, seven candidates also 
received financial support from their families. This blending of finances (income 
and family support) was needed because the income of many candidates was 
not sufficient to cover all candidacy costs. Husbands, parents, siblings and 
extended families helped these women candidates through donations and loans. 
A candidate from Golkar in Yogyakarta City said that her extended family and her 
in-laws lent her money for her campaign. A candidate from PPP in Yogyakarta 
City borrowed money from the bank and mortgaged her family’s land. A PDIP 
candidate from Bantul explained that during the early phases of her candidacy, 
her husband did not allow her to run, however she was determined and 
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persistent. This created conflict and tension with her husband and almost resulted 
in divorce. She used her family business capital to fund her campaign (for which 
she had not received permission from her husband to do) and also received 
financial support from her mother. Although she did not win the election, she did 
not regret her decision to run.  
 
8.3.2 DOMESTIC ARRANGEMENTS (INCLUDING FAMILY SUPPORT) 
As candidates, women need to perform multiple roles that often limit their ability 
to campaign. Many of these roles are related to the household. This research 
found, consistent with the literature, that many women candidates still undertook 
domestic tasks while they campaigned. Out of the 17 married candidates 
interviewed, only two of them said that they shared selected domestic tasks with 
their husbands such as minding the children and picking them up from school. 
None of the candidates reported their husbands taking over all domestic 
responsibilities during the campaign. More than half of these women had to do 
their domestic tasks during their campaigns, others received assistance from 
domestic staff or extended family members such as mothers or mothers-in-law.  
 
For those women who did all of the domestic tasks during their campaigns, they 
often started their day before morning prayer. These women also tended to think 
that such domestic tasks were their responsibility as the wife or mother of the 
household. 
 
...although I have children, I am also active in organisations and 
social activities in the community. If I was going to those activities, 
I had to finish my duties at home first. During the times when I had 
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to meet and greet the elderly groups at 5.30am to exercise, I woke 
up at 4.00am to start cooking... or I prepared the ingredients, cut up 
the vegetables the night before. I got all of the food cooked on the 
table before I left home for meetings. The important thing was that 
I had cooked... and it was up to my husband and children whether 
they wanted to eat the food that I had cooked. As a housewife, I 
have to be responsible, so before I attended activities, I had to finish 
my domestic tasks first. I did not want my husband to think that I 
always attended organisation activities while abandoning my 
household responsibilities (Candidate from Golkar, Yogyakarta City 
2009, pers. comm. 4 December).     
 
This statement is supported by a candidate from PPP who confirmed that it was 
very hard taking care of three children, two of them in primary school, while 
campaigning. Her eldest daughter helped her pack her siblings' clothes and 
nappies when she went to meet with the community. She cooked early in the 
morning before her children woke up. She added that her children understood 
that they had to eat whatever she cooked. Cooking breakfast was quite easy for 
her because she just cooked eggs or nuggets. Below she describes what it was 
like to campaign with a baby. 
 
When I took my baby campaigning with me... several times I had to 
breastfeed my six month old baby while I was giving a speech and 
explaining my programs in front of the community. I was 
embarrassed, but I had no choice, my baby would stop crying if I 
 183 
breastfed her. Therefore, I could give a speech for longer 
(Candidate from PPP, Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 23 December).  
 
Similarly, a PDIP candidate from Yogyakarta cooked breakfast and lunch for her 
family then prepared her children for school before going to work. Once she 
arrived home from work, she helped her children do their homework. She visited 
the community to campaign in the evenings.  
 
A Golkar candidate from Bantul always tried to spend her time with her children 
during her candidacy, including helping them study.  
 
As a mother at home, I had to divide my time as I did not have 
domestic staff.... My husband was busy travelling from Yogyakarta 
to Jakarta. I enjoyed it, so it was not a burden for me. At that time 
when my campaign coincided with my children's school 
examinations, I finished my campaigning at 2.00am so I could help 
them study early in the morning. After they left for school, I went to 
bed. Then I cooked dinner. At 4.00pm I attended my PKK meeting. 
Around 6.00pm, I campaigned. This continued for six months. My 
children protested as my husband and I forgot to look at my son's 
university entrance papers. He was mad at me. I also felt very guilty 
and asked him to forgive me (Candidate from Golkar, Bantul 2009, 
pers. comm. 4 December). 
 
A candidate from PBB in Yogyakarta City with domestic staff said that she had 
more time to campaign and less of a domestic burden compared to those 
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candidates who did not have domestic staff. Her experience is similar to that told 
by a candidate from PDIP Bantul below: 
   
During my campaign period, I only spent three hours a night at 
home... the longest was six hours. In one night from 8.00pm to 
1.00am in the morning, I could go to four or five areas to campaign. 
I would sleep four to five hours then go and do my job as an MP 
until 3.00pm. After work, I campaigned at one or two locations until 
7.00pm. Then I went home just to change my clothes. At 7.30pm or 
8.00pm, I went out to campaign again (Candidate from PDIP, Bantul 
2009, pers. comm. 30 December) 
 
This description is similar to three other candidates who had adult children and 
therefore did not need to take care of small children during the campaign. A 
candidate from PAN Bantul said that her adult children were able to take care of 
themselves, whereas another PAN candidate from Yogyakarta City said that she 
requested her children to order take away food or to eat out during the campaign 
period so she had more time to do campaigning.  
 
Two women indicated that even though they got help from their mothers, 
mothers-in-law or domestic staff, they nevertheless felt guilty for not doing the 
domestic tasks and that they had neglected their families. One of these 
candidates felt sorry that she did not take care of her husband’s meals; the other 
candidate felt guilty for arriving home late and leaving her young child with her 
domestic staff.  
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While some women had assistance to manage their households, most described 
their roles as wives/mothers and candidates as a double burden. Five candidates 
had to demonstrate that they could undertake all of the domestic responsibilities 
in order to get their husband's approval to participate in public life. In the case of 
a candidate from PKB, her husband required her to look after his needs before 
she could campaign and participate in community activities. According to her 
husband, the success for their thirty-year marriage was that his wife had never 
said no to him. For example, if he wanted to eat noodles at 2.00am in the morning, 
his wife would have to cook them for him.  
 
If I had events or meetings to attend in the morning, I made cups of 
tea for my husband and son before I went. My husband usually went 
back to sleep after doing the morning prayer. So when he woke up, 
a cup of tea was ready for him on the table. It was the same thing 
in the afternoon. I cannot ride a motorcycle so either my husband 
or son had to take me to a meeting. If my husband did not feel like 
picking me up, then I had to ask my friend to give me a lift home 
(Candidate from PKB, Yogyakarta 2009, pers. comm. 1 December). 
 
Even though some women seemed to be able to manage their domestic and 
public lives, they would have preferred to have been released from their domestic 
duties.  
 
... Yeah, it was difficult for me to keep up with the domestic tasks. 
For as long as I could, I would continue to do the tasks, including 
cooking. I cooked very early in the mornings before morning prayer. 
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Sometimes it was fine for my husband to have takeaway meals 
instead of my cooking, but my children protested because they 
wanted a home cooked meal. I admit it... this is the hardest part 
about being a woman... Domestic tasks burden women; we cannot 
get away from it. No matter how exhausted we are when we come 
home and the floor is dirty, we clean it. It is different with men, sorry 
to say this: they do not care about domestic tasks (Candidate from 
Golkar, Yogyakarta City 2009, pers. comm. 24 December).      
 
Family support outside of domestic tasks also contributed to the success of 
candidates. A Golkar candidate received guidance and mentoring from her father 
who is a former MP from Golkar. He became her campaign manager. He taught 
her how to strategise and how to communicate to a range of different people. He 
also used his network. Another type of family support included husbands 
accompanying their wives to campaign in communities to avoid negative 
comments (should the wife visit alone).  
 
Aside from financial support and company during the campaign, families also 
supported candidates on voting day and beyond.  
 
Support from family is number one.... my extended family supported 
me, morally and if I needed more money, they would give it to me. 
They also became my witnesses to make sure votes were not 
stolen. My family was everywhere (Candidate from PDIP, 
Yogyakarta 2009, pers. comm. 30 December).  
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8.3.3 RELIGION 
Religion was identified as a hindrance by some women during their candidacy, 
particularly for non-Moslem candidates. They faced certain challenges related to 
their beliefs when campaigning in the community. One candidate was the victim 
of a black campaign that prohibited Moslems to vote for an infidel (Christian).  
 
In a Moslem worship group, someone said to the group when I was 
there: "Is it right that you as Moslems will vote for Mrs {xxx} who is 
a Christian?" He should not have raised the religion issue. I think 
that it influenced them [the voters]. They changed their minds not to 
vote for me. But I stayed committed. In my teacher's association 
where I am the Chair, members of this association know that I never 
had any issues with anyone's religion. But religious differences 
were used in this campaign to slam non-Moslem candidates, 
moreover on the issue about women not being allowed to be 
leaders. They said that it is not right for a woman to be a leader. I 
reported this incident immediately to the Law and Advocacy 
department in my party. This was not right: they should have 
debated my proposed program rather than my religion (Candidate 
from Golkar, Bantul 2009, pers. comm. 4 December).  
 
Aside from being a hindrance during the campaign, a Golkar candidate also 
claimed that her religion prevented her from being placed number one on her 
party's list. She explained that based on scoring she should have been placed 
number one. The party initially put her as number three, but she challenged this 
and requested that she be placed first on the party's list. As a result, the party 
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held an internal meeting to discuss her request. They said that they could only 
place her as number two since she is orang palangan (Catholic). If she had of 
been placed number one, the party believed that it would have struggled to get 
strong support from the community.  
 
According to four candidates, their opponents used religion to their advantage by 
telling people that women cannot be imam (leader for prayer) and Moslems are 
not allowed to vote for non-Moslems. In response to this, a candidate from Golkar 
in Bantul explained to the community that she did not want to become their imam, 
but she would represent them as an MP and would convey their voices and 
interests in parliament.  
 
8.3.4 SUPPORT FROM WOMEN'S GROUPS 
Chapter Three on the women's movement and gender quotas outlined efforts 
made by the women's movement to promote the adoption of gender quotas. The 
women's movement adopted a holistic approach (hulu ke hilir) in ensuring that 
national laws adopted measures to increase the percentage of women in 
parliament. After the gender quota provision was adopted, the women's 
movement at the national and local levels in Yogyakarta worked to promote 
women's representation and to support women candidates from recruitment to 
voting day. Women's groups not only provided support at the policy level, but also 
supported candidates through capacity building activities, fundraising, and 
providing media support.  
 
Interviews with candidates and women's groups identified the following measures 
of support provided to women candidates: 
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 Road show to political parties 
Women's organisations met and lobbied several of the major parties in Jakarta 
and Yogyakarta to put more women on their party lists. In Jakarta, they also 
submitted proposed lists of aspirants to parties. The Caucus of Women in Politics 
in Yogyakarta and the Indonesian Women’s Coalition met with parties to request 
them to put more women on their lists and to provide support for them. The PAN 
party leader in Bantul said that his party faced difficulties to recruit women as 
candidates. So, he requested women’s organisations to nominate aspirants for 
his party’s consideration.  
 
 Capacity Building  
Women's organisations and international organisations provided training for 
women candidates on campaign strategies, how to develop campaign messages, 
leadership skills, public speaking, political mapping, gender budgeting and MP 
roles. Eight candidates and MPs interviewed attended such capacity building 
activities. The Indonesian Women's Coalition, supported by UNIFEM, published 
a book for women candidates about campaign strategies. Nahiyah Faraj, the 
chair of the Caucus of Women in Politics Yogyakarta explained that the Caucus 
delivered voter education for women in 25 sub-districts in the Yogyakarta 
province. The aims of the voter education were to demonstrate how to vote and 
to promote women voters to vote for women candidates. In addition to educating 
voters, this organisation also delivered leadership training for women candidates 
across several political parties. Similarly, two of the biggest women’s Moslem 
organisations, Fatayat NU and Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, 
conducted awareness training of the importance of women in parliament to their 
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community members. In contrast, only three candidates said that their parties 
provided training. The training itself it was not tailored for women rather a one 
day seminar for all candidates in the party.  
 
A candidate from PPP in Yogyakarta City said that the training she received from 
women's NGOs and other NGOs helped her to campaign: 
 
The Party only gave us a one day seminar about elections and the rules 
for all candidates. However, this only happened close to the election 
day. At that time [before I attended the trainings delivered by the 
NGOs], I did not know where to start, who to ask questions to and who 
to rely on. Lucky me, there was the Indonesian Women's Coalition and 
Women's Caucus that held seminars about women's issues. They 
invited an MP to share her strategies for running for office (Candidate 
from PPP, Yogyakarta 2009, pers. comm. 5 December).  
 
 Facilitate Networks  
Women's organisations facilitated candidates to meet with constituents including 
female voters. Such an event was conducted in five provinces including 
Yogyakarta. Fatayat NU in Yogyakarta invited women candidates to the 
workshop to meet with women voters. In addition to constituents, women’s 
organisations also facilitated meetings with academics. They also supported 
candidates by providing campaign materials. None of candidates and MPs 
interviewed said that they received these campaign materials from women’s 
organisations, however two candidates from different districts in Yogyakarta who 
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participated in the focus group discussion received this support and expressed 
their gratitude as these campaign materials eased campaign costs.  
 
 Media relations  
Women’s organisations in Jakarta met with the national media and called for it to 
have more coverage on affirmative action and the importance of women in 
parliament. The mass media was also asked to raise the profile of women 
candidates in their newspapers. They also held talk shows with women 
candidates as opportunities to campaign. A women's group in Yogyakarta lobbied 
local newspapers and radios to have free spots promoting women candidates.  
 
 Moral support and counselling  
The pressure from other candidates, families, black campaigns about personal 
lives and problems arising during or after the campaign took a toll on many of the 
candidates. Often, women's organisations offered support, advice, or took on the 
role as a helpline for women candidates. By providing this counselling, these 
organisations have developed personal relationships with these candidates. A 
key person from the Indonesian Women's Coalition Yogyakarta branch provided 
moral support for women candidates which was crucial to maintaining their 
enthusiasm and spirit. 
 
One of the women’s organisations interviewed reflected that the elections should 
not be seen as a five year event where women’s organisations need to respond 
and consolidate. To increase women’s representation in parliament, particularly 
in an open list system, the women’s movement should meet and strategise 
regularly. This includes having targeted capacity building and personalised 
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mentoring for women candidates who have higher chances of winning rather than 
having blanket training for all candidates. Additionally, support for women 
candidates should be coordinated, strategised, and divided amongst the 
women’s movement to avoid overlapping and to achieve better outcomes.  
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the socioeconomic and cultural factors that influenced 
the campaigns of women candidates. Interviews with candidates overwhelmingly 
focused on factors in the household (finances, domestic arrangements, family 
support) as either helping or, in the majority of cases, hindering their campaigns. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies, including the findings of the 
Equality in Politics Survey conducted by the IPU (IPU 2008). The survey found 
that women candidates cite domestic responsibilities as the single most important 
deterrent to entering a life in politics, an obstacle rated much lower among male 
respondents.  
 
Why does this matter? Research by Diaz (2005) in 15 Western European 
countries found that countries where household chores are more equally shared 
between the husband and wife are more likely to have higher women's 
representation in parliament. For example, in Sweden, Norway and Finland 
where women share 59.8 to 62 percent of domestic tasks, women's 
representation in parliament is between 36 to 42 percent. Without relieving this 
burden from women's shoulders, women's participation in politics will continue to 
remain low. 
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A 2008 study by the IPU found that female politicians in many countries cited 
hostile attitudes towards women's political participation as one of the most 
important barriers to running for parliament. Questions about women's leadership 
capabilities is often raised by the general public, and in many cases, these 
attitudes filter down to the household level.  
 
While one cannot prove that women's double roles as mother/wife and political 
candidate is the sole reason for the failure of many women to be elected, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the time spent doing domestic tasks could be 
allocated campaigning. As seen in the candidates' responses, women who have 
these double roles sacrifice time to rest and sleep in order to fulfil their duties as 
mothers, wives and political candidates.  
 
The social and cultural factors inhibiting women's political participation is 
highlighted in CEDAW General Recommendation No 23 (16th session, 1997): 
 
In all nations, the most significant factors inhibiting women’s ability 
to participate in public life have been the cultural framework of 
values and religious beliefs, the lack of services and men’s failure 
to share the tasks associated with the organization of the household 
and with the care and raising of children. In all nations, cultural 
traditions and religious beliefs have played a part in confining 
women to the private spheres of activity and excluding them from 
active participation in public life (paragraph 10). 
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The recommendation calls for women to be relieved from these barriers through 
special measures, including financial assistance and training. As seen earlier, 
support for women outside of the household or family comes from women's 
groups, with little systematic support coming from the State (despite its ratification 
of CEDAW) and political parties. Because Indonesia is geographically dispersed 
over thousands of islands, the coverage of women’s organisation’s activities was 
not well spread across the country. Even within Bantul and Yogyakarta City alone, 
there were over 350 women candidates across 10 electoral districts. These are 
significant numbers of women for women’s organisations to support. Women’s 
organisations tend to have limited resources and based on the information 
provided by respondents in this research, these organisations are addressing a 
gap which should ideally be filled by political parties.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1 OVERVIEW 
This research is important because Indonesia has committed itself to meeting the 
requirements under CEDAW to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
political and public life of the country. Indonesia is one of over 100 countries that 
have adopted gender quotas as part of its commitment to increasing women’s 
political representation. Indonesia first implemented gender quotas in the 2004 
elections. At that time, the gender quota provision in the Elections Law was weak 
as it only called for political parties to consider having 30 percent of their party 
lists comprised of women candidates. This early version of Indonesia’s gender 
quota was an empty gesture and as a result, the number of elected women did 
not significantly increase in the national parliament. In 2008 the gender quota 
provision was significantly strengthened following strong advocacy and lobbying 
by the Indonesian women’s movement. This new version of the gender quota 
required political parties to have at least one woman for every three candidates 
on party lists. It also gave the authority to the KPU to return party lists that did not 
meet this requirement. This gender quota was specifically designed to match the 
formula for electoral victory at that time: rank of order on party lists.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s subsequent decision to annul article 214 of the 
Elections Law regarding the formula for electoral victory created controversy 
within government and civil society, with many sub-groups supporting the 
change, and many others opposed to the change. The Court’s decision changed 
the electoral victory from rank of order to suara terbanyak, therefore changing 
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Indonesia’s electoral system from using semi-open lists to open candidate lists. 
As a result of this change, the women’s movement expected this new electoral 
system to weaken the effectiveness of the quota system. This research 
investigated how this change in the 2008 Elections Law influenced the 
effectiveness of the gender quota. This research also investigated what 
socioeconomic and cultural factors in an open-list system influenced the 
campaigns of women candidates.  
 
This final chapter answers the research questions posed in Chapter One. Based 
on the answers to these questions, implications of the study will be drawn and 
suggestions for further research will be made. This chapter will conclude with 
policy recommendations aimed at increasing women’s representation in the 
current electoral system.  
 
9.2 HOW DID THE 2008 ELECTIONS LAW, SPECIFICALLY THE FORMULA 
FOR ELECTORAL VICTORY INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
LEGISLATED PARTY LIST QUOTA? 
 
This research concludes that the formula for electoral victory reduced the 
effectiveness of the gender quota. If the quota had of been effective, one could 
expect to have seen a noteworthy increase in women’s representation in the two 
district parliaments. However, women’s representation in Bantul increased in 
2009 to only 13.3 percent, meanwhile women’s representation decreased in 
Yogyakarta City to 15 percent. Both these figures are significantly lower than the 
aspirational 30 percent and are inconsistent with the experiences of other 
countries such as Argentina that implemented a 30 percent gender quota for the 
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first time in 1993 and saw women’s representation in the Chamber of Deputies 
rise from 5.9 percent in 1992 to 14 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 2001 and 
33.2 percent in 2005 (Carrio 2005). Despite losing its effectiveness and parties 
implementing it as a tick-a-box exercise, the quota still provided the benefit of 
increasing the number of women candidates participating in the elections.  
 
9.2.1 A. WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN 
ADVOCATING AND LEGISLATING GENDER QUOTAS? 
 
As discussed Chapter Three, the women’s movement played a pivotal role in 
encouraging the government to legislate gender quotas. The women’s movement 
had three key roles in advocating for gender quotas. These roles were as 
initiators of the quota campaign; drivers of the quota network; and primary think 
tank of the campaign.  
 
As initiators of the campaign, the women’s movement raised the awareness of 
the importance of women in decision-making amongst various stakeholders, 
including political parties, MPs, various Ministers, the media, religious leaders 
and the general public. For example, the women’s movement convinced the 
Minister for Women’s Empowerment to play a more prominent role in the 
campaign, including to be part of the special taskforce in parliament representing 
the executive to ensure gender quota provisions were adopted for the 2009 
elections.  
 
In its second role, as the driver of the quota network, the women’s movement 
determined advocacy strategies. The movement applied a holistic approach hulu 
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ke hilir, meaning the campaign focused on every step in the political process from 
recruitment to nomination to election. To get maximum impact for its strategies, 
the movement also strengthened its relationship with international networks and 
built relationships with the media.  
 
Third, as the primary think tank, the women’s movement supported women MPs 
with briefing papers and data for parliamentary sessions. The movement also 
supplied background information and media briefings to the Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment.  
 
To this day, the inclusion of gender quotas into Indonesia’s Elections Law stands 
out as one of the key achievements of the Indonesian women’s movement. It is 
also a feature of the evolution of Indonesia’s democracy outlined in Chapter Two. 
There is no doubt that meaningful gender quotas would not have been legislated 
without the advocacy and hard work of the women’s movement.  
 
9.2.2 B. WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCED THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S 
DECISION TO CHANGE THE FORMULA FOR ELECTORAL VICTORY? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Constitutional Court rejected the review of 
article 55 in the Elections Law about gender quotas, however it approved the 
review of article 214 on the formula for electoral victory. This review of article 214 
was based on the argument that the article was against Indonesia’s democratic 
principles and that it allowed corrupt practices to take place within parties. This 
decision demonstrates that the Constitutional Court failed to recognise that the 
gender quota regulated in article 55 was specifically designed to suit article 214. 
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The Court assumed that having article 55 alone would result in an increased 
number of women elected to parliament, however it failed to understand the 
impact of the weak sanctions for non-compliance as well as the socioeconomic 
and cultural factors that influence women’s representation in an open list system. 
As discussed earlier, not all parties complied with the quota and most women 
struggled to manage their domestic responsibilities as wives and mothers during 
their campaigns.  
 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court approved the review of the formula for 
electoral victory to reduce political party dominance and corruption in the 
placement of candidates on party lists. As discussed in Chapter Five, political 
parties are the gatekeepers to the selection and placement of candidates. As 
such, party elites hold the power and authority to determine who is selected and 
placed on party lists. This power often creates non-transparent decision-making 
that significantly disadvantages women candidates. The gender quota combined 
with article 214 was one mechanism to deal with this issue. According to the 
Constitutional Court judge interviewed for this research, the women’s movement 
did not present compelling evidence on the advantages of rank of order compared 
to suara terbanyak to increase women’s representation. This was a bitter lesson 
for the women’s movement. 
 
While the Constitutional Court’s decision on article 214 was argued to be inline 
with the principles of democracy, it significantly weakened the gender quota. 
From the perspective of the candidates, it changed the rules of the game and as 
a result, disadvantaged women candidates who tend to have fewer resources 
and time to campaign.   
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9.2.3 C. HOW DID POLITICAL PARTIES IMPLEMENT THE GENDER QUOTA 
AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL IN THE 2009 ELECTIONS? 
 
As outlined in Chapter Five, this research found that the implementation of gender 
quotas by political parties was not always linked to a commitment to increase 
gender equality. The two main reasons for why parties fulfilled the quota 
requirement were because: it was either in the party’s interests (for example, PPP 
and PAN put more women on their party lists to attract women voters) and it was 
a tick-a-box requirement that parties needed to fulfil. For example, even though 
parties developed rigorous selection and placement criteria, those criteria were 
not always applied fairly in the placement of women candidates.  
 
Overall, the Bantul and Yogyakarta City lists were comprised on average of 30 
percent of women candidates. However, not all parties met the gender quota 
requirement, including large parties. Additionally, less than 20 percent of women 
candidates from the major political parties were placed as number one on the 
party lists. Women candidates dominated the third ranked position or lower on 
party lists. From a recruitment and placement perspective, parties did not develop 
strategies for how to recruit women aspirants to comply with the gender quota 
requirement. These issues demonstrate that most parties met the gender quota 
to maintain their image and to satisfy the requirement.  
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9.2.4 D. HOW DID SUARA TERBANYAK INFLUENCE THE CAMPAIGNS FOR 
WOMEN CANDIDATES? 
 
The Constitutional Court’s change to the electoral system came shortly before 
the 2009 elections and as a result, many candidates were unprepared for how 
this would influence their campaigns. Some candidates quickly adapted and 
focused their campaign strategies on raising their profile as individuals rather than 
as political party candidates. As a consequence, candidates needed additional 
funds and resources to campaign. This posed particular challenges for women 
candidates who tended to have fewer resources than men to campaign. 
Ultimately, suara terbanyak created additional barriers for women as 
campaigning became more competitive and as a result, more expensive.  
 
Competition amongst candidates for votes prompted candidates to use any 
possible means to win parliamentary seats, including vote buying. One candidate 
described the 2009 elections as using “jungle rules”. Candidates reported wide 
spread vote buying, though no one interviewed in this research admitted to this. 
In addition to vote buying, other corrupt practices reported included giving grocery 
packs, prayer kits and other goods such as televisions and cement packs to 
communities or organisations. Suara terbanyak also saw the emergence of vote 
brokers who could secure a certain number of votes from his/her community in 
exchange for money from the candidate. Ironically, the Court’s decision to annul 
article 214 to minimise political party corruption has unintentionally created 
opportunities for corruption at the community level.  
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9.3 WHAT OTHER FACTORS ENHANCED OR INHIBITED WOMEN 
CANDIDATE CHANCES OF BEING ELECTED IN THE 2009 DISTRICT 
ELECTIONS IN BANTUL AND YOGYAKARTA CITY? 
 
Consistent with much of the literature (Matland 2005; Schmidt 2003), this 
research concludes that women are disadvantaged in the open list system. This 
conclusion is in contrast to Siregar’s (2007) suggestion that an open list system 
would advantage women. Siregar (2007) argued that an open list system would 
provide opportunities for women to campaign as individuals and thus display their 
personal capacity. As this study has found, the open-list system where 
candidates are competing as individuals for the most votes, created very high 
campaign costs that not many women could afford. Additionally, several scholars 
argue that an open list system is not beneficial for women if it is implemented in 
countries that uphold traditional gender roles (Matland 2005). This research 
found that women, in their roles as wives and mothers tend to have fewer 
resources than men to campaign, this not only includes finances but also time. 
 
In terms of factors that enhanced women candidates chance of being elected, 
this research found that support from the women’s movement, in particular 
training and advocacy for women candidates filled an important gap left behind 
by political parties.   
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9.3.1 A. HOW DID SOCIOECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS 
INFLUENCE WOMEN CANDIDATE EXPERIENCES IN THE 2009 DISTRICT 
ELECTIONS? 
 
While the adoption of gender quotas is expected to increase women’s political 
representation, the quota alone cannot be effective without additional support for 
women to overcome certain socioeconomic and cultural challenges. This 
research found that even as candidates and MPs, women are still expected to 
fulfil traditional gender roles as wives and mothers. As a result, domestic 
responsibilities restrict the ability of women candidates to campaign. As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, most women candidates perceive their domestic 
responsibilities as their duty and thus feel obliged to complete these tasks before 
they can campaign. In other words, when dinner is on the table, then they can go 
out and campaign.  
 
This research also found that financing, particularly a lack of financing, is another 
significant inhibiting factor. Financing is paramount to campaigning, especially in 
a suara terbanyak context where candidates must campaign as individuals. 
Women who were financially independent were less inhibited in their 
campaigning compared to those women who had to seek permission from their 
husbands to use the family finances or borrow.  
 
Religious beliefs and norms were other significant barriers for women. Some 
opponents of women candidates cited a verse in the Hadist that forbids women 
from becoming leaders (Imam). This strategy was used to discourage voters from 
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voting for women candidates. For non-Moslem candidates, their opponents called 
for voters not to vote for non-Moslem women candidates.  
 
9.3.2 B. WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF THE YOGYAKARTA’S WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENT IN ADVOCATING AND SUPPORTING WOMEN CANDIDATES IN 
THE 2009 DISTRICT ELECTIONS? 
 
The women’s movement in Yogyakarta used three approaches to promote 
women’s representation in the Yogyakarta area. The first was working with 
political parties. The movement was active in advocating the implementation of 
gender quotas by lobbying parties to recruit and place women on their party lists. 
Secondly, the women’s movement provided support and capacity building for 
women candidates. Thirdly, the movement lobbied women voters to vote for 
women candidates. Despite these efforts, there was little strategy or coordination 
within the movement to harmonise these efforts. Additionally, the movement had 
limited funding and time to implement these activities. As a result, these activities 
were implemented over a short timeframe and in limited areas. This may indicate 
that the women’s movement’s strategy is a program of support that takes place 
once every five years, rather than a long-term program.  
 
9.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This is the first time research on women’s representation in Indonesia has 
focused on the nexus between implementation of the gender quota and an open 
list electoral system at the district level. While on the one hand this research 
covered the experiences and perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders, it 
nevertheless focused on the results of just two district parliaments in Indonesia. 
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To have more confidence in the conclusion that the quota lost its effectiveness 
as a result of the open list system, future research could increase the number of 
sampled districts and assess the election results across those districts. Noting 
that the Constitutional Court’s decision on suara terbanyak was made after 
political parties had submitted their candidate lists to the KPU for the 2009 
elections, future research could also assess candidate lists and district election 
results for 2014 to see how parties responded to suara terbanyak. 
 
Interviews with candidates and political party leaders described the gatekeeper 
role political parties play in the recruitment, selection and placement of women 
candidates. Party leaders often commented that it is difficult for parties to meet 
the gender quota requirement because there is a shortage of qualified women 
aspirants. While there might be some truth in this for the 2009 elections, future 
research could explore whether parties have been proactive in responding to the 
quota requirement, including if they have employed specific recruitment and 
training strategies for women candidates. Future research could also explore the 
party culture and what factors within political parties prevent or inhibit women 
from joining and running as candidates.  
 
9.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even though Indonesia has a gender quota to increase women’s political 
representation, this research has shown that it is ineffective when paired with the 
current open list electoral system. Without a gender quota that matches the 
electoral system, one could argue that Indonesia is not meeting its obligations 
under CEDAW and as a result, changes are needed to make the quota more 
meaningful and effective.  
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The main alternative to the current quota in an open list system is the reserved 
seats quota where a proportion (for example, 30 percent) of the seats in 
parliament are reserved for women candidates who receive the highest number 
of votes. This type of quota was once advocated in Indonesia by the women’s 
movement but was squashed by political parties and other groups who argued 
that if there were reserved seats for women, then other minority groups (such as 
indigenous groups and people with disabilities) should also have a similar quota. 
Despite these arguments, the reserved seat quota is the most effective quota for 
increasing women’s representation and has been successfully implemented at 
the national level in Afghanistan and Iraq among other countries (Quota Project 
2014). Unfortunately, since the 2009 elections there has been little advocacy from 
the women’s movement and elsewhere of the importance of changing the gender 
quota to suit the open list system. Given how pivotal the women’s movement was 
to legislating the current quota, without the movement’s support to change it 
again, a quota to suit the open list system seems unlikely.  
 
A more likely alternative to changing the gender quota is strengthening the 
framework that supports the current quota. These changes include: 
1. Strengthening sanctions for non-compliance: East Timor and other 
countries have demonstrated that implementing strong sanctions against 
political parties that fail to meet the quota is an effective supporting 
measure. In the Indonesian context, this would require equipping the KPU 
with the legal basis to reject party lists that do not comply with the gender 
quota. This has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the quota, 
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particularly if the larger parties with stronger voter support meet the 
gender quota.  
2. Creating financial sanctions and incentives: for example Ireland has 
implemented financial sanctions that mean that parties that fail to run at 
least 30 percent of women in the general elections will lose half of their 
annual state funding (Buckley 2013). Likewise in Kenya, a party will lose 
its public funding if more than two-thirds of its elected officials are of one 
gender (Quota Project 2014). In terms of incentives, Colombia distributes 
five percent of total state funding for political parties in proportion to the 
number of women representatives elected from their lists (Quota Project 
2014).     
 
When parties register for the elections, they must fulfil 18 requirements 
including providing information on: party structures, membership numbers, 
bank account details as well as a statement that the party will fulfil the 30 
percent gender quota. To increase the transparency around the recruitment, 
selection and placement process, an additional requirement could include 
that parties outline the processes (including criteria) for how they select and 
place candidates. Such a requirement would be consistent with the 
Constitutional Court’s rationale for moving to an open list system: to remove 
(or at least decrease) the power of political party elites.  
 
Given that the open list system has resulted in candidate-centred campaigns 
that require significant financing, regulations that require candidates to report 
their campaign funding sources and spending are likely to deter candidates 
from engaging in corrupt practices such as vote buying. A number of 
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countries have implemented variations of this policy, including America which 
has systems in place that require candidates to report their financial details; 
and Canada which has placed strict limits on the donations that can be made 
to political parties and candidates.  
 
In addition to the requirement for candidates to report their individual 
campaign sources and spending, the government could provide campaign 
funds and support for women candidates. At present, parties that contest 
elections receive funds from the national budget proportional to their number 
of winning seats in the last elections. To improve the success rate of women 
candidates, the current law could be ammended to allow the government to 
give extra funds to parties that have more than 30 percent women 
candidates, and especially rewarding parties that put women in winnable 
positions. These extra funds could be provided especially for the campaigns 
of women candidates, to increase their capacity to campaign effectively in the 
open list system.  
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POST SCRIPT 
 
 
10.1 2014 ELECTIONS OVERVIEW  
 
Under the 2012 Election Law, the 2014 elections used the same open list 
electoral system as in the 2009 elections. The Elections were held on 9 April 
2014.  
 
At the national level, there were 15 political parties that contested, including three 
Acehnese local parties and a new national party established in 2011 by former 
Golkar party elites and national media owner, Surya Paloh: National Democrat – 
NasDem. The number of parties contesting in the election was almost half the 
number that competed in the 2009 elections as a result of changes to the electoral 
threshold from 2.5 to 3.5 percent. Twelve parties contested in the Bantul and 
Yogyakarta City elections. In Bantul, one additional electorate was added bring 
the total number of electoral districts in Bantul to six.  
 
Despite widespread corruption practices in the 2009 elections, no regulation on 
transparency of campaign spending for political party candidates was issued. The 
design of the ballot and how to vote remained unchanged. Voters could cast a 
vote for a candidate, or party, or a candidate and party.  
 
 
10.2 GENDER QUOTA IMPLEMENTATION  
 
The women’s movement used the revision of the package of political laws for the 
2014 elections as an opportunity to improve women’s representation in 
parliament. The movement requested parliament to include two crucial legislative 
changes to increase the proportion of women in parliament: 1) implementing a 
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zipper system that would alternate men and women candidates on party lists; and 
2) to strengthen sanctions for non-compliance by disqualifying parties that did not 
meet the gender quota (Komnas Perempuan 2015).  Parliament rejected these 
proposals. As a result, the gender quota provision used for the 2009 elections 
remained the same for the 2014 elections. In addition to lobbying parliament, the 
women’s movement also requested the KPU to enforce the gender quota by 
rejecting party lists that did not have at least 30 percent of women in all electoral 
districts. These efforts were successful with the KPU issuing a regulation that 
required parties to have 30 percent of women on party lists in all electoral districts. 
The KPU also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with MOWE to increase 
representation and participation of women in politics (KPU 2015; Perludem 
2015).  
 
Table 17 shows that all parties in Bantul and Yogyakarta City met the gender 
quota requirement. This is significantly different to the 2009 elections where of 
the 33 parties that competed, only 41 percent met the gender quota requirement. 
Overall, 40 percent of party lists in Bantul and Yogyakarta City were comprised 
of women candidates.   
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Table 14: Implementation of gender quotas in Bantul and Yogyakarta City –  
2014 elections 
 
 
Party 
Percentage of women candidates on 
party lists 
 
Bantul Yogyakarta City 
Demokrat 60 37 
Gerindra 40 38 
Golkar 42 40 
Hanura 39 53 
Nasdem 42 40 
PAN 44 38 
PBB 52 53 
PDIP 36 37 
PKB 45 40 
PKPI 50 63 
PKS 40 38 
PPP 39 38 
Average 44 43 
 
 
Out of seven largest parties in Yogyakarta City, Golkar put the highest percentage 
of women on the party list. This increased from 32 percent in the 2009 elections 
to 40 percent in the 2014 elections. Meanwhile in Bantul, Golkar increased the 
number of women candidates on its party lists from 35 to 42 percent since the 
last elections.  Similarly to the last elections, small parties tended to nominate 
more women.  
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Figure 14: Proportion of women on party lists in Bantul electorates for the seven 
largest parties 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Proportion of women on party lists in Yogyakarta City electorates for 
the seven largest parties 
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As seen in Figures 14 and 15, contrary to the 2009 elections where PKS led in 
implementing the gender quota, in the 2014 elections PKS did not meet the quota 
in one electoral district in Yogyakarta City. Partai Demokrat in Bantul on the other 
hand consistently exceeded the quota across all electoral districts by placing 
between 40 to 75 percent of women on its lists.  
 
10.2.1 CANDIDATE PLACEMENT 
The 2014 elections was the first time that parties developed their party lists 
knowing that suara terbanyak would be the formula for electoral victory. As a 
result of this, one might assume that parties would evenly distribute men and 
women candidates across the party lists, including the top three positions. 
However as shown in Figures 16 and 17, parties in both Bantul and Yogyakarta 
City still preferred to put male candidates at the top of their lists.  
 
Figure 16: Rank of candidates on party lists in Bantul 
 
 
 
For Bantul, PKS was the only major party that did not place a woman candidate 
in the top position. The highest placed woman from PKS was listed in third 
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position. PAN, Gerindra and Golkar placed two women at the highest position on 
their party lists.  
 
Figure 17: Rank of candidates on party lists in Yogyakarta City 
 
 
In Yogyakarta City, PKS and PDIP nominated 40 and 38 women candidates 
respectively, however none of their women candidates were placed in the top 
position. The majority of women were placed as number three and six. On the 
other hand, Gerindra placed four women candidates as number one, and similar 
to 2009, Golkar placed two of its women candidates in top position. Partai 
Demokrat, PAN, and PPP put one woman as number one.  
 
 
10.3 2014 ELECTIONS RESULTS 
 
There were very different outcomes for women’s representation in the 2014 
elections in Bantul and Yogyakarta City. Women’s representation in Bantul 
dropped to 7 percent from 13 percent in 2009.  This drop is despite women 
accounting for an average of 44 percent of party lists. As seen in Table 15, of the 
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45 elected MPs in the Bantul DPRD, only three were women (from PKB, Golkar 
and PAN).  
 
Table 15: Women’s representation in the 2014 Bantul DPRD Elections 
Party 
Number 
of 
Women 
MPs 
Number 
of Men 
MPs 
Total 
MPs 
% of Women 
MPs 
PKB 1 3 4 25 
Golkar 1 4 5 20 
PAN 1 5 6 17 
Demokrat  1 1 0 
Gerindra  6 6 0 
Nasdem  2 2 0 
PBB  1 1 0 
PDIP  12 12 0 
PKS  4 4 0 
PPP  4 4 0 
Total 3 42 45 7 
 
 
Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta City (Table 16), the percentage of women elected 
almost doubled from 15 percent to 25 percent. Out of 10 elected women 
candidates, half of them are from Gerindra.  Gerindra had 38 percent of women 
on its party lists, a similar figure to Partai Demokrat and PKS which had no women 
candidates elected. This difference might be because three of the elected women 
from Gerindra were placed number one on the party’s lists. The Gerindra Leader, 
Prabowo Subianto was running as a Presidential candidate in 2014 which may 
have also influenced district parliament election results.   
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Table 16: Women’s representation in the 2014 Yogyakarta City DPRD Elections 
 
     
Party 
Number 
of 
Women 
MPs 
Number 
of Men 
MPs 
Total 
MPs 
% of Women 
MPs 
Gerindra 5 0 5 100 
Golkar 2 3 5 40 
PPP 1 3 4 25 
PAN 1 4 5 20 
PDIP 1 14 15 7 
Demokrat  1 1 0 
Nasdem  1 1 0 
PKS  4 4 0 
Total 10 30 40 25 
 
 
 
10.3.1 DID PLACEMENT MATTER? 
 
The results of the Bantul and Yogyakarta City elections produced two different 
results for women candidates. Despite these different results, there was one 
commonality: like the 2004 elections, placement was an important factor for 
winning the elections. Forty-two percent of the elected MPs in Bantul and 50 
percent of the MPs in Yogyakarta were ranked in first position on their parties’ 
lists. In Bantul, two of the women MPs were placed first, while in Yogyakarta City, 
seven of the women MPs were ranked first. These results indicate that in the era 
of suara terbanyak, placement on party lists is still an important factor for winning 
a parliamentary seat. 
 
 
10.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GENDER QUOTA 
 
Implementation of the gender quota has increased the proportion of women on 
party lists in Bantul from 30 percent in the 2009 elections to 44 percent in the 
2014 elections. In Yogyakarta City this proportion has increased from just over 
30 percent to 40 percent. This is likely the result of the KPU issuing and enforcing 
a regulation that requires parties to have at least 30 percent of women on their 
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lists. This regulation has forced parties to recruit and place more women on their 
party lists and as a result, has opened the door for women to become active in 
the political arena. Parties such as Golkar in both Bantul and Yogyakarta City and 
Gerindra in Yogyakarta City had stronger commitments by placing women on top 
list.   
 
The literature suggests that gender quotas are most effective when 
implementation is combined with the proper electoral system. This has been 
reinforced through this literature and by the 2014 elections results. The 2014 
elections in Bantul and Yogyakarta City would have provided different results if 
the formula used to determine electoral victory was rank of order. In Bantul, there 
would be 10 women MPs (as opposed to three) if rank of order had of been used. 
This means an additional seven women MPs bringing the proportion of women in 
parliament to 22 percent, a three-fold increase from the 2014 results based on 
suara terbanyak. In Yogyakarta City, if rank of order had of been used, an 
additional two women MPs would have been elected, thus increasing women’s 
representation in Yogyakarta City from 25 to 30 percent. These figures 
demonstrate the ongoing negative impact of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
to annul article 214 on rank of order on women’s representation in Indonesian 
parliaments.  
  
 218 
REFERENCES 
ACE Project 2013, Electoral system viewed on 29 September 2013, 
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd02/default. 
Araujo, C & Garcia, I 2006, ‘Latin America: The experience and the impact of 
quotas in Latin America’ in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, quotas and politics, 
Routledge, New York, pp. 83-111. 
Arivia, G 2006, Feminisme: Sebuah kata hati, Penerbit buku Kompas, Jakarta. 
Asia Network for Free Elections, 1999, Democratisation in Indonesia: Report of 
the 1999 election observation mission 25 May- 10 June 1999, ANFREL and 
Forum-ASIA, Bangkok. 
Assidiqie, J 2009, Melembagakan Mahkamah Konstitusi di negara demokrasi 
baru, viewed on 23 March 2014, http://www.jimly.com/pemikiran. 
Bacchi, C 2006, ‘Arguing for and against quotas: theoretical issue’, in D. 
Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics, Routledge, New York, pp. 32-51. 
Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Bantul, 2008, Bantul dalam angka 2008, Bantul. 
Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Yogyakarta, 2008, Kota Yogyakarta Dalam Angka, 
Yogyakarta City. 
Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Yogyakarta, 2010, viewed on 7 January 2013, 
jogjakota.bps.go.id/ 
Baldez, L 2004, ‘Elected bodies: the gender quota law for legislative candidates 
in Mexico’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 231-258. 
Ballington, J. & Matland, R 2004, Political parties and special measures: 
enhancing women's participation in electoral processes. Paper presented at 
OSAGI Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes in Post 
Conflict Countries, 19-22 January 2004, New York. 
Bauer, G 2004, ‘The hand that stirs the pot can also run the country: electing 
women to parliament in Namibia’, Journal of African Studies, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 
479-509. 
Bauer, G 2008, ‘Fifty/Fifty by 2020’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 348-368. 
Baviskar, B 2003, ‘A decade of women's empowerment through local 
government in India: impact of women’s participation in local governance in 
rural India, New Delhi’, Institute of Social Sciences viewed on 3 March 2012, 
www.sapcanada.org/wp-content/.../SAP-WE-Workshop-Baviskar.pdf 
Bessell, S 2004, ‘Women in parliament in Indonesia; denied a share of power’, 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government ANU, viewed on 5 May 
2013, http://apseg.anu.edu.au. 
 219 
Bessell, S 2010, ‘Increasing the proportion of women in the national parliament: 
opportunities, barriers and challenges’, in Aspinall, E & Mietzner, M (eds.), 
Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, Singapore, ISEAS, pp. 219-242. 
Birks, T 2006, ‘Neglected duty: providing comprehensive reparations to the 
Indonesian 1965 Victims of state persecution’, International Centre for 
Transnational Justice, viewed on 3 March 2012, 
https://www.ictj.org/publication/neglected-duty-providing-comprehensive-
reparations-indonesian-1965-victims-state. 
Blackburn, S 1999, ‘Winning the vote for women in Indonesia’, Australian 
Feminist Studies, vol. 14, no. 29, pp. 207-218. 
Blackburn, S 1999, ‘Women and citizenship in Indonesia,’ Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 34, no. 2, pp.189-204. 
Blackburn, S 2004 ‘Women’s suffrage and democracy in Indonesia’, in 
Edwards, L & Roces, M (eds.), Women’s Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism, 
and Democracy, Routledge, London. 
Buckley, F 2013 ‘Women and politics in the Republic of Ireland: the road to sex 
quotas’, Irish Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 341-359. 
Budhiati, I 2002, ‘Kuota perempuan dalam UU politik’, Suara Merdeka, 10 
October 2002, viewed on 10 August 2011, 
http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0210/10/kha1.htm. 
Budiardjo, M 2008, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik, Gramedia, Jakarta. 
Bylesjo C & Seda, F 2006, 'Indonesia: the struggle for gender quotas in the 
world's largest Muslim country', in Dahlerup, D (ed.), Women, Quotas and 
Politics, Routledge, New York, pp. 259-265. 
Carrio, E 2005, ‘Argentina: A new look at the challenges of women’s 
participation in the legislature’ in Ballington, J & Karam, A (eds), Women in 
Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Stockholm, International IDEA, pp.164-172. 
Caul, M 2001, ‘Political parties and the adoption of candidate gender quotas: a 
cross national analysis’, The Journal of Politics, vol. 63 no. 4 pp.1214-1229. 
Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO) 2002, Data dan Fakta: Keterwakilan 
Perempuan Indonesia di Partai Politik dan Lembaga Legislatif, 1999 –2001, 
Jakarta. 
Chiang, L 2008, ‘Women as agents of change in legislation in Taiwan’ in K. 
Iwanaga (ed.), Women's political participation and representation in Asia: 
obstacles and challenges, NIAS Press, pp. 81-100. 
Dahlerup, D & Freidenvall, L 2005, ‘Quotas as a fast track to equal 
representation for women’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 7, no. 
1, pp. 26-48.   
 220 
Dahlerup, D & L. Freidenvall 2013, Electoral gender quota systems and their 
implementation in Europe, European Parliament, viewed 29 April 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies. 
Dahlerup, D 2003, ‘Comparative studies of electoral gender quotas’, paper 
presented at the International IDEA Workshop: Implementation of Quotas Latin 
America Experiences, 23-24 February 2003, Peru, International IDEA, viewed 
on 2 January 2009, www.idea.int. 
Dahlerup, D 2006, ‘Introduction’, in D Dahlerup (ed.) Women, Quotas and 
Politics, New York, Routledge, pp. 3-31. 
Dahlerup, D 2007, ‘Electoral gender quotas: between equality of opportunity 
and equality of result’, Representation, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 73-92. 
Davies, G 2005, ‘Women and politics in Indonesia in the decade Post-Beijing’, 
International School Social Science Journal, vol. 57, no.184, pp. 231-242 
Diaz, M 2005, Representing Women?: Female Legislators in West European 
Parliaments, Colchester, ECPR press. 
DPRD Kota Yogyakarta 2009, ‘DPRD Kota Yogyakarta berduka cita’, Aspirasi, 
vol. 2, no.10, pp. 24-25. 
Electoral Council of Australia, 2012, Electoral system, viewed on 19 June 2012, 
www.eca.gov.au. 
Evans, K 1999, ‘Sistem baru, suasana baru Pemilu 1999 yang dinanti’, in J. 
Suryakusuma (ed.), Almanak Parpol Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Finch, H & Lewis, J 2003, Focus groups, qualitative research practice: a guide 
for social science students and researchers, Sage Publications, London. 
Franceschet, S & Piscopo, J 2008, ‘Gender quotas and women’s substantive 
representation: lessons from Argentina’, Politics and Gender, vol. 4, no.3 
pp.393-425. 
Freidenvall, L 2006, ‘The Nordic countries: an incremental model’ in D. 
Dahlerup (ed.), Women, quotas and politics, New York, Routledge, pp. 55-82. 
Galligan, Y 2013, ‘Bringing women in: global strategies for gender parity in 
political representation’, University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, 
Gender and Class, vol. 6, no. 2, pp.1-19. 
Gerung, R 2009, ‘Politik perempuan vs putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi’ Jurnal 
Perempuan, vol. 63, pp.103-112. 
Goetz, A. M 2002, ‘No shortcuts to power: constraints on women's political 
effectiveness in Uganda’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 4, no. 40, pp. 
549-575.  
Goetz, A. M et al. 2008, ‘Progress of the world's women 2008/2009: who 
answers to women: gender & accountability,’ UNIFEM, viewed on 10 June 
 221 
2009.http://www.unifem.org/progress/2008/media/POWW08_Report_Full_Text.
pdf. 
Gabriela Women’s Party (GWP) 2013, About us, viewed on 3 May 2013, 
www.gabrielawomensparty.net. 
Harding, S 1987, Feminism and methodology, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington. 
Haris, S (ed.), 1998, Menggugat pemilihan umum Orde Baru, Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, Jakarta.  
Hidayat, S 2009, ‘Money politics and the dangers of “informal governance” 
practices’, in Erb, M & Sulistiyanto, P (eds.), Deepening democracy in 
Indonesia: Direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada), ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 
125-146. 
Hillman, B 2010, ‘Political parties and post-conflict transition: the results and 
implications of the 2009 parliamentary elections in Aceh’, Policy Papers, Centre 
for Democratic Institutions, Canberra.  
Hinojosa, M 2012, ‘Mexico: Más Mujeres? Mexico's Mixed-member electoral 
System,’ in M. Tremblay (ed.),Women and legislative representation: Electoral 
systems, political parties, and sex quotas, Palgrave MacMillan, New York. 
Htun, M 2005, ‘Women, political parties and electoral systems in Latin America’ 
in Ballington, J & Karam, A (eds.), Women in parliament: beyond numbers, 
Stockholm, International IDEA. 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) 2013, Enam parpol diduga memanipulasi 
dana kampanye, viewed on 3 March 2013, 
http://www.antikorupsi.org/new/index.php?option=com_content&view…asi-
laporan-dana-kampanye&catid=42:rokstories&Itemid=106&lang=id  
International IDEA 2003, ‘Strengthening women’s political participation in 
Indonesia’, International IDEA, Stockholm. 
International IDEA 2009, ‘Quota project: global database of quotas for women’, 
Stockholm University, International IDEA & IPU. 
International IDEA 2011, Voters turn out, viewed on 23 May 2011 
www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm. 
International IDEA 2011, Overview, viewed on 2 August 2011, 
http://www.idea.int/about/index.cfm. 
International IDEA 2013, Political finance, viewed on 15 November 2013 
http://www.idea.int/political-finance.  
International IDEA 2014 ‘Electoral gender quotas - a major electoral reform’, 
viewed on 23 October 2014, http://www.idea.int/publications/atlas-of-electoral-
gender-quotas/upload/Atlas-on-Electoral-Gender-Quotas_3.pdf. 
 222 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2008, ‘Equality in politics: A survey of women 
and men in parliaments’, Geneva. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2011, Indonesian electoral system, viewed on 2 
February 2011, www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2147_B.htm. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2014, Women in national parliament, viewed in 
4 October 2014, pp. 2-14. 
Ishiyama, J 2003, ‘Women’s parties in post-communist politics’, East European 
Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 266-304. 
Ismail, M 2013, ‘Megawati dari wapres ke RI 1’, Tempo, viewed on 8 May 2013, 
http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/profil/prof-megawatisoekarnop.html. 
James, F & Fontana, A 2003, ‘The group interview in social research’, in D. 
Morgan (ed.), Successful focus groups: advancing the state of art, Newbury 
Park, Sage publication, pp. 20-34. 
Jones, M 2006, ‘Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women: 
evidence from the Latin American Vanguard’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 
42, no. 1, pp. 56-81. 
Kalyanamitra 2013, Sejarah Kalyanamitra, viewed on 13 October 2013, 
www.kalyanamitra.or.id/tentang-kami/sejarah. 
Kang, Konate, & Morna 2006, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: on the fast track to women's 
political representation,’ in D. Dahlerup (ed.), Women, quotas and politics, New 
York, Routledge, pp.112-137. 
Karan, K, Gimeno, J & Tandoc, E ‘The internet and mobile technologies in 
Elections campaigns: the Grabriela women’s party during the 2007 Philippines 
Elections’, Journal of Information and Technology & Politics, vol. 6, pp. 326-339. 
Katjasungkana, N 2002, ‘Quota 30% adalah hak perempuan’, in Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia, Tindakan khusus sementara: menjamin keterwakilan 
perempuan, Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta, pp. iii-vii. 
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI) (nd), Report on the Indonesian women’s 
congress 14-17 December 1998, Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI) 1999, ‘Agenda politik Koalisi Perempuan 
Indonesia untuk Keadilan dan Demokrasi dan harapan kepada partai politik,’ 
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI) 2001, ‘Raih jumlah yang imbang antara laki-
laki dan perempuan dalam lembaga pengambilan keputusan’, Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia 2002, ‘Tindakan khusus sementara: menjamin 
keterwakilan perempuan’, Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta. 
 223 
Komisi Nasional Perlindungan Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM) 2012, 
Pemenuhan hak sipil dan politik dalam Pemilu 2009, viewed on 26 August 
2012, http://www.komnasham.go.id/. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) 2009, Jumlah caleg, kursi, dan dapil pada 
Pemilu, www.mediacentre.kpu.go.id/images/mediacentre. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) 2010, Laporan dana kampanye partai Pemilu 
2009, viewed on 8 May 2012, http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) 2011, Contoh surat suara, viewed on 12 April 
2011, www.mediacentre.kpu.go.id/home/kpu7. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) 2013, Profile Komisi Pemilihan Umum, viewed 
on 27 August 2013, www.mediacentre.kpu.go.id/home/kpu7. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Yogyakarta Province 2009, ‘Daftar calon tetap 
Kota Yogyakarta’.  
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Yogyakarta Province 2009, ‘Daftar calon tetap 
Bantul.’  
Komnas Perempuan 2001, ‘Laporan tiga tahunan pertama Komisi Nasional Anti 
Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan. 
Komnas Perempuan, 2010, Gerakan perempuan perlu meredifinisi strategi, 
membuat pola baru, viewed on 6 October 2013, 
http://www.komnasperempuan.or.id/2010/05/yuniyanti-chuzaifah“gerakan-
perempuan-perlu-meredifinisi-strategi-membuat-pola-baru”/. 
Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Kowani), 1978 ‘Sejarah setengah abad pergerakan 
wanita Indonesia,’ Balai Pustaka, Jakarta. 
Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Kowani) 2011, Sejarah Kowani, viewed on 9 August 
2011, http://humaskowani.blogspot.com/p/sejarah.html. 
KPU and KPPA 2015, Kesepakatan bersama antara Kementrian 
Pemberdayaan Perempuan dengan Komisi Pemilihan Umum, viewed on 31 
January 2015, http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/MoU%20KPU-
Kemen%20PPPA.pdf. 
Krook, M 2006, ‘Campaigns for candidate gender quotas: a new global 
women’s movement?’ paper presented at the Women’s Movements Worldwide: 
Flourishing or in Abeyance? Roundtable, International Political Science 
Association World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, July 9, 2006. 
Krook, M 2007 ‘Candidate gender quotas: a framework for analysis’, European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 46, pp. 367-394. 
Krook, M. 2009, ‘Quotas for women in politics: gender and candidate selection 
reform worldwide,’ New York, Oxford University Press. 
 224 
Kunovich, S 2012, ‘Unexpected winners: the significance of an open-list system 
on women’s representation in Poland’ Sociology Research, Paper 1 
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_sociology_research/1. 
Larsarud, S & Taphorn, R 2007, Designing for Equality: Best-fit, medium-fit and 
non-favourable combinations of electoral system and gender quotas, 
Stockholm, International IDEA. 
Lee, Mei 2007 ‘Does a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture?: the 
case of Indonesia’, Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, vol. 3 no.1, pp. 99- 
122. 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum untuk Perempuan (LBH APIK), 2014, Tentang kami, 
viewed on 13 October 2014, www.lbh-apik.or.id/tentang%20kami.htm. 
Lewis, J. & Ritchie (eds.) 2003, Qualitative research practice: a guide for social 
science students and researchers, Sage Publications, London. 
Lovenduski, J 2005, Feminizing politics, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Machmudi, Y 2006, Islamising Indonesia: The rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), doctoral thesis, Australian National University, 
Canberra, ANU Press, viewed on 2 March 2011, 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/islam_indo_citation.html. 
Mahfud, MD 2009, ‘The role of the Constitutional Court in the development of 
democracy in Indonesia’, paper presented at the World Conference on 
Constitutional Justice, Cape Town, January 23 – 24, 2009, viewed on 2 June 
2009, http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Papers/INA_Mahfud_E2.pdf. 
Mahkamah Konstitusi 2011, Sejarah pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi, 
viewed on 11 September 2011, 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilMK&id=1. 
Mahkamah Konstitusi 2013, Pendaftaran perkara, viewed on 4 April 2014, 
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/#. 
Marcoes, Lies 2002, ‘Women’s grassroots movement in Indonesia: a case study 
of PKK and Islamic Women,’ in K Robinson & S Bessell (eds.), Women in 
Indonesia: Gender, equity, and development, ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 187-197. 
Martyn, E 2005,The women’s movement in Post-Colonial Indonesia: gender 
and nation in a new democracy, Routledge Curzon, New York.  
Masruchah 2009, ‘Partisipasi perempuan dalam politik Indonesia’, Jurnal 
Perempuan Indonesia, vol. 63, pp. 113-119. 
Matland, R 2002, ‘Enhancing women’s political participation: legislative 
recruitment and electoral systems’ in International IDEA, Women in parliament, 
viewed on 1 July 2009, http://www.idea.int. 
Matland, R 2004, ‘The Norwegian experience of gender quotas,’ paper 
presented at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
 225 
(IDEA)/CEE Network for Gender Issues Conference, Budapest, 22-23 October 
2004, viewed on 30 May 2011, www.idea.int/. 
Matland, R 2005, ‘Explaining women’s representation: the role of legislative 
recruitment & electoral systems’, paper presented at the UN Expert Group 
meeting on equal participation of women and men in decision-making 
processes, with particular emphasis on political participation and leadership,  24 
to 27 October 2005, viewed on 25 August 2009, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/eql-men/docs/EP.4_Matland.pdf. 
Matland, R 2006 ‘Enhancing women’s political participation: legislative 
recruitment and electoral systems,’ in Ballington, J & Karam, A (eds.) Women in 
Parliament: beyond numbers, Stockholm, International IDEA, pp. 93-110. 
McAllister, I & Studlar, Donley, 1991, ‘Political recruitment to the Australian 
Legislature: towards an explanation of women's eectoral disadvantages’, The 
Western Political Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 467-485.  
Mies, Maria 1991, ‘Women’s research or feminist research? The debate 
surrounding feminist science and methodology,’ in M. Fonow & J. Cook (eds.), 
Beyond methodology, Bloomington, Indiana Press, pp. 60-84. 
Mietzner, M 2008, ‘Comparing Indonesia’s party systems of the 1950s and the 
post-Suharto era: from centrifugal to centripetal inter-party competition’, Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 431-453.  
Mochtar, Y 2000, ‘Gerakan perempuan dan politik gender Orde Baru’. Jurnal 
Perempuan, no.14, pp. 6-13. 
Morgan, D 1997, Focus groups as qualitative research, Sage Publications, 
London. 
Muhammadong, N 2003, ‘Menimbang Tap MPRS No XXV/MPRS/1966’, 
Kompas, 15 September 2003. 
Murray, R 2013, ‘Towards parity democracy? Gender in the 2012 French 
legislative elections’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 66, pp. 197-212. 
Myakayaka-Manzini, M 2004 ‘Political party quotas in South Africa’ paper 
presented at the International IDEA- EISA-SADC Parliamentary Forum 
Conference: the Implementation of quotas: African experiences, 11-12 
November 2003, Pretoria, viewed on 14 November 2013, 
http://www.quotaproject.org/CS/CS_South_Africa_Manzini-final2-6-2004.pdf. 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) 2003, Nominating for change: strengthening 
women’s position in political parties, NDI, Jakarta. 
Noerdin, E 2002, ‘Customary institutions, Syariah Law and the marginalisation 
of the Indonesian women’, in K Robinson and S Bessell (eds.) Women in 
Indonesia, gender equity and development, ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 179-186. 
Norris, P & Inglehart, R 2001 ‘Cultural obstacles to equal representation’ 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 3, pp.126-140. 
 226 
Palmer, B 2009, Purchasing power, viewed on 4 July 2013 
http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/purchasing-power. 
Pambudy, N 2003. Mengisi kuota 30 persen, Kompas.  
Pamungkas, S 2009, Perihal Pemilu, Univesitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta 
Parawansa, K 2004, ‘Enhancing women’s political participation in Indonesia,’ in 
Ballington, J & Karam, A (eds.), Women in Parliament beyond numbers, 
International IDEA, Stockholm, pp. 82-90. 
Patton, M 2001, Qualitative research & evaluation methods, Sage Publications 
Inc., London. 
Pelita 2014, Hanya dua caleg yang raih BPP, viewed on 5 May 2014, 
http://www.pelita.or.id. 
Perludem 2015, Mendorong afirmasi Perempuan, KPU dan KPPA 
Tandatangani MoU, viewed on 20 February 2015, 
http://perludem.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=758:mendorong-
afirmasi-perempuan-kpu-dan-kppa-tandatangani-mou&Itemid=122. 
Peschard, J 2002, 'The quotas system in Latin America: general overview', 
International IDEA.  
PKS Kota Tangerang 2011, Fatwa Dewan Syariah, viewed on 2 February 2011, 
http://pks-kotatangerang.org. 
Powley, E 2005, 'Rwanda: women hold up half the Parliament', in Ballington, J 
& Karam, A, Women in Parliament: beyond numbers, Stockholm, International 
IDEA, pp.154- 163.  
Quota Project 2009, South Africa, viewed on 2 November 2009, 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?id=246. 
Quota Project 2014, Columbia, viewed on 1 November 2014 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=48. 
Quota Project 2014, Kenya, viewed on 1 November 2014 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=4. 
Quota Project 2014, Quotas in African countries, viewed on 1November 2014, 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/search.cfm#. 
Reilly, B. 2007, 'Democratization and electoral reform in the Asia-Pacific region: 
is there an "Asian Model" of democracy?’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 
40, no. 11, pp. 1350-1371. . 
Reinharz, S 1992, Feminist method in social research, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Reynolds, A, Reilly, B & Ellis, A 2008, Electoral system design: the new 
International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm, International IDEA. 
 227 
Robinson, K & Bessell, S 2002, 'Introduction to the issues', in K Robinson, S 
Bessell (eds.), Women in Indonesia: gender equity and development, ISEAS, 
Singapore, pp.1-12. 
Robinson, K 1999, ‘Women: difference versus diversity,’ in D. Emmerson (ed.), 
Indonesia beyond Soeharto, policy economy society transition, New York, pp. 
237-261. 
Robinson, K 2009, 'Islam, gender, and politics in Indonesia', in L Edwards and 
M Roces (eds.), Women in Asia: women and political power, Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group, New York, pp. 292-306. 
Rochiati 1983, Dewi Sartika, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 
Jakarta. 
Romli, L 2004, Evaluasi Pemilu 2004 analisis proses dan hasil pemilu 
legislative, LIPI, Jakarta. 
Sadli, S 2002 ‘Surat Terbuka Bagi Wakil Rakyat’, Kompas, 18 November 2002, 
viewed on 27 June 2009, http://www.kompas.com/kompas-
cetak/0211/18/opini/sura36.htm.  
Salim, R 2004, ‘Soal hak bekas anggota PKI’, Kompas, 4 March 2004. 
Satriyo, H. 2010, 'Pushing the boundaries: women in direct local elections and 
local government,' in Aspinall, Ed & Mietzner, M (eds.), Problems of 
democratisation in Indonesia, Singapore, ISEAS, pp. 242-263. 
Sawer, M and Simms, M 1993, A woman’s place: women and politics in 
Australia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
Sawer, M 2004, 'Why women support women: Emily's List and the substantive 
representation of women in Australia', paper presented at the Australasian 
Political Studies Association Conference, 29 September - 1 October 2004, 
Adelaide. 
Sawer, M 2010, 'Women and elections', in Le Duc L, Niemi, R & Norris, P 
(eds.), Comparing democracies 3: elections and voting in the 21st Century, 
London, Sage Publications Inc., pp. 202-285. 
Scaffer, F 2005, Clean elections and the great unwashed: vote buying and voter 
education in the Philippines, viewed on 6 April 2013, 
https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/paper21.pdf.  
Schmidt, G 2003, 'Unanticipated successes: lessons from Peru’s experiences 
with gender quotas in Majoritarian Closed List and Open List PR systems' paper 
presented atThe implementation of quotas: Latin American Experiences 
workshop, 23-24 February, Lima.  
Schmidt, G 2012, ‘Success under Open List PR: the election of women to 
congress,’ in Tremblay, M (ed.), Women and legislative representation: electoral 
system, political parties and sex quotas, New York, Palgrave and Macmillan, 
pp. 155-167. 
 228 
Schöpp-Schilling, H. B 2005, 'The role of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its monitoring procedures for 
achieving gender equality in political representation,' in Ballington, J & Binda F, 
The implementation of quotas: European experiences.. International IDEA, 
Stockholm, pp. 130-136. 
Sherlock, S 2004, The 2004 Indonesian elections: how the system works and 
what parties stand for: a report on political parties, Centre for Democratic 
Institutions, Canberra, viewed on 12 April 2012, 
archives.cap.anu.edu.au/cdi_anu...2004/.../Sherlock_DPR_2004.rtf. 
Sherlock, S 2006, ‘Indonesia’s regional representative assembly: democracy, 
representation and the region: a report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah 
(DPD)’, Policy Papers, Centre for Democratic Institutions, Canberra. 
Sherlock, S 2009, 'Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: The new electoral system and 
the competing parties', Policy Papers, Centre for Democratic Institutions, 
Canberra. 
Sineau, M. 2012, 'France: the single-member district system: the hidden bonus 
for notables,' in M. Tremblay (ed.), Women and legislative representation: 
electoral systems, political parties, and sex quotas, Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York, pp. 84-92. 
Siregar, W 2006, 'Political parties, electoral system and women's representation 
in the 2004-2009 Indonesian parliaments', Policy Papers, Centre for Democratic 
Institutions, Canberra. 
Siregar, W 2007, Gaining representation in parliament: a study of the struggle of 
Indonesian women to increase their numbers in the national, provincial and 
local parliaments in the 2004 elections, doctoral thesis, Australian National 
University, Canberra.  
Sjarifudin, N 2009, ‘Peningkatan keterwakilan perempuan: keniscayaan untuk 
sebuah perubahan,’ Jurnal Perempuan, vol. 63, pp.12-29. 
Snape, D & Spencer, L 2003 'The foundations of qualitative research,' in 
Ritchie, J & Lewis J, Qualitative research practice: a guide for social science 
students and researchers, London, Sage Publications. 
Soetjipto, A 2011, Politik harapan: perjalanan politik perempuan Indonesia 
Pasca Reformasi, Tangerang, Marjin Kiri. 
Special Minister of State (SMOS) 2012, Appointment of the Australian Electoral 
commissioner, viewed on 29 August 2012, www.smos.gov.au. 
Stanley, L & Wise, S 1990,’ Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist 
research processes,’ in L. Stanley (ed.), Feminist praxis, Routledge, London, 
pp. 20-60.  
Supriyanto, D 2010, Perempuan dan politik pasca Orde Baru: Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia dan gerakan peningkatan keterwakilan perempuan di 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (1998-2009), master thesis, University of Indonesia, 
Jakarta. 
 229 
Suryadinata, L 1997, ‘Democratization and political succession in Suharto's 
Indonesia’, Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 269-280.  
Suryakusuma, J 1996, ‘The state and sexuality in Indonesia’, in L Sears (ed.), 
Fantasizing the feminine in Indonesia, Duke University Press, Durham, pp. 92-
119. 
Suryakusuma, J 1999, Almanak Parpol Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Suryochondro, S 1984, Potret Pergerakan Wanita di Indonesia, PT Rajawali, 
Jakarta. 
Tomm, W 1989, The effect of feminist approaches on research methodologies, 
Wilflied Laurier University Press, Waterloo. 
Transparency International 2013, Hakim konstitusi terpilih disahkan, baru 
pemilihan Ketua MK dilakukan, viewed on 3 March 2013, 
http://www.ti.or.id/index.php/press-release/2013/03/22/hakim-konstitusi-terpilih-
disahkan-baru-pemilihan-ketua-mk-dilakukan. 
Tremblay, M 2012, 'Introduction’. Women and legislative representation: 
electoral systems, political parties, and sex quotas, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, pp. 1-12. 
Trimurti, SK 1946,’Partai politik wanita’, Kedaulatan Rakjat, 29 August 1946. 
Tripp, A & Kang, A 2008, ‘The Global Impact of Quotas: on the fast track to 
increased female legislative representation’, Comparative Political studies, vol. 
41, no. 3, pp.338-361.   
Ufen, A 2007, ‘Political party and party system institutionalisation in Southeast 
Asia: a comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand,’ viewed on 12 
December 2013, www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers. 
United Nations, 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination 
against Women, viewed on 1 September 2010, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. 
United Nations 1995, Beijing Platform for Action, viewed 12 May 2009, from 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/. 
UN Women 1997, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 23: Political and 
Public Life, 16th session 1997. 
Usu, R 2010, Affirmative action in Indonesia: the gender quotas system in the 
2004 and 2009 Elections, Flinders Asia Centre Occasional Paper, viewed on 11 
October 2011, http://www.flinders.edu.au/sabs/fac/asiaonline/. 
Valiente, C 2012, 'Spain: women in parliament: the effectiveness of quotas,' in 
M. Tremblay (ed.), Women and legislative representation: electoral systems, 
political parties, and sex quotas, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, pp. 123-133. 
Vreede-de Stuers, C 2008, Sejarah perempuan Indonesia: gerakan dan 
pencapaian, Komunitas Bambu, Depok. 
 230 
Wanandi, J 2004, ‘The Indonesian general elections 2004’, Asia Pacific Review, 
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 115-131.  
Wardhani, S 2009, ‘Perjuangan menggagas kebijakan afirmatif bagi perempuan 
dalam UU Pemilu tahun 2008,’ Jurnal Perempuan, vol. 63, pp. 41-62. 
Wieringa, S 1999 ‘Reformasi, sexuality and communism in Indonesia’, paper 
presented at Conference on Sexuality and Human Rights, July 1999, 
Manchester. 
Wieringa, S 2003, ‘The birth of the new order state in Indonesia: sexual politics 
and nationalism’, Journal of Women’s History, vol. 15, no.1, pp.70-91. 
Yayasan Anissa Swasti (Yasanti) 2013, Profile Yasanti, viewed on 13 October 
2013, www.yasanti.or.id/content.php?id=7. 
Yogyakarta City Government, 2013, Profile of Yogyakarta City, viewed on 3 
October 2013, www.jogjakota.go.id. 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 
List of questions for one-on-one interviews and Focus Group Discussion 
1. Women candidates and women Member of Parliament 
a. Why did you run as a candidate in this election?  
b. How do you see yourself as a candidate? Do you think as a 
woman you have something different to offer?  
c. What are the reasons for your choice of political party? What was 
your main channel for becoming a member of a political party? 
How long have you been a member of your political party? 
d. What did you do to be placed in winnable position? 
e. What support was provided by your political party? Did you 
receive training from your political party? If not, did you receive 
training from elsewhere? 
f. Did you have a campaign manager? What were your campaign 
strategies?  
g. Did you campaign about women’s issues? If you did, what were 
your programs? 
h. Were you supported by women’s NGOs or women’s political 
caucus? 
i. Did your family support your candidacy?  In what ways? 
j. What is your opinion about the Constitutional Court’s decision? 
k. Did you change your campaign strategy after the Constitutional 
Court decision? If you did, please explain further? 
l. Financially do you think it is hard to get money for campaign? How 
much did you spend for your campaign? Do you think you would 
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spend less if there was no decision of the electoral victory 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court? 
m. What were the obstacles to running as a candidate? Were you 
treated differently from the male candidates?  
n. Based on your experiences, what are the main differences 
between the 2004 and 2009 elections? (For women who ran both 
in the 2004 and 2009 elections). 
 
2. Political party leaders 
a. What are your strategies or programs to attract more women to be 
members of your party? 
b. What is your opinion about gender quotas? 
c. Does your party have a program or strategy to increase women’s 
representation? If so, what are they? 
d. How did you recruit women to run as candidates for your party? 
e. What were the mechanisms in your party for making the party list? 
f. What are the criteria for placing candidates in electoral districts? 
g. Does your party have a women’s wing or branch? If so, what is its 
purpose? How effective is the branch/wing in supporting women’s 
participation in your political party? 
 
3. Members of the Electoral Commissions 
a. What are your opinions about women’s representation in 
parliament? 
b. According to you, what is the best electoral system to increase 
women’s representation? 
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c. What do you think about the 2009 election law, mainly about how 
to monitor the implementation of gender quotas in the party list? 
Do you think there should be strong sanctions for non 
compliance? Do you think the Electoral Commission should be 
given more power? 
 
4. Judge of the Constitutional Court 
a. What is your opinion about women’s representation in parliament? 
b. What do you think about women’s quotas? 
c. Why did you endorse the electoral victory formula from the 
placement on the party lists to the individual votes? 
 
5. Women activists  
a. Why is it important for women to be members of parliament? 
b. Why did you and your organisation campaign for quotas? 
c. How do you see the quotas campaign at the moment, do you think 
there are more organisations involved now compared to the 2004 
campaign?  
d. What are the roles of women’s movement at the local level in 
campaigning for quotas? 
e. What are the reasons for alternating women and men on the party 
lists? 
f. What are your opinions about the Constitutional Court’s 
endorsement? 
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g. What are the programs or strategies of your organisation to 
increase women’s representation in parliament? Do you have 
programs to support women candidates? 
h. What are future strategies to increase women’s representation in 
parliament? 
 
Focus Group Discussion       
Participants for the Focus Group discussion are different from participants on one 
on one interview with women candidates and women MPs.  
Questions for Focus group discussions for women candidates 
a. Why did you run as a candidate? 
b. Do you think as a woman you have something different to offer? 
c. What is your opinion about the Constitutional Court decision? 
d. How did you manage your campaign? Did you have a campaign manager? 
How much money did you spend? Do you think you would have spent less 
money if there was no Constitutional Court decision? 
e. Did your family support you? In what way?  
f. What are the main obstacles to winning seats? 
g. Did you receive support from any women’s groups? What were they? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
